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CRIMINAL PROSECUTION IN AMERICAN HISTORY: PRIVATE OR
PUBLIC?
JONATHAN BARTH†
There is a great deal of confusion and mystery surrounding the history of the
office of the public prosecutor in early America. Some legal scholars assert that
private prosecution all but disappeared by the eighteenth century; others say that
private prosecution disappeared at the ratification of the Constitution; still others
claim that it disappeared around the second quarter of the nineteenth century. In
this article, I aim to clarify our historical understanding of the institution, tracing
the origins and evolution of American prosecution. Among other things, the question has vast implications for today’s legal debate over the proper role of the victim in criminal prosecution. This article demonstrates that early Americans utilized a hybrid system of criminal prosecution through at least the middle of the
nineteenth century. The frequency of public prosecution undoubtedly increased,
though gradually, in the decades leading up to the mid-nineteenth century. Nevertheless, private prosecution remained a core tenet of American criminal justice
for much longer than many legal theorists realize and was certainly still common
at the framing of the Constitution.
I. INTRODUCTION
A great deal of confusion and mystery surrounds the history of American
criminal prosecution. This is particularly true of our understanding of the evolution of the office of the public prosecutor. To what extent did private prosecution
survive the early colonial period in what later became the United States? Some
legal scholars insist that private prosecution all but disappeared by the eighteenth
century; others say that private prosecution disappeared around the ratification of
the Constitution; still others claim that it disappeared around the second quarter of
the nineteenth century.1 Professor William F. McDonald tells us that the onset of
public prosecution in America, together with the role of the victim in the prosecution of criminal cases, is remarkably “difficult to trace,” and its historical development remains, for the most part, an unresolved “puzzle,” having “received only
limited scholarly treatment.”2
Copyright © 2022. All rights reserved by Jonathan Barth and the South Dakota Law Review.
† Jonathan Barth is Associate Professor of History at Arizona State University. His first book, THE CURRENCY OF EMPIRE: MONEY AND POWER IN SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY ENGLISH AMERICA, was published
with Cornell University Press in 2021. He has also been published in numerous journals including T HE
WILLIAM AND MARY QUARTERLY, THE JOURNAL OF POLICY HISTORY, and THE NEW ENGLAND QUARTERLY.
1. See generally William F. McDonald, Towards a Bicentennial Revolution in Criminal Justice:
The Return of the Victim, 13 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 649 (1976) (discussing the history of private prosecution).
2. Id. at 659-61.
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Such an extraordinary gap in the historical record, nevertheless, has not prevented most legal historians from tacitly assuming that private prosecution—if it
survived at all in America beyond the mid-eighteenth century—was a virtual dead
letter by the dawn of the nineteenth century.3 “Public prosecutions began to replace the system of private prosecutions long before the colonies gained their independence,” writes Professor John D. Bessler;4 “by the advent of the American
Revolution,” legal historian Joan E. Jacoby argues, “private prosecution had been
virtually eliminated in the American colonies.”5 The question of the origins of
public prosecution in America bears enormous implications for today’s debate
over victims’ rights. Supporters of the Crime Victims’ Rights Act of 2004
(“CVRA”) generally espouse the view that victim participation in criminal prosecution was more prolific at the framing of the Constitution than it is today.6 Opponents of the CVRA, on the other hand, typically assert that private prosecution
had almost completely disappeared in criminal proceedings by the time of the nation’s founding.7
3. See, e.g., JOAN E. JACOBY, THE AMERICAN PROSECUTOR: A SEARCH FOR IDENTITY 13-19, 3637 (1980) (claiming that private prosecution had been virtually eliminated in the colonies by the time of
the American Revolution); Andrew Sidman, The Outmoded Concept of Private Prosecution, 25 AM. U.
L. REV. 754, 762-63 (1976) (discussing the evolution of public prosecution in the United States, especially
Virginia); John D. Bessler, The Public Interest and the Unconstitutionality of Private Prosecutors, 47
ARK. L. REV. 511, 516-17 (1994) (observing that by the time colonies gained independence, a system of
public prosecution had largely replaced private prosecution); Juan Cardenas, The Crime Victim in the
Prosecutorial Process, 9 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 357, 368-71 (1986) (noting that by 1643 Virginia had
appointed an attorney general to initiate prosecutions, and various others had established officers akin to
a sheriff and public prosecutor); Robert M. Ireland, Privately Funded Prosecution of Crime in the Nineteenth-Century United States, 39 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 43, 43 (1995) (observing that by 1820 most states
had instated offices that served the purposes of public prosecution); Jack M. Kress, Progress and Prosecution, 423 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 99, 105 (1976) (explaining that the modern criminal
justice system in the United States evolved from public prosecution); BRUCE L. BENSON, TO SERVE AND
PROTECT: PRIVATIZATION AND COMMUNITY IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 95-96 (1998) (noting that the prosecution system rapidly evolved from private to public in the original thirteen colonies, driven in part by an
effort to increase judicial revenue); ROSCOE POUND, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN AMERICA 117 (Harvard Univ.
Press 1945) (concluding that the legal history of the United States criminal justice system began largely
after the American Revolution). But see ALLEN STEINBERG, THE TRANSFORMATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PHILADELPHIA, 1800-1880, at 5-7 (1989) (asserting that in the United States, and particularly in
Philadelphia, the legal system was rooted in private prosecutions); Stephanie A.J. Dangel, Is Prosecution
a Core Executive Function? Morrison v. Olson and the Framers’ Intent, 99 YALE L.J. 1069, 1071-75
(1990) (noting that only five of the original thirteen constitutions provided for a state attorney general, and
only Connecticut mentioned a local prosecutor); William F. McDonald, The Role of the Victim in America,
in ASSESSING THE CRIMINAL: RESTITUTION, RETRIBUTION, AND THE LEGAL PROCESS 295-98 (Randy E.
Barnett & John Hagel III eds., 1977) (arguing that in colonial America, while criminal prosecutions were
brought in the name of the state, the state did not play an active role or have a vested interest) [hereinafter
McDonald, Role of Victim]; Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., Delegation of the Criminal Prosecution Function to
Private Actors, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 411, 421-22 (2009) (asserting that private prosecution remained
prominent in the United States well into the nineteenth century).
4. Bessler, supra note 3, at 516.
5. JACOBY, supra note 3, at 19.
6. Rachel King, Why a Victims’ Rights Constitutional Amendment is a Bad Idea: Practical Experiences from Crime Victims, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 357, 366-68 (2000).
7. See, e.g., Paul G. Cassell, Barbarians at the Gates? A Reply to the Critics of the Victims’ Rights
Amendment, 1999 UTAH L. REV. 479, 526 n.251 (discussing the potential for a private prosecution to
violate another’s rights through the Thirteenth Amendment); King, supra note 6, at 366-68 (stating criminal law at the time of the country’s founding was a mix of public and private prosecution with movement
towards public prosecution); Erin C. Blondel, Victims’ Rights in an Adversary System, 58 DUKE L.J. 237,
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There is no reason at all for such ambiguity and acute, factual disagreements
to persist in today’s legal debate over the proper role of the victim in criminal
prosecution. This article aims to clarify our historical understanding of the institution of the prosecutor, tracing, very carefully, the origins and evolution of American prosecution. This article incontrovertibly demonstrates that early Americans,
from the colonial period through at least the middle of the nineteenth century, if
not a few decades beyond, utilized a hybrid system of criminal prosecution. The
frequency of public prosecution—the ratio of public to private prosecutions—undoubtedly increased from the early eighteenth century to the mid-nineteenth century, albeit gradually. Nevertheless, private prosecution remained a core tenet of
American criminal justice for much longer than many legal theorists realize, and
it certainly remained prolific at the time of the framing of the Constitution.
This article begins with a description of the origins of the adversarial system
in England and then carefully investigates the prosecutorial system in colonial
America in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, continuing onward to the
early national period, nineteenth and twentieth centuries, to the passing of the
CVRA in 2004. Finally, I conclude with an analysis of the current debate and a
proposal on how to return the United States to a hybrid system of criminal prosecution for the twenty-first century.
II. BACKGROUND
A. THE ENGLISH ADVERSARIAL SYSTEM
Many of the English migrants who settled in North America in the seventeenth century left their home country because they wished to improve upon or
discard the many social, political, religious, and economic orders of the Old
World. They wished to start afresh in a land where they might possess greater
opportunity, individually and collectively, to mold a new society after their own
particular liking. It should come as no surprise, however, that most, if not all, of
the same immigrants—yearning for the comforts of familiarity amid the vastly
unfamiliar—imported, simultaneously, a vast array of ideas from the Old World.
They brought with them, in many cases, traditional notions of criminal justice,
dating all the way back to the High Middle Ages.8
After the fall of the western half of the Roman Empire in the fifth century,
criminal justice became a matter largely between the victim and the offender.9
Criminal justice in the early Middle Ages was a wholly private system of sanction
and vengeance; it was fraught with many of the problems that we might naturally
expect from a world largely absent of third-party arbiters, not to mention formal

247 (2008) (suggesting that, in the Bill of Rights, the government is considered the defendant’s adversary
in criminal proceedings).
8. Lynne N. Henderson, The Wrongs of Victim’s Rights, 37 STAN. L. REV. 937, 940-42 (1985).
9. Id. at 938-39.
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juries and courts.10 Yet as the Middle Ages proceeded, and as the English nationstate gradually consolidated and augmented power, a more regular and organized
judicial system evolved in England, founded upon the ancient premises of common law, but in which the state became closely wrapped up in law enforcement.11
State administrators in the Middle Ages increasingly believed that the criminal
offender, besides wronging the victim, had also violated the king’s peace, threatening the sovereignty of his Majesty’s government.12 The formal commission of
the Justice of the Peace (“JP”) first appeared in the thirteenth century, having
evolved from King Richard I’s authorizing a survey of knights to keep the peace
within certain turbulent areas in the country.13 By the late fourteenth century, the
function of the JPs included powers to arrest any persons suspected of criminal
activity.14 The apprehension of suspected offenders was no longer the sole responsibility of the victim, family, or neighborhood, though private persons still
legally and frequently engaged in powers of arrest.15
By the mid-sixteenth century, the functions of the JP expanded to include the
binding over of witnesses to the king’s court, active investigations of the most
serious crimes, and occasional prosecutorial assistance when requested by the victim.16 Even so, under common law, crime in England remained a matter between
victim and offender.17 The State certainly had an interest in criminal justice; its
interest, however, was not as the prosecutor, but as the neutral arbiter or umpire,
under an adversarial system of plaintiff versus defendant.18 Indeed, the typical JP
preferred not to prosecute at trial at all, leaving this duty rather to the victim.19
This was no dereliction of duty; on the contrary, English subjects preferred the
system to operate this way: the JP was a Crown-appointed officer, and the English
were extraordinarily jealous of a royal power that might abuse its prosecutorial
role to persecute perceived enemies of the state.20
Private prosecution in England was thus the default position in the early modern period. It avoided the pitfalls of Crown-directed prosecutions, while also functioning as a civilized substitute for the older, unregulated system of purely private
vengeance, where victims had formerly acted as judge, jury, and executioner.21
Under private prosecution, the victim—after having consulted the JP—possessed
the burden of presenting a convincing case before a neutral, third-party arbiter:
10. Erin Ann O’Hara, Victim Participation in the Criminal Process, 13 J.L. & POL’Y 229, 235
(2005).
11. Henderson, supra note 8, at 940.
12. Id. at 938-40.
13. POUND, supra note 3, at 86-87.
14. A.J. Musson, Sub-Keepers and Constables: The Role of Local Officials in Keeping the Peace in
Fourteenth-Century England, 470 ENG. HIST. REV. 1, 3-4 (2002).
15. POUND, supra note 3, at 107.
16. BENSON, supra note 3, at 198-213; POUND, supra note 3, at 86-87, 90, 107.
17. POUND, supra note 3, at 86-87, 90, 107.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Cardenas, supra note 3, at 361; BENSON, supra note 3, at 222-23; POUND, supra note 3, at 87;
Kress, supra note 3, at 100.
21. Kress, supra note 3, at 101.
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first, to the grand jury (consisting of private citizens, determining whether or not
criminal charges should proceed), and then, to the state-run court, operated by the
State because the king had an interest in preserving the peace.22 If the prosecution
was overzealous, deceitful, or malicious, the grand jury or the court would effectively check the accuser by acquitting the accused.23 If the judge, on the contrary,
found the defendant guilty—of larceny, for instance—restitution was the chief
mode of punishment, with the State receiving its due portion and the victim the
other.24
No doubt the State still played a vital and significant role in criminal justice
in early modern England. Besides running the court system, and aside from the
expanding role of JPs, the Crown retained several prosecutorial prerogatives. For
the most serious crimes, victims led and organized the prosecution in the name of
the Crown; though here, to be clear, a private party still initiated, conducted, and
controlled the actual prosecution itself.25 Prosecuting in the name of the Crown
was largely symbolic but not unimportant. The State also interpreted certain antisocietal or political crimes without any clear-cut victim as a violation of the individual right of the king, and so the king, as “victim,” proceeded directly with criminal charges, prosecuted by the king’s attorney—the attorney general—who acted
as a “private” citizen.26 This was an important and frequently exercised prerogative. Most important of all was the attorney general’s right, on behalf of the king,
to intervene and put a stop to any private prosecution.27 Upon the attorney general
issuing a writ of nolle prosequi, the private prosecution immediately terminated
without any further inquiry from the court (nolle prosequi means “unwilling to
pursue” and is sometimes shortened to “nol. pros.”).28 The nol. pros. prerogative
had existed since the sixteenth century, occasionally utilized by the attorney general to interrupt a frivolous or chimerical prosecution.29
Even so, despite these regal prerogatives, the victim always retained the right
to initiate proceedings, and this alone distinguished the English system from other
competing Continental systems in Europe.30 European use of the inquisitorial
system—in contrast to the adversarial system—necessitated, by its very nature, a
public prosecution.31 Under the inquisitorial system, the court, rather than acting
as a neutral arbiter, actively administers the case, with the judge and court appointees initiating proceedings, investigating the crime, collecting evidence, calling

22.
23.
24.

POUND, supra note 3, at 87-89.
Cardenas, supra note 3, at 362.
Leslie Sebba, The Victim’s Role in the Penal Process: A Theoretical Orientation, 30 AM. J.
COMPAR. L. 217, 227-28 (1982); O’Hara, supra note 10, at 235; Dangel, supra note 3, at 1071.
25. Cardenas, supra note 3, at 361.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 365.
29. McDonald, supra note 1, at 659-60; ABRAHAM S. GOLDSTEIN, THE PASSIVE JUDICIARY: PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION AND THE GUILTY PLEA 12 (1981); POUND, supra note 3, at 107.
30. See, e.g., Pendleton Howard, Criminal Prosecution in England, 29 COLUM. L. REV. 715, 71617 (1929) (distinguishing the English prosecutorial system from others in Europe).
31. Kress, supra note 3, at 102.

BarthFINAL(third sub. edits_J.) (Do Not Delete)

124

SOUTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

8/21/2022 3:37 PM

[Vol. 67

witnesses, and constructing the case against the accused.32 The public prosecutor
in Continental Europe possessed the exclusive right to criminally prosecute;
France established the position of procureur publique around the fifteenth century.33 In much of continental Europe, in criminal prosecutions, the interests of
society overrode the interests of the victim, distinguishing it dramatically from
English common law.34
B. SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY COLONIAL AMERICA
Not surprisingly, the first English colonists who settled in North America
closely mirrored criminal justice norms in England, with minor variations. Because the custom of private prosecution derived from English common law, the
various colonial governments—with the exception of West and East Jersey, as
detailed below—did not feel any need to proactively or explicitly write the practice into law. Private prosecution was simply the accepted practice, and that was
that.
The most important variation from the English system, at first, was purely
practical. The colonial population was much smaller than the numbers in England,
and so government activity was often streamlined and conducted by fewer officials.35 In early colonial Virginia, for instance, the governor, council, and members of the house of burgesses adjudicated criminal cases in simple government
tribunals.36 In 1643, the Virginia governor established the colony’s first attorney
general, whose duties closely patterned those of the king’s attorney general in
England.37 The Virginia attorney general only prosecuted cases of sedition
against the colony or England;38 he was neither required to be present at court for
criminal cases, nor was he required to live in the capital at Williamsburg, the seat
of the colonial court.39
The victim was the plaintiff in most criminal cases in early colonial Virginia,
with courts issuing the writ and summons for witnesses, jurors, and for the accused.40 As in England, the Virginia executive (the governor) appointed all JPs,
and colonial JPs took a nearly-identical oath to that taken by JPs in England, bearing instructions “to doe [sic] all such things” as are “done by justices of the peace

32.
33.
34.
35.

Id.
Cardenas, supra note 3, at 371.
Blondel, supra note 7, at 241-42; Kress, supra note 3, at 102-03.
2 U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES, COLONIAL
TIMES TO 1970, at 1168 (1975).
36. JACOBY, supra note 3, at 12.
37. Id. at 13.
38. Cardenas, supra note 3, at 369; BENSON, supra note 3, at 95.
39. JACOBY, supra note 3, at 13.
40. 3 WILLIAM WALLER HENING, THE STATUTES AT LARGE; BEING A COLLECTION OF ALL THE
LAWS OF VIRGINIA, FROM THE FIRST SESSION OF THE LEGISLATURE IN THE YEAR 1619, at 287-303 (1823)
[hereinafter 3 HENING].
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there.”41 The JP’s commission in early colonial Virginia stated explicitly that in
criminal cases both the plaintiff and defendant were private parties; the role of the
JP was simply to uphold the laws of England and Virginia and “to keepe [sic]
records, of all judgments, orders, and other matters of moment.”42
The statute books from seventeenth-century Virginia contain numerous references to private attorneys prosecuting on behalf of the victim.43 Prosecution
was a matter solely “between attornie [sic] and his client,” and after 1666, convicted offenders had to “defray the charge” incurred by the victim in financing the
prosecution.44 One of the only references to public prosecution was a law in 1692
pertaining to slaves suspected of capital crimes, in which cases the governor commissioned a prosecutor “to cause the offender to be arraigned and indicted.”45
This new statute for a public prosecutor in Virginia was one of a series of laws
known as “slave codes,” designed to tighten the colony’s grip on the growing slave
population. The act responded to fears that the “extraordinary charge usually attending the tryalls [sic] of criminalls [sic]”—an allusion to private prosecutions—
might dissuade slaveowners and private attorneys from effectively prosecuting recalcitrant slaves, a job more suitable for a public prosecutor.46 Nevertheless, most
prosecutions in early colonial Virginia remained privately initiated and run.
New England colonists, like those in Virginia, also brought England’s common law tradition with them to America. The founders of Massachusetts Bay,
settled after 1628, arranged for JPs to keep the peace in the many rural towns that
sprouted up across the colony and “in all things to have like power that justices of
peace hath in England.”47 The same practice persisted after Massachusetts received a new royal charter in 1691: the governor appointed JPs, judges, sheriffs,
and constables to “duly execute all warrants,” but it nevertheless remained “in the
liberty of every plaintiff or defendant in any of the said courts”—including criminal courts—“to plead and defend his own cause in his own proper person, or with

41. 2 WILLIAM WALLER HENING, THE STATUTES AT LARGE; BEING A COLLECTION OF ALL THE
LAWS OF VIRGINIA, FROM THE FIRST SESSION OF THE LEGISLATURE IN THE YEAR 1619, at 70 (1823)
[hereinafter 2 HENING].
42. 1 WILLIAM WALLER HENING, THE STATUTES AT LARGE; BEING A COLLECTION OF ALL THE
LAWS OF VIRGINIA, FROM THE FIRST SESSION OF THE LEGISLATURE IN THE YEAR 1619, at 169 (1823)
[hereinafter 1 HENING].
43. See generally id. (showcasing cases with private attorney prosecution).
44. Id. at 419; 2 HENING, supra note 41, at 20. See also 1 HENING, supra note 42, at 273, 302
(discussing trial by jury and attorney ethics); 2 HENING, supra note 41, at 384 (discussing justice of the
peace behavioral standards).
45. 3 HENING, supra note 40, at 102-03.
46. Id. at 269.
47. 1 RECORDS OF THE GOVERNOR AND COMPANY OF THE MASSACHUSETTS BAY IN NEW ENGLAND 74 (Nathaniel B. Shurtleff ed., 1853). JPs were also appointed in New Hampshire and Rhode Island.
See 1 DOCUMENTS AND RECORDS RELATING TO THE PROVINCE OF NEW-HAMPSHIRE, FROM THE EARLIEST PERIOD OF ITS SETTLEMENT: 1623-1776, at 450 (Nathaniel Bouton ed., 1867-1873) (empowering JPs
to preside over certain civil actions); 3 RECORDS OF THE COLONY OF RHODE ISLAND AND PROVIDENCE
PLANTATIONS IN NEW ENGLAND 503 (John R. Bartlett ed., 1856-1862) (providing for the commissions
of JPs in Rhode Island).
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the assistance of such other as he shall procure.”48 The only limitation for a private prosecutor was that he neither be “scandalous nor otherwise offensive to the
court.”49
The court records of Essex County, Massachusetts—containing Salem, Ipswich, and Newbury—reveal an enormous number of criminal cases prosecuted
directly by private individuals. Murder charges were relatively rare in this courtroom, but assault and battery charges were common and prosecuted privately. In
1679, for instance, Robert Downer prosecuted a man named Stockman “[f]or striking him several blows at his own house, to the danger of the loss of one of his
eyes.”50 Four years earlier, in 1675, John Hathorne prosecuted John Gifford for
battery, and the convicted Gifford had to compensate Hathorne for prosecutorial
expenses.51 Besides assault and battery, Thomas Maule, in 1680, prosecuted
Zacheus Perkins for burglary, Perkins having broken into Maule’s shop and stolen
£250 worth of goods.52 The court records also include two instances of a private
prosecution in cases of rape. After William Nellson, in 1680, sexually violated
Mehittabell Anis—a girl under ten years old—her kinsman, Abraham Martyne,
prosecuted Nellson and secured a conviction.53 Thomas Knoulton, in 1670, prosecuted Laurence Clenton for violating his wife Mary Knoulton, and besides being
“severely whipped with twenty stripes well laid on,” Clenton had to pay Mr.
Knoulton for the costs of prosecution.54 Libel, slander, and forgery, too, were all
privately prosecuted and classified under criminal law, not civil law.55
Not all criminal cases in early Massachusetts Bay were privately prosecuted.
If the victim could not afford to prosecute the alleged offender, the government
offered to help. In 1680, for instance, Martha Stacy—daughter of Henry and Jane
Stacy—was “beaten black and blue, with many marks on her body, so that some
doctors despaired of her life.”56 The offender was known, but with the Stacy family “not having money to commence a suit against him for such a crime of high
abuse,” the county court appointed someone “to take evidence in the case.”57 Furthermore, if there was no surviving victim or family to prosecute, the government
48. 1 ACTS AND RESOLVES, PUBLIC AND PRIVATE, OF THE PROVINCE OF THE MASSACHUSETTS
BAY 72-79 (John H. Clifford et al. eds., 1869) [hereinafter 1 ACTS OF MASSACHUSETTS].
49. Id. at 287.
50. 7 RECORDS AND FILES OF THE QUARTERLY COURTS OF ESSEX COUNTY, MASSACHUSETTS 275
(George F. Dow ed., 1919) [hereinafter 7 MASSACHUSETTS RECORDS].
51. 6 RECORDS AND FILES OF THE QUARTERLY COURTS OF ESSEX COUNTY, MASSACHUSETTS 9
(George F. Dow ed., 1917) [hereinafter 6 MASSACHUSETTS RECORDS].
52. 7 MASSACHUSETTS RECORDS, supra note 50, at 364.
53. 8 RECORDS AND FILES OF THE QUARTERLY COURTS OF ESSEX COUNTY, MASSACHUSETTS 15
(George F. Dow ed., 1921) [hereinafter 8 MASSACHUSETTS RECORDS].
54. 4 RECORDS AND FILES OF THE QUARTERLY COURTS OF ESSEX COUNTY, MASSACHUSETTS 269
(George F. Dow ed., 1914).
55. See generally id. (describing a private prosecution for defamation); 6 MASSACHUSETTS RECORDS, supra note 51, at 9 (showcasing several cases involving private prosecution); 7 MASSACHUSETTS
RECORDS, supra note 50, at 364 (describing a private prosecution); 8 MASSACHUSETTS RECORDS, supra
note 53, at 1, 15 (describing private prosecutions and subsequent punishments); 1 ACTS OF MASSACHUSETTS, supra note 48, at 53 (describing a private prosecution).
56. 7 MASSACHUSETTS RECORDS, supra note 50, at 421.
57. Id.
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immediately stepped in to prosecute. In New Plymouth, for instance, the court
publicly prosecuted four English colonists “for murther [sic] & robbing” a Native
American named Penowanyauquis; the four men were promptly “hanged by the
neck until their bodyes [sic] were dead.”58
A public form of prosecution was also necessary for victimless crimes, and
there were many of them in colonial New England. A litany of moral crimes filled
the court record books; profanity, cursing, swearing, drunkenness, fornication,
sodomy, illegal gaming, idleness, and Sabbath-breaking were all classified as
criminal acts, requiring the observance of at least a single JP or two witnesses to
secure a conviction.59 Because of the lack of any obvious victim, the JP was responsible for committing the offender to jail.60 During trial, simple court procedures required no civil officer to either represent the government or to bring prosecution: the moral offender simply had to plead guilty or defend him or herself
before the judge; thus, even here, there was no public prosecutor as we know it
today.61 Remarkably, however, there were even a few cases in which a moral
crime could be prosecuted privately. If anyone, for example, observed a particular
individual exhibiting cruelty toward animals—“calves, sheep or lambs brought
alive to the market . . .”—the private witness “shall seiz[e] and prosecute for the
same . . . .”62
Other New England colonies likewise enacted the same prosecutorial norms,
with criminal trials conducted “according to the precedents of the law of England
as near as may be.”63 In Plymouth Colony in 1686, John Brandon prosecuted
Matthew Boomer, who “sundry times beat him . . .” and who also attempted to
coerce his wife Mary Brandon, “attempting by force to lye [sic] with her . . . .”64
The same day in court, the robber of a ship at the local wharf was prosecuted
directly by the vessel’s owner.65 Court records throughout colonial New England
were legion with private prosecutions of assault & battery, theft, and other offenses.66 The victim often, though not always, hired an attorney to represent him
or her in court; in 1644, for instance, Clement Campion hired John Barnes—
“Campions attorney”—to prosecute a man for stealing two of his oxen.67 There
58. 1 RECORDS OF THE COLONY OF NEW PLYMOUTH IN NEW ENGLAND 96-97 (Nathaniel B.
Shurtleff & David Pulsifer eds., 1855).
59. 1 ACTS OF MASSACHUSETTS, supra note 48, at 51-58.
60. Id. at 57.
61. JACOBY, supra note 3, at 13.
62. 1 ACTS OF MASSACHUSETTS, supra note 48, at 60.
63. PLYMOUTH COLONY CONST. art. 17 (1636).
64. 6 RECORDS OF THE COLONY OF NEW PLYMOUTH IN NEW ENGLAND 178 (Nathaniel B. Shurtleff
& David Pulsifer eds., 1856) [hereinafter 6 RECORDS OF NEW PLYMOUTH].
65. Id.
66. See generally 2 RECORDS OF THE COLONY OF NEW PLYMOUTH IN NEW ENGLAND (Nathaniel
B. Shurtleff & David Pulsifer eds., 1856) [hereinafter 2 RECORDS OF NEW PLYMOUTH] (containing court
orders from the Colony of New Plymouth between December 1640 and October 1651); 6 RECORDS OF
NEW PLYMOUTH, supra note 64 (containing court orders from the Colony of New Plymouth between
March 1678 and July 1691).
67. 2 RECORDS OF NEW PLYMOUTH, supra note 66, at 73. See also id. at 18, 24, 137 (listing instances where a private attorney represented a citizen in court); 6 RECORDS OF NEW PLYMOUTH, supra
note 64, at 178 (listing additional instances where a private attorney represented a citizen); 8 RECORDS OF
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was a single case in New Hampshire when the attorney general prosecuted an assault and battery case, but only because the accused had assaulted the Deputy
Governor and a member of “his Majesty’s Council”; in all other routine criminal
cases in early New Hampshire, “the plaintiff or his attorney” remained private.68
Some legal historians erroneously point to an action by the Connecticut Assembly in 1662 as evidence that the Connecticut colony established an early form
of public prosecution.69 In an extraordinary and temporary case, the Connecticut
legislature, in 1662, appointed William Pitkin “as Attourney [sic] for ye [sic]
Generll [sic] Court, to prsecute [sic] Thomas Ford, Senr, John Deming, Senr, Mrs
Lattimore and Thomas Hurlbut . . . .”70 This is all the information that we possess
on this case; we do not know why the four persons were prosecuted, and Pitkin’s
role as “Attourney [sic] for the Generall [sic] Court” does not appear again in the
record book. The lack of any further evidence on this matter has not prevented
some legal historians, however, from labeling Pitkin the first American public
prosecutor.71 The phrase “Attourney [sic] for the Generall [sic] Court” may explain their confusion, as many legal commentators today may not realize that
“General Court” was the name for the colonial legislature, not for the judiciary.
For whatever reason, the legislature needed a lawyer to prosecute these four individuals, and so they hired a private attorney, Pitkin, for this temporary need. The
colony did not even appoint JPs in each of its counties until 1698, and a Connecticut statute in 1686 confirmed that there were private “suits at law” for both criminal and civil actions.72 In 1704 the Connecticut Assembly established a formal
position of public prosecutor—a more permanent position than the one held by
Pitkin in 1662—and this will be addressed in the eighteenth-century section.73
Some legal historians also point to New York and New Jersey as having
adopted an exclusive system of public prosecution in the late seventeenth century.
These colonies acted heavily under the influence of Dutch law; until 1664, New
York and New Jersey were Dutch colonies, governed under the name New Netherland.74 Not surprisingly, the Dutch inquisitorial system of criminal justice was
THE COLONY OF NEW PLYMOUTH IN NEW ENGLAND 35, 56 (Nathaniel B. Shurtleff & David Pulsifer eds.,
1857) (listing instances where a private attorney represented a citizen); 11 RECORDS OF THE COLONY OF
NEW PLYMOUTH IN NEW ENGLAND 12, 251 (Nathaniel B. Shurtleff & David Pulsifer eds., 1861) (listing
additional instances where a private attorney represented a citizen).
68. 1 DOCUMENTS AND RECORDS RELATING TO THE PROVINCE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE FROM 1692
TO 1722, at 578-81 (Nathaniel Bouton ed., 1867). See also id. at 449-50, 465, 467, 485-86 (listing instances of assault and battery).
69. See 1 THE PUBLIC RECORDS OF THE COLONY OF CONNECTICUT, 388 (J. Hammond Trumbull
ed., Hartford, Brown & Parsons, 1850) (pointing to action taken during Connecticut Assembly in 1662).
70. Id.
71. JACOBY, supra note 3, at 16; W. Scott Van Alstyne, Jr., The District Attorney—A Historical
Puzzle, 1952 WIS. L. REV. 125.
72. 3 PUBLIC RECORDS OF THE COLONY OF CONNECTICUT, 1636-1776, at 414 (Charles J. Hoadly
ed., Hartford, Brown & Parsons, 1850); 4 PUBLIC RECORDS OF THE COLONY OF CONNECTICUT, 16361776, at 235-36 (Charles J. Hoadly ed., Hartford, Brown & Parsons, 1850) [hereinafter 4 RECORDS OF
CONNECTICUT].
73. 4 RECORDS OF CONNECTICUT, supra note 72, at 468.
74. Report of the Commissioners of the Colonie on the Delaware River, in 2 JOHN R. BRODHEAD,
DOCUMENTS RELATIVE TO THE COLONIAL HISTORY OF THE STATE OF NEW-YORK 165, 165 (E.B. O’Callaghan ed., 1858) [hereinafter 2 COLONIAL HISTORY OF NEW YORK].
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adopted by the first colonial court established in New Amsterdam in present-day
Manhattan.75 The Dutch colonial court included the Director-General of the colony, three magistrates, and a presiding officer called the schout.76 The schout
received criminal complaints from colonists, exercised limited powers of arrest,
and occasionally prosecuted criminal cases, presenting evidence in court against
the defendant.77 The prosecutorial services of the schout were only occasionally
utilized in colonial New Netherland.78 During one extended period, for instance,
a Dutch officer noted that “no criminal cases occurred in my time . . .” and that
the “direction and management of all business, both Civil and Criminal, have been
undertaken by the Director himself . . .”—the governor—not the schout.79 Regardless of who prosecuted the occasional criminal case, however, the judicial
procedures in New Netherland were very clearly distinct from that of the English
adversarial procedure. The question remains as to whether the colony retained
this particular system of criminal justice after New Netherland became New York
in 1664.
According to some legal historians, after 1664, the new position of sheriff in
New York retained the prosecutorial function of the former schout in New Netherland.80 Yet there is simply no evidence of this. On the contrary, the initial law
code in New York, adopted in June 1665, neither acknowledged the position of
schout nor assigned his role to the sheriff, but rather recognized private prosecution in “Actions of Assault or Battery,” with the JP, as in England, “Commit[ting]
to Prison such offenders.”81 The New York law code outlined that “the Plaintiffe
[sic]” could indeed be private; the role of “the Sheriffe [sic]” was not to ordinarily
prosecute, but “to Summon Witnesses” and to “issue forth any writte [sic] or warrant according to the Nature of the plaint,” brought about by the victim.82 The
only mention of a prosecutorial role for the sheriff was “if any poore [sic] person
not able to plead his owne [sic] Cause shall request the Court to Assigne [sic] him
the High Sheriffe [sic] . . . to plead for him . . . .”83 This implied, of course, that
if any victim could afford a private attorney—or was willing to plead his case
directly—he had the liberty to do so in a criminal case.84
The first sheriff of New York after the law code of 1665 was Allard Anthony,
and the records indicate that Anthony prosecuted only a very small number of
75. Van Alstyne, supra note 71, at 130.
76. Id. at 129-31; JACOBY, supra note 3, at 13-14.
77. Report of the Commissioners of the Colonie on the Delaware River, supra note 74, at 165; Van
Alstyne, supra note 71, at 129-32; JACOBY, supra note 3, at 13-14.
78. Van Alstyne, supra note 71, at 130-32.
79. Instruction for Hendrick van Dyck, Fiscal of the General Incorporated West India Company in
New Netherland and Adjoining Places, in 1 JOHN R. BRODHEAD, DOCUMENTS RELATIVE TO THE COLONIAL HISTORY OF THE STATE OF NEW-YORK 504, 505 (E.B. O’Callaghan ed., 1856).
80. Van Alstyne, supra note 71, at 132-34; JACOBY, supra note 3, at 14; Cardenas, supra note 3, at
370-72; BENSON, supra note 3, at 96.
81. 1 THE COLONIAL LAWS OF NEW YORK, FROM THE YEAR 1664 TO THE REVOLUTION 8 (1896)
[hereinafter 1 COLONIAL LAWS OF NEW YORK].
82. Id. at 11, 63.
83. Id. at 16.
84. See id. at 8, 11, 13, 16, 43-44 (listing cases of victims hiring private attorneys in criminal cases).
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cases.85 He did not even monopolize murder cases. For instance, later that year,
a private citizen named Abel Hardenbroeck prosecuted a man for attempted murder; three years later, the same plaintiff prosecuted another man for theft.86 Another plaintiff, in 1669, prosecuted a woman for having stolen “a pair of gold ornaments.”87 Victims also privately prosecuted criminal cases of assault and battery, some serious enough to warrant imprisonment for the convicted.88 Vincent
Martyn, for instance, prosecuted a man in October 1665 for an assault that caused
him to “not walk for some time.”89 Women in early New York were also allowed
to privately prosecute criminal cases: one Elizabeth Cornelissen, in July 1666,
prosecuted a man named Matthys Bastiaensen “[i]n an action of Assault and Batterye [sic] . . . ,” wherein he “hath wounded hur[sic] most deadly with a great
Knife . . . ,” causing her “Anguish and Paine [sic] . . . ” and much expense in “the
Curinge [sic] of the said Wound . . . .”90 The jury convicted the man and promptly
awarded restitution to Elizabeth.91 No mention of any sheriff or schout was made.
Anthony, as sheriff of New York, prosecuted a limited number of criminal
cases, but they tended to be victimless moral crimes or crimes against victims void
of the means to effectively prosecute.92 In February 1666, for instance, Anthony
prosecuted one Omfrie Cley because “he Lives with a woman as man & wife, with
whome [sic] he is not Lawfully married . . . .”93 Anthony prosecuted another man
“for having sold strong beer to the Indians . . .”;94 another for “racing with a boat”
on Sunday, contrary to Sabbath laws.95 Breaking from jail warranted a public
prosecution from Anthony, as did the refusal of colonists to appear as witnesses
when summoned for privately-prosecuted criminal cases.96 Even in cases where
Anthony prosecuted a criminal case with a victim, he did so on behalf of the victim, not on behalf of the state. In July 1665, for instance, Anthony prosecuted a
thief, but “on behalf of Grietie Pieters,” the victim.97 A few months later, he prosecuted a man for having “beat his servant Jan Harmsen so badly, that his entire

85. 5 THE RECORDS OF NEW AMSTERDAM, FROM 1653 TO 1674 ANNO DOMINI 250 (Berthold Fernow ed., 1897) [hereinafter 5 RECORDS OF NEW AMSTERDAM].
86. Id. at 287-88; 6 THE RECORDS OF NEW AMSTERDAM, FROM 1653 TO 1674 ANNO DOMINI 150
(Berthold Fernow ed., 1897) [hereinafter 6 RECORDS OF NEW AMSTERDAM].
87. 6 RECORDS OF NEW AMSTERDAM, supra note 86, at 206.
88. Id. at 383.
89. 5 RECORDS OF NEW AMSTERDAM, supra note 85, at 297.
90. 6 RECORDS OF NEW AMSTERDAM, supra note 86, at 25.
91. Id. For other privately prosecuted assault and battery cases after June 1665, see 5 RECORDS OF
NEW AMSTERDAM, supra note 85, at 260, 267-68 (discussing a private lawsuit between a solider and a
sailor as well as a case of assault and battery between private citizens); 6 RECORDS OF NEW AMSTERDAM,
supra note 86, at 89, 92, 115, 234, 294 (describing occurrences of private criminal law suits).
92. See, e.g., 5 RECORDS OF NEW AMSTERDAM, supra note 85, at 316, 338 (providing a specific
instances when Anthony prosecuted a defendant for failing to walk beside his cart after repeated warnings
and another defendant for having a quarrel in her home).
93. Id. at 338.
94. Id. at 311.
95. Id. at 290.
96. See generally id. at 269, 322 (referencing when Anthony filed suit against defendants who broke
arrest or failed to appear).
97. Id. at 272.
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face was nothing, but blood when said Jan Harmsen came to complain to
him . . . .”98 The servant was unlikely to have the means to properly prosecute,
and so Anthony assumed the role, again, on behalf of the victim. And though
women like the aforementioned Elizabeth Cornelissen had the right to privately
prosecute cases of assault and battery, Anthony pursued a case against the man if
the woman requested a public prosecution. For instance, only weeks after Cornelissen prosecuted Bastiaensen for a near-fatal attack with a knife,99 Anthony prosecuted the same deranged man for having “severely beat[en] Mary Cocx.”100
Professor W. Scott Van Alstyne, Jr., was the chief legal historian to argue
that New York sheriffs adopted the prosecutorial function of the former schout,
putting forth this argument in 1952.101 The only public prosecution cited by Van
Alstyne, however, was an assault and battery case prosecuted by Anthony in June
1665.102 But the record itself explicitly stated that the reason for a public prosecution in that particular instance was for “it beinge [sic] a case of great Consequence.”103 No further details are provided—one can only speculate—but on literally the same page of the court records, there was a private prosecution of another assault and battery case, and just a page earlier, there was yet another private
prosecution of “Assualt & Batterie [sic].”104 Van Alstyne, very clearly, had to
have seen this, but he curiously elected to leave it out of his article, though it directly contradicted his thesis. His work was since frequently cited as evidence that
the system of criminal prosecution in colonial America was primarily public, not
private.
Even more illuminating is this: when the Dutch briefly regained New Netherland from England in 1673-1674, during the Third Anglo-Dutch War, the colony
reinstated the schout, returning the “form of Government of this City to its previous character.”105 The court records from this twelve-month period indicate that
the reinstated schout prosecuted all criminal cases, including all cases of assault
and battery.106 The law code of this period explicitly emphasized (as though to
distinguish itself from the previous system) that “the Schout acts as Prosecutor”
in “all criminal offences.”107
When the English regained the colony in the summer of 1674, the adversarial
system of criminal justice returned; the schout once again disappeared. The sheriff, it is true, had the right “to apprehend & prosecute any Transgressors, as hee
98. Id. at 332.
99. 6 RECORDS OF NEW AMSTERDAM, supra note 86, at 25.
100. Id. at 34.
101. Van Alstyne, supra note 71, at 130, 133.
102. See generally id. at 131 n.24 (discussing a singular case of public prosecution).
103. Id. at 133 n.26; 5 RECORDS OF NEW AMSTERDAM, supra note 85, at 268.
104. 5 RECORDS OF NEW AMSTERDAM, supra note 85, at 268-69.
105. 1 COLONIAL LAWS OF NEW YORK, supra note 81, at 101-02.
106. See generally 7 THE RECORDS OF NEW AMSTERDAM, FROM 1653 TO 1674 ANNO DOMINI 9-10,
85, 89 (Berthold Fernow ed., 1897) (containing minutes of the court of burgomasters and schepens between September 1673 and November 1674).
107. Provisional Instruction for the Schout and Magistrates of the City of Willemstade and Colonic
Renselaers Wyck, in 2 COLONIAL HISTORY OF NEW YORK, supra note 74, at 653, 653-54; 1 COLONIAL
LAWS OF NEW YORK, supra note 81, at 37.
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[sic] shall see cause,” but so too did private citizens.108 A New York statute from
1684 confirmed this right of private prosecution for all actions of “[A]ssault, Menace, Battery, [and] Wounding”: the victims “att [sic] liberty to bring the same Actions . . . .”109 A law of 1683 reiterated that the plaintiff could be private in “Cases
and Causes Criminall [sic], as Cases and Causes civill [sic]”; the role of the sheriff,
this law said, was “to Execute the Judgments and Execusions [sic] of this Court,”
as well as intermittent, though not exclusive, prosecutions of “Murtherers [sic],”
occasional “Capitall [sic] Offenders,” and “such as are overtaken with Drink,
Swearing, Sabbath breaking, Vagrant persons or night walkers.”110 What we see
in New York, then, after 1674, was a hybrid system of public and private prosecutions, with the general rule established that “Persons shall have Liberty, also to
plead and prosecute” in “all matters and Things and Causes Tryable [sic] att [sic]
the Common Law . . . Civill [sic] Criminall [sic], and Mixt [sic].”111
New Jersey was also a former part of New Netherland and, like New York,
was also temporarily seized by the Dutch in 1673-1674.112 Shortly after the English regained the colony, in 1676, it split into East Jersey and West Jersey until
united again as a single colony in 1702.113 Here too we see a hybrid system of
public and private prosecution, with most criminal cases conducted privately, especially those involving robbery, burglary, assault, and battery.114
English common law ensured Jersey subjects a right to private prosecution:
as the East Jersey assembly affirmed in 1678, “no man within this Province shall
be deprived of the benefit of the common law, and a free process therein, as of
right belongs to every free English subject.”115 Four years later, in 1682, another
law in East Jersey confirmed that in “all matters, causes and cases, capital, criminal, or civil . . . all and every person and persons whatsoever, shall and may, if
they see meet, remove any action or suit,” so long as “there be just cause for the
same.”116 A West Jersey law, in 1676, was even more specific in guaranteeing a
right to private prosecution in criminal cases:

108. Council Minute. The Authority of the Sheriff at Esopus Defined (4 Aug. 1676), in 13 BERTHOLD
FERNOW, DOCUMENTS RELATIVE TO THE COLONIAL HISTORY OF THE STATE OF NEW-YORK 498 (E.B.
O’Callaghan ed., 1881).
109. 1 COLONIAL LAWS OF NEW YORK, supra note 81, at 156.
110. Id. at 28-29, 125-26.
111. Id. at 16, 228-29.
112. History of New Jersey, BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/place/New-Jersey/History
(last visited Dec. 27, 2021).
113. Id.
114. See generally THE GRANTS, CONCESSIONS, AND ORIGINAL CONSTITUTIONS OF THE PROVINCE
OF NEW JERSEY, (Aaron Leaming & Jacob Spicer eds., Philadelphia, n.d.) [hereinafter GCOC] (detailing
published copies of state codes, city charters, and state constitutional conventions); DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE COLONIAL HISTORY OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY, THIRTY-THREE VOLUMES AND INDEX
(William A. Whitehead et al. eds., 1880-1928) [hereinafter DRNJ] (describing the hybrid system between
private and public prosecution over thirty-three volumes); ACTS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE
PROVINCE OF NEW-JERSEY (Samuel Allinson ed., Burlington, 1776) [hereinafter ACTS OF NEW JERSEY]
(detailing acts of the General Assembly between April 1702 and January 1776).
115. GCOC, supra note 114, at 129.
116. Id. at 232.
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[A]ll and every person and persons whatsoever, who shall prosecute or prefer any indictment or information against others for any
personal injuries, or matter criminal, or shall prosecute for any
other criminal cause, (treason, murther [sic], and felony, only excepted) shall and may be master of his own process, and have full
power to forgive and remit the person or persons offending against
him or herself only, as well before as after judgment, and condemnation, and pardon and remit the sentence, fine and punishment of
the person or persons offending . . . .
That [in] the tryals [sic] of all causes civil and criminal . . .
no person or persons shall be compelled to fee any attorney or
councillor [sic] to plead his cause, but that all persons have free
liberty to plead his own cause, if he please.117
This is one of the clearest statements of a right to private prosecution in the colonial statute books, besides the plethora of cases in court record books across all of
the colonies that also attest to the existence and frequency of private prosecution.
Moreover, the same law of 1676 was reiterated again, with nearly identical language, in 1681.118 Ironically, this came from the very colony cited by Jacoby as
having adopted, early on, an exclusive system of public prosecution.119
The wording of the West Jersey statute is quite remarkable. The victim of a
crime—excepting only the worst cases—was not only “master of his own process”
in the prosecution of the case, but he or she could also “forgive and remit the
person”—before or after the court’s judgment, with a right to even “pardon and
remit the sentence.”120 The victim, then, enjoyed total discretion, with only the
worst crimes excepted. A careful reading of this exception, however, implies a
right to private prosecution even in cases of murder: the only difference, in that
instance, was that the victim could not simply “forgive” the murderer if he or she
chose, and thus did not possess total discretion over the process.121
The West Jersey government, it ought to be noted, established a public attorney in 1686, and East Jersey followed in 1694.122 This is the reason why Jacoby
and other legal historians cite New Jersey as an early example of public prosecution.123 Nevertheless, though the public attorney could and would occasionally
prosecute criminal cases like burglary, the office clearly did not possess a monopoly over criminal cases, as private prosecution remained in the court record books
thereafter.124 Public prosecution was very often, if not most often, utilized to
prosecute murderers in Jersey, though private prosecution was certainly an option
even in cases of murder—as the aforementioned laws explicitly stated—and even
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

Id. at 397-98.
Id. at 429.
JACOBY, supra note 3, at 15.
GCOC, supra note 114, at 397-98.
Id. at 397-98, 429.
JACOBY, supra note 3, at 15; GCOC, supra note 114, at 344.
JACOBY, supra note 3, at 15; Kress, supra note 3, at 104.
GCOC, supra note 114, at 344-45; ACTS OF NEW JERSEY, supra note 114, at 5.
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the public prosecutor in a murder case worked closely and intimately with the
friends or family of the victim, considering, very seriously, their various concerns
and interests, and prosecuting the case on their behalf.
The seventeenth-century prosecutorial system in America, then, we can
safely say, was practically every bit as private as the system in England, with perhaps only a slightly greater number of public prosecutions in a sea of actions initiated and conducted directly by crime victims or hired attorneys.
C. EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY COLONIAL AMERICA
Private prosecution was by far the most utilized method for trying criminals
in seventeenth-century colonial courts. In the eighteenth century, however, the
colonial judicial system gradually evolved to include the option of public prosecution, yet not at the expense of the private option. Public prosecution expanded
in fits and starts in the eighteenth century, depending on the colony: the fact that
England never prescribed a uniform judicial system for colonial America allowed
for vast experimentation. Private prosecution was still commonplace, affording
eighteenth-century colonial Americans a hybrid system of criminal justice.
Though instances of public prosecution had certainly increased by the time of the
colonies’ independence from Britain in 1776, private prosecution was still very
much presumed to be the right of the victim if the victim so elected, and a large
number of them did.
America underwent a demographic revolution in the eighteenth century, provoking slight alterations in prosecutorial procedure. The population of British
North America rose by a factor of eight between 1700 and 1770, from 250,000 to
just under 2,000,000 colonists.125 The New England population soared in that
period from under 100,000 to 560,000; Virginia’s population rose from 64,000 to
450,000; Pennsylvania’s from 18,000 to 240,000; New York’s from 20,000 to
150,000; New Jersey’s from 14,000 to 120,000.126 North Carolina’s population
increased by a factor of twenty, from 10,000 to nearly 200,000.127 Though the
vast majority of colonists still inhabited rural areas, a limited degree of urbanization accompanied this population explosion, and with it, an increase in the crime
rate.128 Colonial courts, by consequence, required, first, judges with significant
legal expertise and, second, a learned profession of lawyers to represent plaintiffs
and defendants.129 The need for lawyers inflated the expenses required of victims
to successfully prosecute a case, increasing demand for the option of a public prosecutor.130
Quite regrettably, in the colonial record books, there are often no specifications on who conducted the prosecution in any one particular case. Consequently,
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

2 U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, supra note 35, at 1168.
Id.
Id.
McDonald, supra note 1, at 653-54; Cardenas, supra note 3, at 368.
JACOBY, supra note 3, at 19, 36-37; POUND, supra note 3, at 119.
McDonald, supra note 1, at 653-54.
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we cannot know with any certainty the precise, or even approximate, ratios of
public to private prosecutions in eighteenth-century America. Even the precise
duties of certain judicial officials were notoriously ambiguous. In 1701, for instance, an attorney general in Massachusetts Bay remarked that “I never [c]ould
know what was my duty” or “[w]hat I [s]hould doe [sic] . . . [a]ll other officers
know their power, duty & dues by the law, but [r]elating to the [k]ings Atturny
[sic] the law is [s]ilent.”131
Notwithstanding this unfortunate ambiguity, private prosecutions, in all likelihood, constituted a sound majority of criminal cases in the eighteenth century—
excepting, perhaps, for capital crimes—and even when a case was publicly prosecuted, the evidence strongly indicates that the victims retained ultimate control
over the prosecutorial proceedings.132 Urbanization created a new demand for
private, professional lawyers, yes, but in the many rural and frontier communities
of eighteenth-century America, there was still little need for technical preparation
for the courtroom, rendering it fairly easy for victims to prosecute their cases without having to empty their pocketbooks to hire an attorney.133
Several Massachusetts laws in the early eighteenth century acknowledged the
legality of private prosecution. Such prosecutions, the laws specified, could either
be conducted by the victim (“in his own proper person”) or by “the assistance of
such other person as he shall procure” (his private attorney).134 The latest of these
laws dated to 1714, but they were neither superseded nor repealed and remained
on the books through the rest of the colonial period, all the way up to the Revolutionary War.135 According to Massachusetts law, in cases of non-conviction, the
private plaintiff—i.e., the supposed victim, a private party—must “pay to the adverse party his cost arising by the arrest.”136 On the other hand, upon successful
conviction, the victim of robbery or theft received “treble damages.”137
The fact that colonial prosecutions were often brought forth in the name of
the Crown has misled a few legal historians. In Massachusetts and some other
colonies, all or most court proceedings—civil, criminal, public, and private—were
conducted in the name of the king of England, though the trial, in actuality, remained a contest between two private subjects. “All [a]ctions where any [p]erson
shall [s]ue,” a law in New York stipulated in 1728, shall “be Commenced in his
Majestys [sic] name.”138

131. 1 ACTS OF MASSACHUSETTS, supra note 48, at 709.
132. Dangel, supra note 3, at 1072.
133. POUND, supra note 3, at 118-19; STEINBERG, supra note 3, at 6.
134. 1 ACTS OF MASSACHUSETTS, supra note 48, at 75.
135. See id. at 222, 287, 467, 622-23, 674 (providing laws acknowledging the legality of private
prosecution).
136. Id. at 739.
137. Id. at 52.
138. Id. at 75; 2 THE COLONIAL LAWS OF NEW YORK, FROM THE YEAR 1664 TO THE REVOLUTION
464 (1894) [hereinafter 2 COLONIAL LAWS OF NEW YORK].
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In May 1704, Connecticut became the first colony to establish a permanent
office of the public prosecutor.139 When legal historians argue that eighteenthcentury America developed a mostly-public system of prosecution, Connecticut is
the most frequently cited example. According to the statute, “in every countie
[sic] a sober, discreet and religious person [must be] appointed by the Countie
[sic] Courts to be Atturney [sic] for the Queen, to prosecute and implead in the
lawe [sic] all criminall [sic] offenders, and to doe [sic] all other things necessary
or convenient as an atturney [sic] to suppresse [sic] vice and im̃orallitie [sic].”140
The Connecticut law of 1704 was significant indeed, but legal historians have
vastly exaggerated its meaning and implication. At first glance, the act appears to
have established an exclusive system of public prosecution in criminal cases; after
all, it explicitly states that the public attorney shall prosecute “all criminal offenders.” Jacoby thus claims that the colony in 1704 entirely eliminated private prosecution.141 Upon closer investigation, however, it is abundantly clear that the act
was intended primarily for moral crimes, and that the colony retained a hybrid
system of prosecution for criminal cases with actual victims.
First, the emphasis of the act was “to suppresse [sic] vice and immorallitie[sic].”142 The religious overtones of the act’s prelude make it clear that moral
crimes were primarily in view. The prelude to the act reads as follows:
Whereas we are often told from the publick [sic] ministrie [sic] as
well as from private discourses of the wise and pious persons of
our age, that one crying sinne [sic] that may procure impending
judgments [from God] further to come down on our land . . . is the
neglect of putting good lawes [sic] in execution against im̃oral
[sic] offenders . . . .143
Having established this fear of divine judgment for the colony’s problem of
“sinne” and “im̃orallitie,” the act subsequently argued that “such neglect may be
prevented for the future . . .” by the establishment of a public attorney to prosecute
the same.144
When Puritan lawmakers in New England spoke of “criminal offenders,”
they primarily had moral delinquents in mind, as the vast majority of criminal
offenses were victimless, moral offenses. Moral laws of this kind were necessary,
they believed, for promoting “peaceable and civill [sic] behavior [sic] and good
conversation.”145 By establishing a permanent office to prosecute moral offenders, the Connecticut colony might more effectively combat such sins as fornication, Sabbath-breaking, “houses of bawderye [sic] . . . ,” “night-walkers that be

139. JACOBY, supra note 3, at 10, 16; Bessler, supra note 3, at 516; Sidman, supra note 3, at 763;
Van Alstyne, supra note 71, at 136; Kress, supra note 3, at 103; Cardenas, supra note 3, at 371 n.73;
BENSON, supra note 3, at 96; McDonald, supra note 1, at 660 n.62.
140. 4 RECORDS OF CONNECTICUT, supra note 72, at 468.
141. JACOBY, supra note 3, at 16.
142. 4 RECORDS OF CONNECTICUT, supra note 72, at 468.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 236.
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persons of evill [sic] fame . . . ,” “suspected persons that live idly . . . ,” “drunkard
libellers [sic] . . . ,” and those who “com̃itt [sic] other like misdemeanors or outrages in the night time . . . .”146 Even then, there might be a plausible “victim”—
the witness of someone under the influence of “strong drink,” for example—who
“shall complain of such offenders and prosecute his or their complaint to effect,”
and thereby receive half the fine levied against the delinquent.147 So much for a
public form of prosecution that bears any resemblance to our own.
Private prosecution for crimes with actual victims remained standard practice
in Connecticut after 1704. For the rest of the eighteenth century, the colony’s
record books testify to private prosecutions for cases of assault and battery, burglary, arson, and even a private prosecution of rape in 1743.148 To be sure, the
public attorney in Connecticut occasionally prosecuted violent crimes and crimes
against property. It is likely that most murder trials were publicly prosecuted,
although a law in 1712 confirmed that a “trial [sic] for murther [sic] . . .” shall
proceed “by the rules of the Common Law, . . .” implying, at the very least, that
the victim or his attorney could assist the prosecution, if not run it altogether.149
And even when the public attorney prosecuted such crimes, he did so either on
behalf of the victim or with the victim’s interests in mind, awarding the victim
restitution despite the public nature of the prosecution.150 What we see here in
Connecticut, then, is a hybrid system, where neither public nor private prosecution
possessed an exclusive monopoly.
New York continued its hybrid system of private and public prosecution into
the eighteenth century. A 1759 statute instructed sheriffs on how to handle jailed
offenders if the victim chose to “forbear further to Prosecute . . . .”151 As late as
1772, the records indicate private suits in criminal court for “Assault and Battery,”
and a separate law in 1772 stipulated that private “parties” may conduct “all such

146. Id. at 237.
147. 5 PUBLIC RECORDS OF THE COLONY OF CONNECTICUT, 1636 TO 1776, at 502 (Charles J. Hoadly
ed., Hartford, Brown & Parsons, 1850) [hereinafter 5 RECORDS OF CONNECTICUT].
148. See generally CONNECTICUT ARCHIVES, CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS, FIRST SERIES, 16621789, SIX VOLUMES AND INDEX 4:71-73, 115-16, 217-33, 5:239, 6:89-98 (Effie M. Prickett ed., Hartford
1913) (detailing cases of burglary, murder, and other criminal cases as well as a variety of court documents
in roughly a chronological order); CONNECTICUT ARCHIVES, CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS, SECOND SERIES, 1671-1820, FIVE VOLUMES AND INDEX 4:110 (Hartford, 1970) (containing records of criminal cases
that came before the General Assembly as well as bills relating to criminal punishment and procedure); 7
PUBLIC RECORDS OF THE COLONY OF CONNECTICUT, 1636 TO 1776, at 81 (Charles J. Hoadly ed., Hartford, Brown & Parsons, 1850) (containing records from May 1726 to May 1735); 10 P UBLIC RECORDS OF
THE COLONY OF CONNECTICUT, 1636 TO 1776, at 37, 91, 99, 104, 137, 144 (Charles J. Hoadly ed., Hartford, Brown & Parsons, 1850) (containing records from May 1751 to February 1757).
149. 5 RECORDS OF CONNECTICUT, supra note 147, at 350.
150. See, e.g., 4 RECORDS OF CONNECTICUT, supra note 72, at 290 (appointing auditors to manage
financial distribution accounts); 5 RECORDS OF CONNECTICUT, supra note 147, at 235-36 (providing that
during acts of night walking that the actor “shall be lyable [sic] to pay such damages as the person . . .
complaining shall have sustained or suffered, and such other fine or punishment as the court, assistant, or
justice, before whom the complaint is made, shall see cause to order, not exceeding the sum of five
pounds.”).
151. 4 THE COLONIAL LAWS OF NEW YORK, FROM THE YEAR 1664 TO THE REVOLUTION 356 (1894).
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Civil & Criminal proceedings.”152 Still another law, later in 1772, spoke of private “Parties charged, prosecuting or defending therein . . . whether Criminal or
Civil . . . .”153 Again, public prosecution was by no means uncommon in New
York, but neither was it anything close to an exclusive monopoly. When he was
not busy prosecuting smugglers, tax delinquents, or “Printers and Publishers of
seditious Papers,”154 the attorney general in New York, rather than prosecuting all
or most criminal cases, more frequently advised the government on perfunctory
legal concerns, which took up the vast bulk of his time and energy. 155
The colony of New Jersey, which had statutorily guaranteed a right to private
prosecution in the final quarter of the seventeenth century, likewise continued
forth with a hybrid system of criminal prosecution. Here too, the attorney general
(or “King’s attorney”), rather than prosecuting all or most criminal cases, prosecuted crimes such as tax delinquency, “Rioutously [sic] assembling,” assaulting
the sheriff, and “malicious & reproachfull [sic] words” hurled at government officials, “contrary to the Peace of our Sovereign Lord the King.”156 In 1747 the
public attorney prosecuted thirty-two colonists for their role in a “Tumultuous and
Bloody” mob, “Indicted for High Treason.”157 Though laws in 1714 and 1728
attempted to curb “Malicious Prosecutions” conducted by “evil disposed Persons
unjustly designing to vex and oppress their Neighbours [sic],” private prosecution
remained a fundamental right in New Jersey, so long as the case was not malicious.158 A law in 1774, for instance, permitted defrauded victims to privately
prosecute counterfeiters of paper money in a criminal court of law, and as late as
1775, victims of assault and battery could still legally prosecute their alleged offender.159
Nevertheless, it does appear that public prosecution of crimes with victims
increased in volume in eighteenth-century New Jersey. For the first time in the
colony’s history, a Jersey law in 1747 specifically delineated the “Attorney-General’s Fees” for prosecuting particular capital crimes and other lesser cases, suggesting that the frequency of public prosecution had indeed increased by midcentury.160 Nevertheless, the fact that the victim paid a fee to the public attorney
suggests that the public attorney prosecuted on behalf of the victim. The system
152. Id. at 1090; 5 THE COLONIAL LAWS OF NEW YORK, FROM THE YEAR 1664 TO THE REVOLUTION
287-91, 322 (1894) [hereinafter 5 COLONIAL LAWS OF NEW YORK].
153. 5 COLONIAL LAWS OF NEW YORK, supra note 152, at 406.
154. 2 COLONIAL LAWS OF NEW YORK, supra note 138, at 393, 406-07, 46, 967; Lieutenant-Governor Golden to Secretary Conway, in 7 JOHN R. BRODHEAD, DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE COLONIAL
HISTORY OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY 759, 760 (E.B. O’Callaghan ed., 1856).
155. 3 THE COLONIAL LAWS OF NEW YORK, FROM THE YEAR 1664 TO THE REVOLUTION 617-18
(1894).
156. Indictment of Sundry Persons by the Grand Jury of Mammoth County, in 2 DRNJ, supra note
114, at 332, 332-33; Documents Referring to the Irregular Proceedings of Lewis Morris, George Willocks
and Others, Transmitted to the Lords of Trade with Foregoing Letter, in 3 DRNJ, supra note 114, at 476,
481-87.
157. Judge Neville’s Charge to the Grand Jury of Middlesex County at Session of June, 1747, in 6
DRNJ, supra note 114, at 456, 458-61.
158. ACTS OF NEW JERSEY, supra note 114, at 23-24, 73-75.
159. Id. at 435-36, 473.
160. Id. at 164.
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still retained its hybrid character of criminal prosecution; there was never any repeal of the earlier laws guaranteeing a right of private prosecution, and New Jersey
law continued to recognize private prosecution in the statute books all the way up
to the eve of the American Revolution.161
Colonial Pennsylvania also utilized a hybrid system of private and public
prosecution. Since the colony’s founding in the 1680s, the attorney general and
JP (known as aldermen in Philadelphia) enjoyed identical powers to the same positions in England.162 In 1685 the Pennsylvania Council appointed a prosecuting
attorney for Philadelphia.163 Some legal historians point to this fact as evidence
of an exclusive system of public prosecution, but here, again, there is not a shred
of proof that the public attorney came even close to conducting even a majority of
prosecutions.164 According to Pennsylvania law in 1700, private “inhabitants of
this province” still had a right to prosecute criminal cases in the colony. A law in
1706 explicitly permitted the private prosecution of robbery;165 the same year, a
criminal case at court involved the private prosecution of an arsonist, and Pennsylvania law in 1718 and 1721 reaffirmed the right of individuals to privately prosecute larceny.166 More remarkably, the private prosecution of individuals alleged
to have counterfeited paper money—in a criminal suit, not a civil action—was
expressly and continually permitted by statute, from the first emission of Pennsylvania paper money in 1723 to the eve of the Revolutionary War in 1775.167 This
should come as no surprise, as Pennsylvanians intentionally modeled their system
after the adversarial, common law system in England. Pennsylvania statutes in
1711 and 1714 instructed that criminal procedure be conducted “as near as conveniently may be to the rules of the common law, and to the course and practice
of the Queen’s court of common pleas.”168 A Pennsylvania law in 1727—repeated in 1763 and 1769—instructed that “all actions, suits and causes whatsoever, as well criminal as civil, personal, real and mixed,” be conducted “as near as

161. Id. at 164, 435-36, 473, 475; GCOC, supra note 114, at 573.
162. STEINBERG, supra note 3, at 5-6; JACOBY, supra note 3, at 15.
163. Van Alstyne, supra note 71, at 134; Kress, supra note 3, at 104; JACOBY, supra note 3, at 1415.
164. 1 MINUTES OF THE PROVINCIAL COUNCIL OF PENNSYLVANIA 167 (Jo. Severns & Co. 18511853); JACOBY, supra note 3, at 14-15; Kress, supra note 3, at 104.
165. 2 THE STATUTES AT LARGE OF PENNSYLVANIA, FROM 1682 TO 1801, at 175 (James T. Mitchell
& Henry Flanders, eds., 1896) [hereinafter 2 THE STATUTES AT LARGE OF PENNSYLVANIA].
166. Id. at 211-14, 246-47.
167. 3 THE STATUTES AT LARGE OF PENNSYLVANIA, FROM 1682 TO 1801, at 331, 406 (James T.
Mitchell & Henry Flanders eds., 1896); 4 THE STATUTES AT LARGE OF PENNSYLVANIA, FROM 1682 TO
1801, at 45, 113 (James T. Mitchell & Henry Flanders eds., 1896) [hereinafter 4 THE STATUTES AT LARGE
OF PENNSYLVANIA]; 5 THE STATUTES AT LARGE OF PENNSYLVANIA, FROM 1682 TO 1801, at 248, 300,
443 (James T. Mitchell & Henry Flanders eds., 1898) [hereinafter 5 THE STATUTES AT LARGE OF PENNSYLVANIA]; 6 THE STATUTES AT LARGE OF PENNSYLVANIA, FROM 1682 TO 1801, at 19, 364, 554, 575
(James T. Mitchell & Henry Flanders eds., 1899); 7 THE STATUTES AT LARGE OF PENNSYLVANIA, FROM
1682 TO 1801, at 104, 201-02, 208-09 (James T. Mitchell & Henry Flanders eds., 1900) [hereinafter 7 THE
STATUTES AT LARGE OF PENNSYLVANIA]; 8 THE STATUTES AT LARGE OF PENNSYLVANIA, FROM 1682
TO 1801, at 299, 340, 451 (James T. Mitchell & Henry Flanders eds., 1902).
168. 2 THE STATUTES AT LARGE OF PENNSYLVANIA, supra note 165, at 315, 560.
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conveniently may be, agreeable to the laws, statutes and rights of the kingdom of
England.”169
Again, however, it is important to emphasize that this was a hybrid system in
Pennsylvania: it was neither purely private nor purely public. The public attorney,
for instance, prosecuted “all night-walkers, malefactors and suspected persons
who shall be found wandering and misbehaving themselves,” as well as occasional
cases with victims.170 There were certainly more instances of public prosecution
in colonial Pennsylvania than there were back home in England. As William
Tilghman, Chief Justice of Pennsylvania, explained in 1813:
Every country has its Common Law. Ours is composed partly of
the Common Law of England and partly of our own usages. When
our ancestors emigrated from England, they took with them such
of the English principles as were convenient for the situation in
which they were about to place themselves. . . . By degrees, as
circumstances demanded, we adopted the English usages, or substituted others better suited to our wants, till at length before the
time of the Revolution we had formed a system of our own.171
The “system of our own” that Tilghman referred to was the hybrid system, not an
exclusively public system.172 It is tempting for legal historians to read and interpret this statement (“system of our own”) as indicating an exclusive monopoly of
the public prosecutor in late colonial America.173 The scantiness of the records,
regrettably, reinforces this false interpretation.
But while we will never possess an exact or even approximate ratio of public
to private prosecutions in eighteenth-century colonial America, there is no doubt
that private prosecution remained frequent in Pennsylvania and elsewhere late into
the colonial period. Owing to the meticulous research of Professor Allen Steinberg on private prosecution in early nineteenth-century Philadelphia (addressed in
a later section), we can infer that private prosecution was at least as equally prolific
in colonial Pennsylvania.174 Though Steinberg focuses primarily on nineteenthcentury Philadelphia, he wrote this about private prosecution in colonial Pennsylvania:
Little is known about the actual operation of the courts in criminal
matters . . . . Nevertheless, it is logical to assume that private
prosecution was the typical activity. Both arbitration and the issuance of peace bonds were actions explicitly initiated by private
169. 4 THE STATUTES AT LARGE OF PENNSYLVANIA, supra note 167, at 5; 6 THE STATUTES AT
LARGE OF PENNSYLVANIA, supra note 167, at 566; 7 THE STATUTES AT LARGE OF PENNSYLVANIA, supra
note 167, at 444.
170. 5 THE STATUTES AT LARGE OF PENNSYLVANIA, supra note 167, at 113-14, 227.
171. STEINBERG, supra note 3, at 6.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. See generally id. (covering Steinberg’s broad research on prosecution in nineteenth century Philadelphia); Allen Steinberg, “The Spirit of Litigation”: Private Prosecution and Criminal Justice in Nineteenth Century Philadelphia, 20 J. SOC. HIST. 231 (1986) [hereinafter Steinberg, Spirit of Litigation] (examining private prosecution and criminal justice in nineteenth-century Philadelphia).
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complaint. Further, when the judiciary became a controversial issue in Pennsylvania during the first decades after independence,
the debates were conducted in terms which assumed the dominance of private prosecution. . . . Private prosecution and the minor judiciary were firmly rooted in Philadelphia’s colonial past.175
In eighteenth-century colonial Virginia, the attorney general appointed deputy attorneys to prosecute occasional criminal cases; crime victims, nevertheless,
retained and still exercised a right of private prosecution, albeit on a smaller scale,
perhaps, than in the seventeenth century. According to law, the attorney general
“or any other person prosecuting”—public or private—had to do so in the name
of the Crown, and a statute in 1727 spoke of both the “complainant’s attorney”
and the “defendant’s attorney”: “complainant’s attorney” no doubt refers to a privately-conducted prosecution in criminal court.176 By the middle of the eighteenth century, the hybrid system in Virginia very slowly moved toward the public
end of the spectrum: more so perhaps than in other colonies. After 1751 private
persons had to confer with the deputy attorney general before filing a criminal
prosecution.177 By the eve of independence, the majority of capital offenses in
Virginia were likely prosecuted by deputy attorneys in each of the county courts,
though private persons retained a right to privately prosecute, particularly “for assaults and batteries, and other offences not capital.”178 Victims of capital crimes,
of course, collaborated closely with the public attorney, distinguishing it from our
own system today.179
Private prosecution was normal procedure in North Carolina’s criminal
courts early in the eighteenth century. This was particularly true for crimes of
assault and battery, as well as petty and grand larceny.180 A North Carolina law
in 1701 acknowledged a right to private prosecution, and statutes in 1711 and 1715
confirmed that criminal procedure ought to be conducted “as near as may be agreeable to the Laws and Customs of Our Kingdom of England . . . the common Law
is and shall be in force.”181 The attorney general prosecuted victimless crimes
like Sabbath-breaking and fornication, but in most other actions, the crime victim

175.
176.

Steinberg, Spirit of Litigation, supra note 174, at 233; STEINBERG, supra note 3, at 5.
3 HENING, supra note 40, at 293; 4 WILLIAM WALLER HENING, THE STATUTES AT LARGE;
BEING A COLLECTION OF ALL THE LAWS OF VIRGINIA, FROM THE FIRST SESSION OF THE LEGISLATURE
IN THE YEAR 1619, at 187-97 (1820).
177. BENSON, supra note 3, at 95-96; Cardenas, supra note 3, at 371; JACOBY, supra note 3, at 19.
178. 6 WILLIAM WALLER HENING, THE STATUTES AT LARGE; BEING A COLLECTION OF ALL THE
LAWS OF VIRGINIA, FROM THE FIRST SESSION OF THE LEGISLATURE IN THE YEAR 1619, at 246 (1819).
179. BENSON, supra note 3, at 94-96.
180. Minutes of the Perquimans Precinct Court (Nov. 6, 1693-Nov. 9, 1693), in 1 THE COLONIAL
RECORDS OF NORTH CAROLINA 399, 401 (William L. Saunders ed., 1886) [hereinafter 1 COLONIAL RECORDS OF NORTH CAROLINA]; 25 THE STATE RECORDS OF NORTH CAROLINA 145 (Walter Clark ed., 1906)
[hereinafter 25 STATE RECORDS OF NORTH CAROLINA].
181. Memorial from the North Carolina Governor’s Council and General Assembly Concerning the
State of the Government, Including Acts of the North Carolina General Assembly, in 1 COLONIAL RECORDS OF NORTH CAROLINA, supra note 180, at 784, 789; 25 STATE RECORDS OF NORTH CAROLINA,
supra note 180, at 153.

BarthFINAL(third sub. edits_J.) (Do Not Delete)

142

SOUTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

8/21/2022 3:37 PM

[Vol. 67

in North Carolina assumed prosecutorial responsibility.182 In 1722, for instance,
Thomas Cooke prosecuted a man in criminal court “for beating & abusing him
very notoriously.”183
By the second quarter of the century, however, there was a subtle shift in
North Carolina toward public prosecution, though again, not exclusively. In 1725,
the attorney general prosecuted a man “for stealing of an Anchor . . . contrary to
the peace of Our said Lord the King.”184 In the same session, he prosecuted a
larceny case, though private prosecutions still appeared in the same 1725 session,
including for allegations of robbery.185 The attorney general apparently prosecuted all murder cases;186 in 1727, he even prosecuted a case of assault and battery, usually reserved for private prosecution.187 And yet, as late as 1760, the
North Carolina record books indicate a high frequency of private prosecutions for
“petit larcenies, Assaults, Batteries and Trespasses, Breaches of the Peace and
other Misdemeanors of what kind soever [sic] of an inferior Nature.”188 Indeed,
“all and every Part of the Common Law of England” remained in “full Force,” all
the way up to the Revolutionary War.189 Governor William Tryon, in 1767, attested to the existence of forty-five private lawyers in the colony, some of whom
privately prosecuted in criminal court.190 As one law in 1774 suggested, “the
prosecutors of offences not capital” were usually either the victims themselves or
their private attorney.191
182. Minutes of the Perquimans Precinct Court (Apr. 10, 1705), in 1 COLONIAL RECORDS OF NORTH
CAROLINA, supra note 180, at 619, 622; Minutes of the General Court of North Carolina (July 28, 1720),
in 2 COLONIAL RECORDS OF NORTH CAROLINA 402, 404-05, 411 (William L. Saunders, ed. 1886) [hereinafter 2 COLONIAL RECORDS OF NORTH CAROLINA]. See also 2 STATUTES AT LARGE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 586 (Thomas Cooper ed., 1837) (setting the statute of limitations for suits brought by private individuals for the crimes of “assault, menace, battery, wounding or imprisonment . . . .”).
183. Minutes of the General Court of North Carolina (Oct. 30, 1722-Nov. 3, 1722), in 2 COLONIAL
RECORDS OF NORTH CAROLINA, supra note 182, at 478-79.
184. Minutes of the General Court of North Carolina (July 27, 1725-Aug. 02, 1725), in 2 COLONIAL
RECORDS OF NORTH CAROLINA, supra note 182, at 591-92.
185. Id. at 593; Minutes of the Perquimans Precinct Court (Nov. 6, 1693-Nov. 9 1693), in 1 COLONIAL RECORDS OF NORTH CAROLINA, supra note 180, at 401; Minutes of the General Court of North
Carolina (July 30, 1728-Aug. 6, 1728), in 2 COLONIAL RECORDS OF NORTH CAROLINA, supra note 182,
at 820, 825-27.
186. Minutes of the Perquimans Precinct Court (Apr. 10, 1705), supra note 182, at 619, 622; Minutes
of the General Court of North Carolina (July 26, 1726-Aug. 3, 1726), in 2 COLONIAL RECORDS OF NORTH
CAROLINA, supra note 182, at 655-56; Minutes of the General Court of North Carolina (Oct. 25, 1726Nov. 1, 1726), in 2 COLONIAL RECORDS OF NORTH CAROLINA, supra note 182, at 665, 668-69; Minutes
of the General Court of North Carolina (Mar. 25, 1729-Apr. 3, 1729), in 3 COLONIAL RECORDS OF NORTH
CAROLINA 52, 54-55 (William L. Saunders ed., 1886).
187. Minutes of the General Court of North Carolina (Mar. 28, 1727-Apr. 5, 1727), in 2 COLONIAL
RECORDS OF NORTH CAROLINA, supra note 182, at 686, 697-98.
188. Acts of the North Carolina General Assembly, 1760 (Apr. 24, 1760-May 23, 1760), in 25 STATE
RECORDS OF NORTH CAROLINA, supra note 180, at 405, 407.
189. Acts of the North Carolina General Assembly, 1749 (Sept. 26, 1749-Oct. 18, 1749), in 23 STATE
RECORDS OF NORTH CAROLINA 317, 327 (Walter Clark ed., 1905).
190. Report by Patrick Gordon Concerning Government in North Carolina, Including Cover Letter
from William Tryon to William Petty, Marquis of Lansdowne, in 7 COLONIAL RECORDS OF NORTH CAROLINA 472, 486 (William L. Saunders ed., 1886).
191. Minutes of the Upper House of the North Carolina General Assembly (Dec. 04, 1773-Dec. 21,
1773), in 9 COLONIAL RECORDS OF NORTH CAROLINA 706, 714, 716 (William L. Saunders ed., 1886);
Minutes of the Lower House of the North Carolina General Assembly (Dec. 04, 1773-Dec. 21, 1773), in
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The Scots may have played a role in the trend in Virginia and North Carolina
toward the public end of the hybrid system of criminal prosecution. Scottish influence was extraordinarily heavy in both colonies by the middle of the eighteenth
century, and the Scots had a very different system of criminal prosecution than the
English. Since 1587, the government of Scotland had granted the public attorney
authority to prosecute any crime and to assume (if he pleased) complete control
over any private prosecution.192 Most of the Scottish immigrants to America arrived in the eighteenth century, and North Carolina witnessed the highest concentration, with Virginia running second.
Back in Britain, private prosecution remained the predominant procedure in
criminal courts in the eighteenth century, though here too, there were several recent advancements. Before the mid-eighteenth century, neither the plaintiff nor
the defendant typically utilized the services of either private or public attorneys;
the accused and the victim both generally delivered their own plea or defense.193
After the mid-eighteenth century, however—as English courts demanded greater
technical preparation and legal expertise—private lawyers more frequently represented the victim and the accused.194 Also, before the mid-eighteenth century,
victims in England bore the entire cost of prosecution—compensated by the accused only upon a conviction—but a parliamentary statute in 1752 afforded some
public provision for the cost.195
This provision fell short, however, of the total expense for prosecuting a case
to avert an unwanted encouragement of malicious prosecutions. The restitution
following a successful conviction, moreover, covered the remainder of the expenses regardless.196 The king still enjoyed prerogative rights to pardon a criminal offender; the king’s attorney could still issue a writ of nol. pros. to scuttle an
unwanted private prosecution, and private attorneys and victims still prosecuted
criminal cases in the king’s name.197 As of yet, few in England complained about
the system of private prosecution. The system in America, meanwhile, had become more thoroughly hybrid since the early eighteenth century, with further
changes to come in the decades after independence. America would move ever
slowly, by degrees, to a more public system of criminal prosecution.

9 COLONIAL RECORDS OF NORTH CAROLINA 733, supra note 191, at 751-52, 754, 775, 783; Minutes of
the Upper House of the North Carolina General Assembly (Mar. 2, 1774-Mar. 25, 1774), in 9 COLONIAL
RECORDS OF NORTH CAROLINA, supra note 191, at 831, 842, 849, 855; Minutes of the Lower House of
the North Carolina General Assembly (Mar. 2, 1774-Mar. 25, 1774), in 9 COLONIAL RECORDS OF NORTH
CAROLINA, supra note 191, at 874, 893, 896, 909, 911, 918.
192. Cardenas, supra note 3, at 370-71; BENSON, supra note 3, at 96.
193. BENSON, supra note 3, at 215.
194. Id.; John H. Langbein, Understanding the Short History of Plea Bargaining, 13 L. & SOC’Y
REV. 261, 261-70 (1979); Mark Koyama, Prosecution Associations in Industrial Revolution England: Private Providers of Public Goods?, 41 J. LEGAL STUD. 95, 98 (2012).
195. Craig B. Little & Christopher P. Sheffield, Frontiers and Criminal Justice: English Private
Prosecution Societies and American Vigilantism in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries, 48 AM. SOCIO. R. 796, 797 (1983).
196. Id.; Cardenas, supra note 3, at 360; Harold J. Krent, Executive Control Over Criminal Law Enforcement: Some Lessons from History, 38 AM. UNIV. L. REV. 275, 295 (1989).
197. Krent, supra note 196, at 296 n.103.
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D. EARLY NATIONAL PERIOD
The Second Continental Congress began drafting the Articles of Confederation just eight days after declaring independence from Great Britain, with the final
version sent to the states for ratification in December 1777 and approved by most
of the states within a year. Centered as it was on winning the war, the Articles of
Confederation did not provide for any federal judiciary or system of law enforcement, leaving the subject of criminal prosecution entirely to the newly independent
states, as expressed in their state constitutions.
Prosecutions would no longer commence in the name of the king, of course.
The pre-1789 constitutions of Vermont and Pennsylvania instructed that “[a]ll
prosecution[s] shall commence in the name and by the authority of the freemen of
the [State or commonwealth] . . . and all indictments shall conclude with these
words, ‘Against the peace and dignity of the same.’”198 The pre-1789 constitutions of Maryland, New Hampshire, New Jersey, North Carolina, and Virginia did
not expressly compel that prosecutions commence in the name of the state, but the
constitutions instructed that all “Indictments shall conclude, ‘Against the peace,
government and dignity of the State.’”199
When a prosecution commenced in the name of the state, did it mean that this
was a public prosecution? Or could it still be a private prosecution, stylized, symbolically, in the name of the state, much like private prosecutions in the colonial
period sometimes commenced in the name of the king? Unfortunately, again, this
is not always specified in the record. In 1777, for instance, the North Carolina

198. PA. CONST. of 1776 § 27, reprinted in 5 THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS: COLONIAL
CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE STATES, TERRITORIES, AND COLONIES NOW OR HERETOFORE FORMING THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 3081, 3089 (Francis Newton Thorpe ed., 1909)
[hereinafter 5 FSC]; VT. CONST. of 1777 § XXIV, reprinted in 6 THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS: COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE STATES, TERRITORIES, AND COLONIES NOW OR HERETOFORE FORMING THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 3737, 3746 (Francis Newton
Thorpe ed., 1909) [hereinafter 6 FSC].
199. MD. CONST. of 1776 art. LVII, reprinted in 3 THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS: COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE STATES, TERRITORIES, AND COLONIES NOW OR
HERETOFORE FORMING THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 1686, 1700-01 (Francis Newton Thorpe ed.,
1909) [hereinafter 3 FSC]; N.H. CONST. of 1784 pt. II, reprinted in 4 THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS: COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE STATES, TERRITORIES, AND COLONIES NOW OR HERETOFORE FORMING THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 2453, 2469 (Francis Newton
Thorpe ed., 1909) [hereinafter 4 FSC]; N.J. CONST. of 1776 art. XV, reprinted in 5 FSC, supra note 198,
at 2794, 2597; N.C. CONST. of 1776, art. XXXVI, reprinted in 5 FSC, supra note 198, at 2787, 2793; VA.
CONST. of 1776, reprinted in 7 THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS: COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND
OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE STATES, TERRITORIES, AND COLONIES NOW OR HERETOFORE FORMING
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 3812, 3818 (Francis Newton Thorpe ed., 1909) [hereinafter 7 FSC]. In
the immediate period following the ratification of the federal constitution in 1789, Delaware and South
Carolina also institutionalized this in their state constitutions. See S.C. CONST. of 1790 art. III § 2, reprinted in 6 FSC, supra note 198, at 3258, 3263; DEL. CONST. of 1792 art. VI § 21, reprinted in 1 THE
FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS: COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE
STATES, TERRITORIES, AND COLONIES NOW OR HERETOFORE FORMING THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 568, 578 (Francis Newton Thorpe ed., 1909) [hereinafter 1 FSC].
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court docket stylized the prosecution of such crimes as horse stealing, grand larceny, assault, trespassing, and robbery, as “The State vs. [_____].”200 But did this
equal a public prosecution? A public attorney, no doubt, was available “for the
trial of Criminals in each District.”201
After 1777, judges in North Carolina possessed powers “to appoint some
practising [sic] Lawyer properly qualified to prosecute . . . as attorney for the
State” (making the public attorney a figure of the judicial branch, not the executive
branch).202 An additional North Carolina law in 1783 specified that the public
attorney was to be “a gentleman of known skill and abilities in the law, and of
approved integrity, to act as county attorney and solicitor for the State, in all matters civil and criminal . . . .”203 This latter clause, however, is extremely important. Obviously, at the very least, plaintiffs in civil cases remained private, and
so legal historians ought not to leap to the conclusion that such legislation eliminated the option of private prosecution in criminal court. Indeed, there were several express acknowledgments in the 1780s of private prosecutions in criminal
courts in North Carolina—derided, sometimes, as “vexatious suits and Prosecutions”—including for cases of assault and battery.204 Many such prosecutions,
though privately conducted, commenced in the name of the state.205
A few state constitutions before 1789 established an office of the public prosecutor.206 The Massachusetts constitution of 1780 was the first to institutionalize
the democratic election of public attorneys, specifying that “district-attorneys shall

200. Minutes of the North Carolina House of Commons (Apr. 19, 1784-June 3, 1784), in 19 THE
COLONIAL STATE RECORDS OF NORTH CAROLINA 489, 512-13 (William L. Saunders ed., 1886) [hereinafter 19 STATE RECORDS OF NORTH CAROLINA].
201. Minutes of the North Carolina Senate (Apr. 7, 1777-May 9, 1777), in 12 THE COLONIAL STATE
RECORDS OF NORTH CAROLINA 1, 57 (Walter Clark ed., 1895).
202. Acts of the North Carolina General Assembly, 1777 (Apr. 7, 1777-May 9, 1777), in 24 THE
COLONIAL STATE RECORDS OF NORTH CAROLINA 1, 37 (William L. Saunders ed., 1886) [hereinafter 24
STATE RECORDS OF NORTH CAROLINA].
203. Acts of the North Carolina General Assembly, 1783 (Apr. 18, 1783-May 17, 1783), in 24 STATE
RECORDS OF NORTH CAROLINA, supra note 202, at 475, 494.
204. Minutes of the North Carolina Senate (Apr. 18, 1783-May 17, 1783), in 19 STATE RECORDS OF
NORTH CAROLINA, supra note 200, at 129, 190, 192; Minutes of the North Carolina House of Commons
(Apr. 18, 1783-May 17, 1783), in 19 STATE RECORDS OF NORTH CAROLINA, supra note 200, at 233, 290,
315.
205. Minutes of the North Carolina Senate (Apr. 18, 1783-May 17, 1783), supra note 204, at 190,
192, 214; Minutes of the North Carolina House of Commons (Apr. 18, 1783-May 17, 1783), supra note
204, at 290, 315, 344; Minutes of the North Carolina House of Commons (Nov. 1, 1790-Dec. 15, 1790),
in 21 THE COLONIAL STATE RECORDS OF NORTH CAROLINA 871, 1022 (William L. Saunders ed., 1886);
Minutes of the Salisbury District Court of Oyer and Terminer (Mar. 1, 1777-Mar. 7, 1777), in 22 THE
COLONIAL STATE RECORDS OF NORTH CAROLINA 501, 512-13 (William L. Saunders ed., 1886); Ordinances of Convention, 1776 (Nov. 22, 1776-Dec. 23, 1776), in 23 STATE RECORDS OF NORTH CAROLINA,
supra note 189, at 985, 992, 996 (William L. Saunders ed., 1886); Acts of the North Carolina General
Assembly, 1777 (Apr. 7, 1777-May 9, 1777), 24 STATE RECORDS OF NORTH CAROLINA, supra note 202,
at 36-37; Acts of the North Carolina General Assembly, 1783 (Apr. 18, 1783-May 17, 1773), supra note
203, at 488-89, 494; Acts of the North Carolina General Assembly, 1784 (Apr. 19, 1784-June 3, 1784), in
24 STATE RECORDS OF NORTH CAROLINA, supra note 202, at 543, 595.
206. See MASS. CONST. of 1780 art. XIX § 2, reprinted in 3 FSC, supra note 199, at 1888, 1918;
Cardenas, supra note 3, at 370 (containing constitutional provisions that establish public prosecutors); S.C.
CONST. of 1776, reprinted in 6 FSC, supra note 198, 3241, 3246 (containing constitutional provisions that
establish public prosecutors).
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be chosen by the people of the several districts,” though the governor of Massachusetts, like those in other states, appointed the attorney general.207 In Virginia,
by 1789, deputy attorneys of the attorney general controlled most of the criminal
prosecutions in their respective counties.208 The 1776 constitution of South Carolina acknowledged a role for JPs and the attorney general for overseeing and
conducting “criminal prosecutions,” though most public prosecutions remained
privately initiated.209
Nowhere in any of the state constitutions was the public attorney awarded the
exclusive right to prosecute in criminal court. Far from it: several of the state
constitutions included articles or amendments expressly guaranteeing the rights of
victims in court, implying, very strongly, a constitutional right to private prosecution.210 The Maryland constitution of 1776 was the first to include victims’ rights,
making it the 17th article of the “Declaration of Rights” that served as the preamble to the document:
XVII. That every freeman, for any injury done him in his person
or property, ought to have remedy, by the course of the law of the
land, and ought to have justice and right freely without sale, fully
without any denial, and speedily without delay, according to the
law of the land.211
Massachusetts became the second state to recognize victims’ rights in its constitution, doing so in 1780, and likewise placed it within their preamble entitled “A
Declaration of the Rights of the inhabitants of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts”:
XI. Every subject of the commonwealth ought to find a certain
remedy, by having recourse to the laws, for all injuries or wrongs
which he may receive in his person, property, or character. He
ought to obtain right and justice freely, and without being obliged
to purchase it; completely, and without any denial; promptly, and
without delay; conformably to the laws.212
New Hampshire repeated the same guarantee in its “Bill of Rights” in 1784, so
that by the eve of the Constitutional Convention in 1787, three state constitutions
explicitly acknowledged the rights of victims to pursue and secure justice.213 The
language in these constitutions suggested, indeed, that if the public attorney refused to prosecute, the victim could initiate proceedings on his or her own, obtaining “right and justice freely . . . completely, and without any denial.”214

207. MASS. CONST. of 1780 art. XIX § 2, supra note 206, at 1888, 1918.
208. Cardenas, supra note 3, at 370.
209. S.C. CONST. of 1776, supra note 206, at 3241, 3246.
210. See MD. CONST. of 1776, supra note 199, at 1686; MASS. CONST. of 1780 art. XIX § 2, supra
note 206, at 1918; N.H. CONST. of 1784 pt. II, supra note 199, at 2453, 2455 (containing provisions that
provide individuals with a right to pursue justice independently).
211. MD. CONST. of 1776, supra note 199, at 1686, 1688.
212. MASS. CONST. of 1780 art. XI, supra note 206, at 1888, 1891.
213. N.H. CONST. of 1784 pt. II, supra note 199, at 2453, 2455.
214. Id.
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And what of the federal level? The new federal constitution in 1787 did not
assign exclusive rights to prosecute criminal behavior either to the federal government or to the state governments.215 It is true, of course, that the Constitution
established in the federal government an executive branch possessing broad powers to execute the law of the land; some legal historians, consequently, insist that
the Framers designed for the executive branch to exercise wide and exclusive prosecutorial discretion in the enforcement of federal law.216 The Constitution, these
historians argue, granted federal prosecutors near-total discretion over how to
prosecute (or not to prosecute) criminal violations of federal law.217 The evidence, however, is simply not there: the “Executive Power” clause in Article II is
famously ambiguous and certainly no basis for the view that the Framers designed
for exclusive prosecutorial discretion in the executive branch, even in matters of
federal law.218
The Bill of Rights, which came after the drafting of the Constitution, was
primarily designed to assuage Anti-Federalist fears of an excessively powerful
federal government. It should thus come as no surprise that the Bill of Rights
centered on the rights of defendants against aggressive prosecutors. Some legal
commentators like Erin C. Blondel conclude that “the Bill of Rights appears to
assume that the government is the defendant’s adversary in criminal proceedings,”
and that “[i]t does not anticipate third parties such as crime victims presenting a
challenge to the liberty of accused defendants.”219 But the fact that private prosecution persisted in the states after the ratification of the Constitution (as detailed
below), automatically disqualifies this particular interpretation of the Bill of
Rights. The Framers (many of them lawyers) were quite obviously aware that
private prosecution existed in the states, and they expected the practice to continue. The Framers also understood that historically, government prosecutors
could become extremely abusive of individual rights: thus, they included in the
Bill of Rights protections for defendants. Nothing in those protections, however,
suggests that the Framers rejected victims’ rights or victim participation in court
proceedings. The Ninth Amendment, after all, stipulated that the American people
retain rights not enumerated in the first eight amendments, and one can safely assume that the right of crime victims to reasonably pursue justice would naturally
fall under this category.
The Judiciary Act of 1789, passed in the first session of the inaugural Congress, established the U.S. federal judiciary.220 The Constitution itself had made
no specific provision for judicial procedure in federal courts, but rather left the
matter to Congress.221 The Judiciary Act awarded the President power to appoint

215. Dangel, supra note 3, at 1074-75.
216. Danielle Levine, Public Wrongs and Private Rights: Limiting the Victim’s Role in a System of
Public Prosecution, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 335, 339-40 (2010).
217. Id.
218. Dangel, supra note 3, at 1076-79, 1088.
219. Blondel, supra note 7, at 247; King, supra note 6, at 366-68.
220. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 35, 1 Stat. 73, 92 (1789).
221. Dangel, supra note 3, at 1084.
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the attorney general, who in turn possessed the authority to prosecute suits in federal court that directly concerned the United States government, and to offer legal
advice and opinions to the President.222 The position of federal attorney general
thus closely resembled the king’s attorney in England.223 An earlier draft of the
Judiciary Act vested the power to appoint the attorney general to the U.S. Supreme
Court; the bill’s authors, therefore, did not believe it was a constitutional requirement that the executive appoint the attorney general.224
Besides arranging for a federal attorney general, the Judiciary Act also required that a federal district attorney be appointed for each of the thirteen judicial
districts across the country, with duties “to prosecute in such district all delinquents from crimes and offences, cognizable under the authority of the United
States, and all civil actions in which the United States shall be concerned.”225 The
federal government thus adopted a public system of prosecution far earlier than
many of the state and local governments, and yet, even in federal courts, the victim
was neither silent nor shut out of the process. Private citizens, at first, could lawfully initiate federal prosecutions by lobbying the federal grand jury directly if the
federal district attorney determined not to press charges.226 Attorney General William Bradford, in 1794, affirmed that a private citizen could legally compel a federal district attorney to act upon a grand jury presentment, even after the district
attorney decided not to prosecute.227 Moreover, though federal attorneys conducted the bulk of prosecutions in federal courts, they occasionally hired private
attorneys as “special counsel” to assist in the case.228
Not until the middle of the nineteenth century was private participation in
federal courts officially curtailed. In 1842, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that in
federal courts, “the government alone has the right to control the whole proceedings and execution of the sentence.”229 Another case in 1860 concluded that
“there is no power conferred, by statute or usage, on the courts of the United
States, to recognize a suit, civil or criminal, as legally before them, in the name of
the United States, unless it is instituted and prosecuted by a district attorney legally
appointed and commissioned.”230 These clarifications had to be made more than
half a century after ratifying the Constitution; in the meantime, as we will see, it
was not uncommon for private individuals to influence or even direct criminal
prosecutions in federal court.231
222. JACOBY, supra note 3, at 19-20.
223. Id.; POUND, supra note 3, at 150.
224. Dangel, supra note 3, at 1084.
225. Ann Woolhandler & Caleb Nelson, Does History Defeat Standing Doctrine?, 102 MICH. L. REV.
689, 700 (2004) (quoting Judiciary Act of 1789).
226. Krent, supra note 196, at 292-94; Dangel, supra note 3, at 1083.
227. Dangel, supra note 3, at 1083.
228. Id. at 1083-84.
229. Woolhandler & Nelson, supra note 225, at 700 (quoting United States v. Murphy, 41 U.S. (16
Pet.) 203, 209 (1842)).
230. Id. at 699 n.47 (quoting United States v. McAvoy, 26 F. Cas. 1044, 1045-46 (C.C.S.D.N.Y.
1860) (No. 15,654)).
231. See, e.g., United States v. Skinner, 27 F. Cas. 1123, 1124 (C.C.D.N.Y. 1818) (No. 16,309) (holding that “no instructions were necessary on the part of the president, or any other officer of government,

BarthFINAL(third sub. edits_J.) (Do Not Delete)

2022]

8/21/2022 3:37 PM

CRIMINAL PROSECUTION IN AMERICAN HISTORY: PRIVATE OR PUBLIC?

149

Criminal prosecution, as the Founders envisioned, remained primarily a function of state and local governments. Federal litigation was mostly confined to
federal attorneys handling only the small allotment of crimes of distinct interest to
the national government. Legal historians who insist on the total dominance of
public prosecution in the early national period inordinately focus most of their
attention on the federal system. A hybrid system of criminal prosecution remained
the de facto standard in most states and localities in the early national period. The
new state constitutions of Pennsylvania (1790) and Delaware (1792) included, for
the first time, a guarantee of the rights of crime victims, closely resembling extant
rights promised to victims in Maryland, New Hampshire, and Massachusetts.232
To quote the Delaware constitution (which mirrored, almost word for word, the
language in the Pennsylvania constitution):
All courts shall be open; and every man, for an injury done him in
his reputation, person, movable or immovable possessions, shall
have remedy by the due course of law, and justice administered
according to the very right of the cause and the law of the land,
without sale, denial, or unreasonable delay or expense . . . .233
Nevertheless, there is little doubt that in the early years of the nineteenth century,
the ratio of public to private prosecutions increasingly tilted toward public action.
The influence of Italian criminologist Cesare Bonesana di Beccaria contributed
signally to this development.234 Beccaria’s Essay on Crimes and Punishment—
published in 1764, but taking some time to influence American judges and legislators—regarded crime not as an act against the victim, but rather against society
at large.235 “The sovereign’s right to punish crimes,” Beccaria argued, arose
“upon the nece[ss]ity of defending the public liberty, entru[s]ted to his care, from
the u[s]urpation of individual[s].”236 The political sovereign “repre[s]ents the
[s]ociety it[s]elf,” he argued, and because “crimes are to be e[s]timated by the
injury done to [s]ociety,” the government should prosecute.237

to justify the issuing a warrant for the violation of this or any other law; nor had the president any right to
interfere with the proceedings which had been commenced in this case, by giving any instructions to him
on the subject. Nor was it necessary that the application for a warrant should be made by the district
attorney, as any individual might complain of the infraction of a law, and he considered it his duty to award
a warrant whenever complaint was made to him on oath of a crime’s being committed, whether such
warrant were applied for by the district attorney or any other person.”).
232. DEL. CONST. of 1792 art. I § 9, reprinted in 1 FSC, supra note 199, at 568-69; PA. CONST. of
1790 art. IX § 11, reprinted in 5 FSC, supra note 198, at 3092, 3101. The new 1792 constitution of New
Hampshire reaffirmed its earlier victims’ rights guarantee. N.H. CONST. of 1792 art. XIV, reprinted in 4
FSC, supra note 199, at 2471, 2473.
233. DEL. CONST. of 1792 art. I § 9, supra note 232, at 568-69.
234. See McDonald, supra note 1, at 654-55 (summarizing Beccaria’s influence and pieces of work);
Cardenas, supra note 3, at 369 (referencing Beccaria as a notable enlightened thinker); McDonald, Role
of Victim, supra note 3, at 297 (referencing Beccaria’s influence in America).
235. See generally CESARE BONESANA DI BECCARIA, AN ESSAY ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS
(Monf. De Voltaire trans., 4th. ed., 1775) (discussing the nature of crimes and their effect on society at
large).
236. Id. at 7.
237. Id. at 11, 29.
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The primary aim of criminal justice, Becarria wrote, should be to better society, not to redress the victim, for crime was a societal concern, not a private concern.238 Private actors, for example, might unduly forgive serious crimes, settle
outside of court, or—on the opposite end of the spectrum—extract inordinate financial damages from the offender, prosecuting out of a spirit of vengeance, and
not out of a desire to either deter others or to rehabilitate the criminal. “The end
of puni[s]hment,” Beccaria stated, “i[s] no other, than to prevent the criminal from
doing further injury to [s]ociety, and to prevent other[s] from committing the like
offence.”239 Beccaria emphasized imprisonment over more traditional sanctions
such as corporal punishment, forced servitude, and restitution.240
By the beginning of the nineteenth century, most states in the United States,
for the first time, established prisons, abolishing corporal punishment altogether
and phasing out restitution. Massachusetts founded its first prison in 1805; that
same year, a Massachusetts court imposed, for the final time, a sentence of treble
damages to the victim of a crime.241 Unlike in France, however—where the procureur publique was a centrally controlled figure—the public attorney in America
was a local officer not under the thumb of centralized authorities in the state capital, much less the federal capital.242 In 1793, Vermont joined Massachusetts as
the second state in the Union to establish, in its constitution, that the “State’s Attorney shall be elected by the Freemen of their respective Counties.”243 In Connecticut, the public prosecutor was appointed by the county judge; in Virginia, by
the local court. Even in states where he was appointed by the governor, he remained a local official.244 These were not all-powerful officials. The typical state
attorney general functioned primarily as a legal advisor to the governor, not as a
prosecutor (even when he nominally headed the prosecution).245 Perhaps, for this
reason, a lawyer’s manual in 1816—describing the workings of the county and
town governments in New York—detailed the positions of twenty-one officers in
the state, without a single mention of the office of the public prosecutor, though
such an office existed.246
Private prosecutions were still remarkably common in certain parts of the
United States in the early nineteenth century. Legal historians Professor Paul G.
Cassell and Steven Joffee argue that many scholars mistakenly interpret the “statutory creation of the office of public prosecutor as proof of the end of private

238. Id. at 43.
239. Id.
240. See generally id. (discussing the difference of punishments and their effectiveness on crime deterrence).
241. McDonald, Role of Victim, supra note 3, at 297; McDonald, supra note 1, at 657-59; Levine,
supra note 216, at 338-39.
242. Dangel, supra note 3, at 1074-75; JACOBY, supra note 3, at 24, 37.
243. VT. CONST. of 1793 art. XVI, reprinted in 6 FSC, supra note 198, at 3762, 3775.
244. JACOBY, supra note 3, at 20-21.
245. Id. at 20, 37; Dangel, supra note 3, at 1074.
246. See Dangel, supra note 3, at 1072; JACOBY, supra note 3, at 24. See generally JOHN TAPPEN,
THE COUNTY AND TOWN OFFICER (Kingston, J. Tappen 1816) (describing the workings of the county and
town governments in New York).
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prosecution,” overemphasizing the extent of the public attorney’s activities.247
“However,” they say, “the rise of public prosecutors hardly means that private
prosecutions disappeared.”248 Professor Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., in like manner, recently argued that “well into the nineteenth century, private lawyers regularly
pressed private victims’ cases before the grand jury and at trial.”249
Why did private prosecutions persist? For one, public prosecutors did not
generally possess equal talents as private attorneys.250 The most talented lawyers
of the period entered private practice, relegating the office of the public prosecutor
to young, inexperienced attorneys or to incompetent attorneys of all ages.251 Even
when the public prosecutor was competent or even talented, a lack of staff and
assistant prosecutors made the job highly strenuous, with an intolerably large
amount of terrain to cover and inadequate time to properly deliberate the case.252
Mundane criminal acts were, therefore, still frequently prosecuted by private individuals: the public attorney had little time to handle the many lesser criminal
cases.253 And for more serious crimes like murder, privately funded attorneys (if
the victim could afford it) either prosecuted the case or, at the very least, liberally
assisted the public prosecution.254
Conventional wisdom had it that government should not have the exclusive
power to prosecute criminals.255 Such powers endangered liberty.256 Private
prosecution, where it persisted, reduced the cost and size of government; it also
protected the citizenry from public prosecutors who might improperly abuse their
discretionary powers, robbing the victim of justice.257 Many Americans, for the
same reason, opposed establishing a professional, public police force.258 Alexis
de Tocqueville recorded this observation about crime in America in 1835:
the means which the authorities have at their disposal for the discovery of crimes and the arrestation of criminals are few. A Statepolice does not exist . . . . Nevertheless in no country does crime
more rarely elude punishment. The reason is, that every one conceives himself to be interested in furnishing evidence of the act
committed, and in stopping the delinquent.259
247. Paul G. Cassell & Steven Joffee, The Crime Victim’s Expanding Role in a System of Public
Prosecution: A Response to the Critics of the Crime Victims’ Rights Act, 105 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY
164, 179 (2011).
248. Id.
249. Fairfax, supra note 3, at 422.
250. Ireland, supra note 3, at 43, 45.
251. Id. at 43-44.
252. Id. at 45.
253. Id. at 45-46.
254. Id. at 46. See also Cassell & Joffee, supra note 247, at 177-79 (discussing the origins of private
prosecution).
255. POUND, supra note 3, at 115; ROGER LANE, POLICING THE CITY: BOSTON, 1822-1885, at vii
(1967).
256. LANE, supra note 255, at vii.
257. McDonald, supra note 1, at 653.
258. Id.; LANE, supra note 255, at vii.
259. 1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 76 (Henry Reeve, trans., John C. Spencer, ed., New York, Adlard & Saunders, 1838).
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A vigilant citizenry was the most effective means to ensure social cohesion and
order, many Americans believed, without the perilous threat to liberty posed by a
standing army of centralized police. The same attitude carried forward into the
realm of criminal prosecution.
Private participation in criminal prosecution included the grand jury presentment.260 This was true in both state and federal courts. Even after 1789, in federal
courts, private citizens could present evidence of various crimes before the magistrate and secure, upon his approval, a bench warrant for the arrest of the accused.261 The procedure completely sidestepped the district attorney. The grand
jury, upon investigating the claim, issued a presentment without any involvement
from the district attorney, yet the action was sufficient for the magistrate to arrange
for a trial, upon which the district attorney issued a more formal indictment.262
The district attorney in these cases could also exercise discretion not to act upon a
grand jury presentment, but rather issue a writ of nol. pros. (much like the writ of
the same name in England). “The usage in this country has been, to pass over,
unnoticed, presentments on which the [district] attorney does not think it proper
to institute proceedings[,]” Chief Justice John Marshall stated in 1809.263 A Massachusetts Supreme Court case, Massachusetts v. Wheeler,264 affirmed that the
district attorney had “the power of entering a nolle prosequi[,]” and that the local
judge was “not legally competent” to override his decision.265 And yet, in 1825,
the North Carolina Supreme Court stated that a judge could legally nullify a writ
of nol. pros. if the powers “were oppressively used.”266
Criminal prosecutions could still be launched by private initiatives, including
on the federal level. In 1818, for instance, a private citizen initiated a criminal
case in federal court against three persons suspected of violating the Neutrality
Act, which debarred American citizens from outfitting ships intended to violently
confront foreign nations with whom the United States was currently at peace.267
Without any involvement from the district attorney, the private informer presented
evidence to the federal judge, who then issued warrants against the three suspects.268 In the forthcoming trial, United States v. Skinner,269 the defendants’
attorney moved that his clients be released on the ground that it is “necessary that
the application for a warrant should be made by the district attorney.”270 The

260. Krent, supra note 196, at 292.
261. Id.
262. Id. at 292-93, 292 nn.79-80.
263. United States v. Hill, 26 F. Cas. 315, 316 (C.C.D. Va. 1809) (No. 15,364).
264. 2 Mass. (1 Tyng.) 172 (1806).
265. Id. at 173-74.
266. North Carolina v. Thompson, 10 N.C. (3 Hawks) 613, 614 (1825). See also Krent, supra note
196, at 296 (explaining that Hill arose from the district attorney’s issuance of a series of nolle proseuis);
GOLDSTEIN, supra note 29, at 12-13 (explaining that Hill arose from the district attorney’s issuance of nol.
pros. nolle proseuis).
267. United States v. Skinner, 27 F. Cas. 1123, 1124 (C.C.D.N.Y. 1818) (No. 16,309).
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. Id.
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informer’s private attorney (who now assisted the public prosecution) replied that
a district attorney was, in fact, not necessary at all, and the judge agreed.271
In many places, private individuals could still fully conduct their own prosecution in criminal court. In 1812, for instance, Silas Norton of Connecticut privately prosecuted David Marvin for attempting to rape and poison Norton’s
daughter.272 Marvin was found guilty, and Norton received $600 “for his expenses in aforesaid prosecution.”273 A Pennsylvania law in 1804 gave jurors the
right to fine private prosecutors in the event of dismissal or acquittal, especially if
the case was believed to be petty or malevolent—indicating some frequency in the
instances of privately controlled prosecutions.274
The new states admitted into the Union after 1789 included express guarantees of the rights of crime victims in their constitutions. The articles, almost wordfor-word, replicated each other, affirming “[t]hat all courts shall be open; and
every man, for an injury done him in his lands, goods, person, or reputation, shall
have remedy by due course of law, and right and justice administered without sale,
denial, or delay[,]” whether criminal or civil. 275 The constitutions of Tennessee
(1796), Kentucky (1799), Ohio (1802), Indiana (1816), Mississippi (1817), Alabama (1819), and Missouri (1820), included such rights, and the state constitution
of Connecticut, in 1818, added the guarantee for the first time.276 The territorial
governments, moreover, before applying for admission into the Union, routinely
permitted private prosecution in criminal court, as did the courts of the District of
Columbia.277 The state constitutions of Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois, remarkably,
did not even mention a prosecuting attorney, even as they instructed that prosecutions and indictments “be carried on in the name and by the authority of the
State . . . .”278
Private attorneys did not always guarantee a better result for the alleged victim, as the family of Samuel Griffith discovered in a murder trial in 1821.279 A
couple of years prior, John Reed, a slave belonging to Griffith, ran away from
271. Id.; Krent, supra note 196, at 295.
272. 4 CONNECTICUT ARCHIVES, CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS, SECOND SERIES, 1671-1820, supra
note 148, at 129-30.
273. Id.
274. Steinberg, Spirit of Litigation, supra note 174, at 231 n.4, 245.
275. TENN. CONST. of 1796 art. XI § 17, reprinted in 6 FSC, supra note 198, at 3414, 3423. See KY.
CONST. of 1799 art. X § 12, reprinted in 3 FSC, supra note 199, at 1277, 1290; OHIO CONST. of 1802 art.
VIII § 7, reprinted in 5 FSC, supra note 198, at 2901, 2910; IND. CONST. of 1816 art. I § 11, reprinted in
2 THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS: COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE
STATES, TERRITORIES, AND COLONIES NOW OR HERETOFORE FORMING THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 1057, 1058 (Francis Newton Thorpe ed., 1909) [hereinafter 2 FSC]; MISS. CONST. of 1817 art. I § 14,
reprinted in 4 FSC, supra note 199, at 2032, 2034; CONN. CONST. of 1818 art. I § 12, reprinted in 1 FSC,
supra note 199, at 536, 538; ALA. CONST. of 1819 art. I § 14, reprinted in 1 FSC, supra note 199, at 96,
97; MO. CONST. of 1820 art. XIII § 7, reprinted in 4 FSC, supra note 199, at 2150, 2163.
276. See generally supra note 275 (discussing historic state constitutions).
277. See generally supra note 199 (discussing historic state constitutions).
278. OHIO CONST. of 1802 art. III § 12, supra note 275, at 2901, 2907; IND. CONST. of 1816 art. V §
11, supra note 275, at 1057, 1066-67; ILL. CONST. of 1818 art. IV § 7, reprinted in 2 FSC, supra note 275,
at 972, 979.
279. Linda Myrsiades, Legal Practice and Pragmatics in the Law: The 1821 Trials of John Reed,
“Fugitive Slave,” 138 PA. MAG. HIST. & BIOLOGY 305, 320-21 (2014).

BarthFINAL(third sub. edits_J.) (Do Not Delete)

154

SOUTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

8/21/2022 3:37 PM

[Vol. 67

Maryland to Pennsylvania.280 Griffith and two other men ventured into Pennsylvania to seize Reed, who in turn killed two of the three, including Griffith.281 His
family hired a private attorney to directly assist the public prosecutor, who charged
Reed with two separate counts of murder in the first degree, to be tried in two
separate murder trials.282 The private attorney effectively controlled the prosecution, but despite this assistance, the jury in Pennsylvania acquitted Reed in the
murder of Griffith—arguing that he simply defended himself—and reached a conviction of manslaughter for the second individual, accepting mitigation on the part
of Reed.283
Private initiative and private prosecution were likely more prolific in rural
areas than in urban areas: and the early United States was overwhelmingly rural.284 Private prosecution was especially common in frontier communities, where
common defense was more necessary, and where little technical skill or preparation was required in either prosecuting or judging a criminal case.285 “During my
stay in the United States,” Tocqueville recorded in 1835, “I witnessed the spontaneous formation of committees for the pursuit and prosecution of a man who had
committed a great crime.”286
This idea of private associations for defense and criminal prosecution arose
out of England.287 In the late eighteenth century, many hundreds of such associations emerged in England, a response to the increase in crime that had accompanied industrialization and the country’s lack of a professional police force.288 By
the early nineteenth century, private associations for the prosecution of felons
dominated the English legal landscape: as many as 4,000 such associations were
founded in England between 1750 and 1850.289 Each association established its
own unique system of internal governance; they advertised in local newspapers,
investigated crime, subsidized the costs of private prosecution, hired attorneys to
represent their clients in court, offered rewards for the capture of suspected criminals, and provided various incentives to attract new members.290 Many of these
associations included variable pricing plans to more closely align with the particular security demands of each individual subscriber.291 An advertisement in 1799
for the Association for the Prosecution of Felons claimed that “will not only be
the most likely method to preserve the persons and properties of said Associator
280. Id. at 305.
281. Id.
282. Id. at 306, 320-21.
283. Id. at 320-21.
284. See Little & Sheffield, supra note 195, at 796-97 (suggesting rural areas had fewer resources for
law enforcement, so rural populations initiated private prosecution and other private measures).
285. See id. at 797 (stating that with the creation of urban societies, self-help measures were on longer
adequate to address criminal prosecutorial concerns).
286. TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 259, at 76.
287. Koyama, supra note 194, at 95-96, 100-02, 121; Little & Sheffield, supra note 195, at 797;
William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Private Enforcement of Law, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 2 (1975).
288. Koyama, supra note 194, at 95-96, 100-02.
289. Id. at 103.
290. Id. at 96-97, 102-19; Little & Sheffield, supra note 195, at 797-98.
291. Koyama, supra note 194, at 106, 116.
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safe from felony, but will at the same time conduce greatly to the Public Good.”292
Besides providing the “Public Good” of deterrence—benefiting all members of
society—associations offered the service of funding private prosecutions for nonmembers, either by charging them a special fee or by charitably (and very publicly) providing prosecutorial services to the laboring poor.293 If the association
failed to live up to its promises, the member could leave to join another of the
many competing associations in town.294 Neither were they elitist organizations;
many of them included yeoman farmers, grocers, drapers, wheelwrights, butchers,
bakers, carpenters, and ironmongers.295 The first such association in the United
States was founded in 1782 by private citizens in Northampton, Massachusetts, in
the western, frontieresque part of the state.296 It was a private, anti-theft association.297 Anti-theft associations quickly arose elsewhere in rural communities,
where local constabularies were weak, non-existent, or only part-time and unsalaried.298 In rural Bucks County, Pennsylvania, several private associations arose
to protect the property of the county’s many farmers.299 Especially popular were
anti-horse-thief associations, whose membership rolls included many thousands
of rural Americans: farmers, banding together, extraneous from the state, to detect,
pursue, and then prosecute horse thieves.300 Like the private associations in England, these were not vigilante groups, for they neither held trials nor dispensed
justice.301 Rather, they delivered suspected thieves to state-run courts, whereupon
they either privately prosecuted the thief (most common of all) or they privately
initiated and assisted a public prosecution.302
E. ANTEBELLUM PERIOD
The United States of America thus retained a hybrid system of criminal prosecution (public and private) as it entered the second quarter of the nineteenth century. If public officials exercised a monopoly on prosecuting criminal cases, as so
many legal commentators erroneously imply,303 surely it would have appeared

292. Id. at 95 (quoting ASSOCIATION FOR THE PROSECUTION OF FELONS, COPY OF A DEED OF ASSOCIATION, FOR THE PROSECUTION OF FELONS 2 (Birmingham, T.A. Pearson’s Printing Office, 1799)).
293. Id. at 103-05.
294. Id. at 109.
295. Id. at 116; Little & Sheffield, supra note 195, at 804.
296. Ann-Marie Szymanski, Stop, Thief! Private Protective Societies in Nineteenth-Century New
England, 78 NEW ENG. Q. 407, 410-12 (2005).
297. Id. at 412.
298. Id. at 410-12.
299. Craig B. Little, The Criminal Courts in “Young America”: Bucks County, Pennsylvania, 18201860, with Some Comparisons to Massachusetts and South Carolina, 15 SOC. SCI. HIST. 457, 458, 463
(1991) [hereinafter Young America].
300. Szymanski, supra note 296, at 412-13, 425-26.
301. Little & Sheffield, supra note 195, at 804-05.
302. Id.
303. See Jason Twede, Going Public: How the Government Assumed The Authority To Prosecute In
The Southern United States (2016) (Ph.D dissertation, University of North Dakota) (on file with the Scholarly Commons, University of North Dakota); Cardenas, supra note 3, at 389.
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somewhere in the statute books, yet it did not, and the many examples of private
prosecution nullify the possibility in the first place.
Nevertheless, a significant shift occurred in the years preceding the Civil
War. Though private prosecution was not altogether abandoned in the antebellum
period—and though private assistance in public prosecutions still proliferated, especially in murder trials (as we will see)—the trend clearly titled toward public
prosecution, aided, in part, by the populist rhetoric of Jacksonian Democracy.304
It was at this moment in history that the American system of criminal justice departed decidedly from the English model.305
It would be a great error, however, to assume that private prosecutions in
criminal court died out in this era. Many legal historians have made this mistake.306 The antebellum era witnessed many high-profile cases in which private
attorneys assisted a nominally public prosecution; in reality, in such cases, the
private attorneys clearly ran the bulk of the procedure, rendering it a de facto private prosecution.307 Even more telling, there were also still many fully private
prosecutions in the antebellum period. Indeed, though more public than ever, the
criminal justice system in America retained its hybrid character into the middle of
the nineteenth century.
With the election of President Andrew Jackson in 1828, and again in 1832, a
wave of populist sentiment swept the United States.308 At the heart of this movement was the notion of popular democracy.309 For the first time, many states
adopted universal white male suffrage.310 District attorneys became popularly
elected; the American people were more likely to trust a government official who
was responsive to the will of the electorate.311 Private prosecutors, in contrast—
especially professional lawyers—were increasingly perceived as elitist, corruptible, money-hungry, and unresponsive to the people at large.312 As Jacoby tells
us, private prosecution became “inconsistent with the American concept of democratic process”; prosecution by locally-elected, public attorneys was deemed the
most acceptable “remedy for a population dedicated to a more democratic society.”313
The newly-elective status of the district attorney had an enormous impact on
the public’s perception of criminal justice. The constitutions of Massachusetts
and Vermont, in 1780 and 1793, provided for the election of public attorneys, but
304. JACOBY, supra note 3, at 22.
305. Cardenas, supra note 3, at 363.
306. See generally id. at 381 (“The general rule is that once a crime victim employs a private attorney
to assist the public prosecutor, the private attorney becomes a de facto agent of the state and therefore acts
on its behalf. . . . [H]e is, in effect, a temporary public prosecutor . . . .”).
307. Id. at 388.
308. JACOBY, supra note 3, at 25.
309. Id. at 22.
310. See id. (noting that the Jacksonian Democracy “increased democratization of American political
progress. Its effects were to redefine the national political process to include greater numbers of citizens
both as voters and as potential officers.”).
311. Id. at 22, 25, 37-38; Dangel, supra note 3, at 1074.
312. Woolhandler & Nelson, supra note 225, at 699.
313. JACOBY, supra note 3, at 10, 17.
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elsewhere they remained appointed, either by the governor, legislature, or a local
judge.314 In the new 1832 constitution for Mississippi—replacing the 1817 version—the State determined, for the first time, that the attorney general and district
attorneys “be elected by the qualified voters of their respective districts . . . .”315
Western states—the very heart of Jacksonian Democracy—were particularly
eager to jump on board to this new democratic trend. Iowa’s admission to the
Union in 1846 included a state constitution providing for the local election of the
“prosecuting attorney.”316 When California applied for admission in 1849, its
constitution included the “election by the people” of “district attorneys.” 317 Prosecutions were to “be conducted in the name and by the authority” of “The People
of the State of California;” in contrast to simply the state of California.318 The
1835 constitution for Michigan instructed that the governor appoint district attorneys, but the new constitution in 1850 made the office elective.319 The new 1851
constitution for Indiana—replacing the 1816 version—also provided for the popular election of the “Prosecuting Attorney,” and an 1853 amendment to the Tennessee Constitution made the office elective as well, no longer appointed by the
state legislature.320 Not all Western states joined in: the original constitution for
the Republic of Texas in 1836 provided for the executive appointment of the district attorney, but the 1845 constitution provided for the election of district attorneys by the state legislature.321
A string of state supreme court decisions in the antebellum period directly
addressed the issue of private participation in criminal prosecution. These were
often ambiguous rulings: some curtailing the right, others affirming the right. One
of the first major cases to curtail private participation arose out of Jackson’s home
state of Tennessee, where the state supreme court ruled in 1816 that “[n]o indictment ought to be sent to the grand jury without the sanction and approbation of
the solicitor-general . . . .”322 “[L]eaving prosecutions to every attorney who will
take a fee to prosecute,” they argued, would unduly permit “the innocent to be
oppressed or vexatiously harassed.”323 The state court in New Hampshire in 1827,
while not prohibiting the practice, argued that private prosecutions “are often commenced in very doubtful cases and for the most trivial offences . . . to vex and

314. MASS. CONST. of 1780 art. XIX, supra note 206, at 1888, 1918; VT. CONST. of 1793, supra note
243, at 3762, 3775.
315. MISS. CONST. of 1832 art. IV § 25, reprinted in 4 FSC, supra note 199, at 2049, 2057.
316. IOWA CONST. of 1846 art. V § 5, reprinted in 2 FSC, supra note 275, at 1123, 1131.
317. CAL. CONST. of 1849 art. VI § 7, reprinted in 1 FSC, supra note 199, at 391, 400.
318. Id. § 18.
319. MICH. CONST. of 1835 art. VII § 3, reprinted in 4 FSC, supra note 199, at 1930, 1937; MICH.
CONST. of 1850 art. X § 3, reprinted in 4 FSC, supra note 199, at 1944, 1959.
320. IND. CONST. of 1851 art. XVI § 9, reprinted in 2 FSC, supra note 275, at 1073, 1092; TENN.
CONST. of 1834 art. VI § 5, reprinted in 6 FSC, supra note 198, at 3426, 3435 (amended 1853).
321. TEX. CONST. of 1836 art. IV § 5, reprinted in 6 FSC, supra note 198, at 3532, 3535; TEX. CONST.
of 1845 art. IV § 12, reprinted in 6 FSC, supra note 198, at 3547, 3555.
322. Fout v. Tennessee, 4 Tenn. (3 Hayw.) 98, 98 (1816).
323. Id. at 99.
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harass an opponent.”324 The Louisiana Supreme Court in 1831 warned that private prosecutions reflect “the promptings of envy, malice, and all uncharitableness.”325 It would be wise, they argued, to “forbid the interference of private passions.”326 All of these statements indicate that private prosecutions had yet continued into the second quarter of the nineteenth century.
The first high-profile case to address the matter was Massachusetts v.
Knapp,327 argued before the Supreme Court of Massachusetts in 1830.328 Earlier
that year, Joseph and Francis Knapp were indicted for murdering Joseph White, a
sea captain with substantial wealth.329 The two brothers were said to have murdered White in order to seize his estate.330 A nephew of the deceased captain
hired the famed lawyer and U.S. Senator Daniel Webster to help prosecute the
case.331 The prosecution began first with Francis, then with Joseph.332 The
nephew paid Webster $1,000 to help prosecute the case against Francis.333 Webster, who remains famous to this day as one of the greatest orators in American
history, was a tremendous asset to the prosecution.334 The Knapp brothers were
both quickly convicted.335 Their defense attorney, at first, raised no objection to
Webster’s appearance in the trial of Francis, but when Webster appeared in the
trial of Joseph, the defense quickly objected.336 Webster responded that he was
not being paid to prosecute Joseph, which in turn satisfied the judge.337 Joseph
received a guilty verdict, upon which he appealed to the state supreme court, demanding that Webster’s participation unfairly skewed the trial.338 The state supreme court ruled that the procedure was legal because the attorney general enjoyed, at least nominally, ultimate control over the prosecution, and because Webster had freely volunteered his services with no expectation of financial compensation.339 Whether the justices knew that Webster was paid to prosecute Francis
is not entirely clear.340
But the ruling did not end the controversy of privately assisted prosecutions,
either in Massachusetts or nationally. The issue erupted in another high-profile
case in Kentucky in 1839, during the trial of three Mississippi plantation owners

324.
325.
326.
327.
328.
329.
330.
331.
332.
333.
334.
335.
336.
337.
338.
339.
340.

Waldron v. Tuttle, 4 N.H. 149, 151 (1827).
Markham v. Close, 2 La. 581, 587 (1831).
Id.
27 Mass. (10 Pick.) 477 (1830).
Id. at 477; Ireland, supra note 3, at 48.
Ireland, supra note 3, at 58 n.10.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See generally id. (“[H]is performance was instrumental in securing Knapp’s conviction.”).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 48.
Id.; Massachusetts v. Knapp, 27 Mass. (10 Pick.) 477, 491 (1830).
Ireland, supra note 3, at 48.
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charged with the murder of two artisans from Louisville.341 The three Mississippi
men hired as their defense attorney John Rowan, the most celebrated lawyer in the
entire state of Kentucky.342 In an effort to counter this—and knowing that the
public prosecutor was far less talented than Rowan—friends of the two murdered
artisans paid $1,000 to hire Ben Hardin, another famous private attorney, to assist
in the prosecution.343 At the opening of the trial, Rowan attacked Hardin’s participation, calling it a due process violation.344 Private prosecutors were intrinsically different from public attorneys, Rowan argued.345 A public prosecutor, he
said, is able to presume innocence; the private prosecutor, on the other hand, was
paid to ensure a guilty verdict, regardless of evidence.346 Money, in other words,
would determine the outcome of the case (the irony, of course, was that the three
accused men had a greater chance of securing an acquittal precisely because of the
money they had to hire the most highly-skilled attorney in the state).347 Rowan
failed to persuade the court of the supposed illegality of Hardin’s assistance in the
prosecution, but he was nevertheless able to secure an acquittal for his clients.348
Private assistance in murder trials thus continued onward in places like Kentucky. The vast majority of the time they did not appear to unfairly prejudice the
accused, though a murder trial in that state in 1845 raised some eyebrows.349 Earlier that year, Abner Baker, who suffered from mental illness, murdered one of the
wealthiest men of the county, Daniel Bates.350 Baker falsely believed that Bates
was sleeping with his wife.351 On his deathbed, Bates amended his will to provide
$10,000 for the hiring of private lawyers to successfully convict Baker and ordered
his son to kill Baker in case of acquittal or even a sentence lighter than death.352
Once he died, Bates’s family hired three of the most outstanding and salient attorneys in Kentucky to assist the public prosecutor.353 At all stages of the trial, the
three private attorneys utterly dominated the proceedings, arguing strenuously
against the defense’s argument that Baker’s insanity ought to mitigate the sentence.354 Baker was convicted and hanged.355 Many believed that a public prosecution might have led to a different sentence.356
By the middle of the nineteenth century, the Massachusetts Supreme Court
appeared poised to reverse its earlier decision in Knapp, which had allowed for
341.
342.
343.
344.
345.
346.
347.
348.
349.
350.
351.
352.
353.
354.
355.
356.

Id. at 47.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 47-48.
Id. at 48.
Id.
Id. at 51-52.
Id. at 51.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 51-52.
Id. at 52.
Id.
Id.
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the assistance of a private attorney in the prosecution of criminal cases. In Massachusetts v. Williams,357 the justices vaguely suggested prohibiting such assistance.358 Six years later, in Massachusetts v. Gibbs,359 the Massachusetts Supreme Court prohibited private prosecutions without the use of a public attorney.360 And yet private assistance in criminal prosecutions continued. In Boston,
for instance, in 1850, Professor John White Webster of Harvard University was
put on trial for the murder of Dr. George Parkman.361 Parkman’s family hired the
most prominent attorney in Boston, George Bemis, to assist the prosecution.362
The performance of the public prosecutor, John Clifford, was deficient and poor,
and so Bemis, not surprisingly, dominated the proceedings, resulting in Professor
Webster’s conviction and execution.363 The defense attorney, remarkably, never
once objected to Bemis’s appearance, thus signaling that private assistance in
criminal prosecutions were still largely acceptable in state courts.364
Even federal courts affirmed the right to a privately-assisted prosecution.365
In 1851, a man from Pennsylvania named Hanway was charged with treason
against the United States.366 Hanway was said to have incited a band of African
Americans to assault and kill a slaveowner from Maryland who had ventured into
Pennsylvania with a federal marshal to capture a fugitive slave.367 The slaveowner’s family hired two highly prominent lawyers—one of them a U.S. Senator—to help the federal attorney prosecute Hanway, and the federal judge overruled the defense’s objection to this hire.368 Hanway was nevertheless acquitted;
not even the most talented attorneys in the country could successfully prosecute a
man on insufficient evidence.369
Thus, in murder trials especially, private participation in criminal prosecution
persisted in the middle of the nineteenth century.370 To cite another example, in
1844, in New York City, after Amelia Norman attempted to murder her former
lover Henry S. Ballard, Ballard hired a private attorney to aid in the prosecution.371 In 1859, in Washington, D.C., a private attorney helped prosecute Daniel

357.
358.
359.
360.
361.
362.
363.
1971).
364.
365.
366.
367.
368.
369.
370.
46.
371.

56 Mass (2 Cush.) 582 (1849).
Id. at 585; Bessler, supra note 3, at 519.
70 Mass. (4 Gray.) 146 (1855).
Id. at 147.
Ireland, supra note 3, at 46, 53.
Id. at 53.
Id.; ROBERT SULLIVAN, THE DISAPPEARANCE OF DR. PARKMAN 59 (Little, Brown & Company,
Ireland, supra note 3, at 53.
Id. at 47.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Extraordinary Trials before the Courts, N.Y. HERALD, Jan. 17, 1844; Ireland, supra note 3, at
Ireland, supra note 3, at 46.
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Sickles, accused of killing Philip Barton Key for sleeping with his wife, Mrs. Sickles. Key’s family hired a prominent attorney to assist in the prosecution, and there
was no objection from the court.372
State constitutions provided an implicit justification for private assistance in
criminal prosecutions or even outright private prosecutions. The constitutional
justification appeared in the rights explicitly recognized for crime victims.373 Victim rights were usually listed under Article I of state constitutions alongside the
basic rights afforded to defendants.374 “Every man shall have remedy by due
course of law for injury done him in his person, property, or reputation,” the constitution of Oregon read, with others closely mirroring that language.375 On the
eve of the Civil War, in 1860, twenty states included in their constitutions explicit
acknowledgments of the rights of victims, including Texas (1836 and 1845), Florida (1838), Rhode Island (1842), Wisconsin (1848), Kansas (1855), Minnesota
(1857), and Oregon (1857).376 Other states included Delaware, Mississippi, Pennsylvania, and Maryland.377
A few state constitutions explicitly guaranteed a right for crime victims to
prosecute their own cases. These guarantees were not limited to civil trials but
also extended to criminal trials. The constitutions of Wisconsin and Michigan
instructed that “any suitor, in any court of this State, shall have the right to prosecute or defend his suit, either in his own proper person, or by an attorney or agent
of his choice.”378 The 1836 constitution for the Republic of Texas established that
the “common law of England” would constitute the primary mode of procedure
“in all criminal cases . . . with such modifications as our circumstances, in their
judgment, may require.”379 In Tennessee, in 1853, a constitutional amendment
372. Id. at 46 n.7.
373. TEX. CONST. of 1836, Dec. of Rights § 11, supra note 321, at 3542.
374. TEX. CONST. of 1845 art. I § 11, supra note 321, at 3548; FLA. CONST. of 1838 art. I § 9, reprinted in 2 FCSC, supra note 275, at 665; R.I. CONST. of 1842 art. I § 5, in 6 FSC, supra note 198, at
322; WIS. CONST. of 1848 art. I § 9, reprinted in 7 FSC, supra note 199, at 407; KAN. CONST. of 1855 art.
I § 16, reprinted in 2 FSC, supra note 275, at 1179, 1181; MINN. CONST. of 1857 art. I § 8, reprinted in 4
FSC, supra note 9, at 1991-92; OR. CONST. of 1857 art. I § 10, reprinted in 5 FSC, supra note 198, at
2998-99; DEL. CONST. of 1831 art. 1 § 9, reprinted in 1 FSC, supra note 199, at 582-83; MISS. CONST. of
1832 ART. I § 14, supra note 315, at 2049-50.
375. OR. CONST. of 1857 art. I § 10, supra note 374, at 2999.
376. TEX. CONST. of 1836, supra note 21, at 3542; TEX. CONST. of 1845 art. I § 11, supra note 321,
at 3548; FLA. CONST. of 1838 art. I § 9, supra note 374, at 665; R.I. CONST. of 1842 art. I § 5, supra note
374, at 3223; WIS. CONST. of 1848 art. I § 9, supra note 374, at 4078; KAN. CONST. of 1855 art. I § 16,
supra note 374, at 1181; MINN CONST. of 1857 art. I § 8, supra note 374, at 1992; OR. CONST. of 1857
art. I § 10, supra note 374, at 2999.
377. DEL. CONST. of 1831 art. 1 § 9, supra note 74, at 583; MISS. CONST. of 1832 art. I § 14, supra
note 315, at 2050; PENN. CONST. of 1838 art. IX § 11, reprinted in 5 FSC, supra note 198, at 3104, 3114;
MD. CONST. of 1851 art. XVII, reprinted in 3 FSC, supra note 199, at 1712, 1714.
378. WIS. CONST. of 1848 art. VII § 20, supra note 374, at 4086, 4089; MICH. CONST. of 1850 art.
VI § 24, supra note 319, at 1909, 1955. The only other state constitution to contain anything close to the
language in the Wisconsin and Michigan constitutions was the new constitution for Mississippi in 1832—
replacing the constitution of 1817—which clarified, for the first time, that “no person shall be debarred
from prosecuting or defending any civil cause.” MISS. CONST. of 1832 art. I § 29, supra note 315, at 2051.
Unlike the later constitutions of Wisconsin and Michigan, it was unclear in Mississippi whether or not this
right also extended to criminal cases.
379. TEX. CONST. of 1836 art. IV § 13, supra note 21, at 3536.
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instructed that “in all cases where the attorney for any district fails or refuses to
attend and prosecute according to law, the court shall have power to appoint an
attorney pro tempore.”380 Though not a private prosecution, it limited the discretionary powers of the district attorney, and the action could, in fact, be brought
about by a complaint from the crime victim.381
In antebellum New England, private citizens had the right to sue, in criminal
court, public officials who either violated the law or neglected their public duties.
The tribunal was known as the Court of Sessions. Tocqueville commented extensively on this practice after traveling through the region. “The Americans of New
England are unacquainted with the office of public prosecutor in the Court of Sessions,” Tocqueville reported; rather, he said, a “private individual” could prosecute any officer of the state for “administrative offenses.”382 “I say the Court of
Sessions,” he clarified, “because in common courts there is a magistrate who exercises some of the functions of a public prosecutor.”383
Private prosecution was especially prominent in working-class areas of Philadelphia. Thanks to much diligent and meticulous research by Steinberg, we possess a remarkably detailed portrait of private prosecution in antebellum Philadelphia.384 Steinberg discovered that during the first three-quarters of the nineteenth
century, the police and district attorney had virtually no role in ordinary criminal
procedure. “Private prosecution was the anchor of Philadelphia’s nineteenth-century system of criminal justice,” he found, “deeply rooted in both the city’s legal
and popular culture . . . a major form of dispute resolution among the lower classes”: a system that was highly “popular, particularistic, and extremely locally
based.”385
Working-class Philadelphians initiated criminal proceedings by bringing
their complaints to the neighborhood alderman.386 The vast majority of aldermen
were craftsmen, skilled workers, and ordinary shopkeepers, thus making it easy
for them to relate to the masses; after 1838, the alderman was an elected official.387 By midcentury there were over fifty aldermen in all of Philadelphia, each
presiding over a neighborhood office.388 On a daily basis the alderman heard a
litany of criminal complaints, the vast majority of which were assault and battery
cases, but also accusations of grand and petty larceny and even murder. 389 The
average alderman, in the 1830s, heard over 2,000 criminal cases per annum (the

380. TENN. CONST. of 1834 art. VI § 5, supra note 320, at 3445.
381. Id.
382. TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 259, at 59-60, 59 n.*.
383. Id. at 59 n.*.
384. See generally Steinberg, Spirit of Litigation, supra note 174 (examining private prosecution and
criminal justice in nineteenth-century Philadelphia); STEINBERG, supra note 3 (examining the transformation of criminal justice in nineteenth-century Philadelphia).
385. Steinberg, Spirit of Litigation, supra note 174, at 241-43; STEINBERG, supra note 3, at 2.
386. Steinberg, Spirit of Litigation, supra note 174, at 235.
387. Id.
388. STEINBERG, supra note 3, at 17.
389. Steinberg, Spirit of Litigation, supra note 174, at 236.
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population of Philadelphia was roughly 250,000).390 The accuser and accused
argued their case before the alderman—often before a crowd of spectators—and
if the alderman believed the complaint to be justified, the constable immediately
served either a summons or an arrest warrant.391 Often the accuser simply agreed,
while in the office of the aldermen, to discontinue the prosecution before it proceeded any further if he or she believed that the accused had already been troubled
enough.392 Public attorneys still existed in Philadelphia, but their duties never
included the conducting of all criminal prosecutions; their duty, rather, was to not
“refuse or neglect to institute any suit on behalf of the commonwealth . . . .”393
When the victim of a legitimate case elected not to pursue a prosecution any further—exercising private discretion—the public attorney, in the overwhelming majority of cases, did not intervene with a public prosecution of his own.394
These private prosecutions in Philadelphia resulted in neither a stream of convictions nor even indictments. Steinberg discovered that between 1819 and 1874,
an astounding fifty-three percent of assault-and-battery cases were altogether ignored by the grand jury, and another fourteen percent did not reach a verdict.395
Eighteen percent resulted in acquittals, and only fifteen percent of the overall cases
initially brought before the alderman resulted in a conviction.396 One alderman,
William Milnor, committed to prison only thirty percent of the defendants that he
examined between 1823 and 1829.397 Among the assault and battery cases—the
majority of criminal cases—seventy percent were resolved by the two parties in
the alderman’s office, and only ten percent resulted in prison commitments.398 In
like manner, alderman Amos Gregg, between 1854 and 1878, settled fifty percent
of the assault and battery cases directly in his office and committed fewer than
eighteen percent to prison.399
The lack of convictions caused some people in Philadelphia to complain
about their city’s peculiar mode of prosecution and its propensity to encourage
petty prosecutions. Some of the complaints made obvious their disdain for the
poorer classes; nevertheless, there might have been a degree of truth about it. In
1836, for instance, one prominent newspaper editor wrote that
[a]mong the evils which our fellow citizens suffer, particularly
among the poorer classes, is the spirit of litigation. . . . Having no
property about which to quarrel, too many of the parties who come
into this court for redress, particularly in cases of assault and battery, do so rather to cherish a spirit of revenge than from any other

390.
391.
392.
393.
394.
395.
396.
397.
398.
399.

STEINBERG, supra note 3, at 26.
Steinberg, Spirit of Litigation, supra note 174, at 236.
STEINBERG, supra note 3, at 56.
Id. at 80.
Steinberg, Spirit of Litigation, supra note 174, at 239-40.
Id. at 239.
Id.
Id. at 240.
Id.
Id.
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cause. These cases might generally have been prevented by prudence and a little forbearance.400
A grand jury in 1847 scorned “the great number of cases for trivial offences that
have come before them, principally for assault and battery.” “A large number of
these cases appear to be instituted from motives of mere pique and a litigious disposition,” they said, “and chiefly by [p]ersons in the lower class of society.” 401
Moreover, because aldermen charged a fee for their services, critics of the
system often accused the aldermen themselves of unduly encouraging petty prosecutions.402 The private prosecutorial system in Philadelphia also had many supporters, and not simply from the working classes and aldermen.403 Some of the
judges argued that it encouraged an active and vigilant citizenry.404 Because the
laboring poor enjoyed ready access to the aldermen, supporters of the private system argued that it discouraged the poor from taking the law into their own
hands.405 Otherwise, one judge warned, “revenge, in the absence of law, would
assume its place, and murder would be sanctified by the inefficiency of justice.”406
Another supporter of the private system argued that it “promotes the public peace,”
for, otherwise, the victim might “take the law into his own hands.”407 “Many of
the cases that are considered trivial have really the most merit and ought to have
the most countenance in Court,” the advocate said.408 “They are brought by those
who confide solely in the laws, and if they are taught to distrust them, they will
naturally endeavor to vindicate their own rights and personal security.”409 Finally,
another supporter of the system, in 1853, praised it as “the greatest luxury of all”
for Philadelphia’s poor.410 Steinberg views the Philadelphian system of “citizenprosecutors” quite favorably.411 It was a mode of criminal justice, he argues, that
was “easily accessible and close to the everyday affairs of ordinary citizens”; “a
popular participatory form of government”; “a democratic form of law enforcement and criminal justice, involving in great numbers citizens of all social and
economic groups . . . [and] a practical aspect of the democratic spirit that captured
Americans of all classes in the early nineteenth century.”412

400. Editorial, PUB. LEDGER & DAILY TRANSCRIPT (Philadelphia), June 27, 1836.
401. Presentment of the Grand Jury, PUB. LEDGER (Philadelphia), Nov. 26, 1847.
402. Steinberg, Spirit of Litigation, supra note 174, at 231-34, 242-43; STEINBERG, supra note 3, at
93, 99-100.
403. See STEINBERG, supra note 3, at 1-2 (discussing the centralization of private prosecution in
everyday life in Philadelphia).
404. Steinberg, Spirit of Litigation, supra note 174, at 241.
405. STEINBERG, supra note 3, at 1-2.
406. Assaults and Batteries, PUB. LEDGER & DAILY TRANSCRIPT (Philadelphia), Dec. 6, 1839.
407. Court of Criminal Sessions, PUB. LEDGER & DAILY TRANSCRIPT (Philadelphia), Oct. 11, 1847.
408. Id.
409. Id.
410. STEINBERG, supra note 3, at 1.
411. See generally STEINBERG, supra note 3, at 3, 25, 231 (discussing the power the citizens had
during that time period); Steinberg, Spirit of Litigation, supra note 174, at 233-34, 244 (discussing the
relationship of the lower classes with the minor judiciary and their ability to participate in government).
412. Steinberg, Spirit of Litigation, supra note 174, at 244; STEINBERG, supra note 3, at 3, 231.
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The Philadelphia system benefited disadvantaged groups other than simply
the poor: Steinberg found that “blacks and women were frequent participants in
private prosecution”; the system allowed them to “mobilize the criminal law on
their own behalf.”413 If a public attorney had monopolized criminal prosecution
in antebellum Philadelphia, women and African Americans with legitimate complaints might not have been heard, much less receive justice. Private prosecution,
Steinberg argues, was “a practical aspect of the democratic spirit that captured
Americans of all classes in the early nineteenth century,” allowing disenfranchised
groups “a stake in the legal and political system.”414 Here in Philadelphia, then,
private prosecution seemed very much in line with the spirit of Jacksonian Democracy, contrary to the assertions of some legal historians.415 The Pennsylvania
constitution, after all, designed it that way; the newly revised state constitution of
1838 reaffirmed the 1790 guarantee of the victim’s right to justice in court.416
Nevertheless, in city landscapes across the United States, calls to deeply reform the prosecutorial system, correctional system, and public law enforcement
reached a crescendo in the 1840s and 1850s.417 Urbanization had produced a noticeable increase in violent crime in American cities. Fewer than one-tenth of
Americans lived in urban areas in 1820, but the number increased to roughly onefourth by 1860, a result, primarily, of Irish immigration.418 Imprisonment, by this
time, had already supplanted corporal punishment; next on the agenda was a professional police force. Urbanization was also accompanied by a loss of traditional
notions of shared responsibility among the community to apprehend suspected
criminals on the “hue and cry” of a victim, and bounties and other financial rewards for the private apprehension of suspected criminals was proving insufficient.419 Americans, historically, were greatly uncomfortable with the threat to
liberty posed by a standing army; nevertheless, they were more persuaded than
ever of the necessity in cities of a full-time, paid, and well-trained public unit for
law enforcement.420 Americans compromised by creating a professional force
subject to civilian control via the ballot box, comprising police that were themselves ordinary citizens.421 New York City introduced its first truly professional
police force in 1844, and Boston, too, around this time, established professional
policing.422 Ten years later, in 1854, Philadelphia established its first professional
police force.423 Aldermen, nevertheless, retained control of the criminal justice

413. Steinberg, Spirit of Litigation, supra note 174, at 241; STEINBERG, supra note 3, at 25.
414. STEINBERG, supra note 3, at 231.
415. See Fairfax, supra note 3, at 433 (claiming that public prosecution carried “tremendous symbolic
importance in the modern American constitutional democracy.”).
416. PA. CONST. of 1838 art. IX § 11, reprinted in 5 FSC, supra note 198, at 3104, 3114.
417. STEINBERG, supra note 3, at 4; McDonald, supra note 1, at 654; McDonald, Role of Victim,
supra note 3, at 298.
418. Young America, supra note 299, at 457; LANE, supra note 255, at vii.
419. McDonald, supra note 1, at 653, 665-67.
420. LANE, supra note 255, at vii.
421. Id.; McDonald, supra note 1, at 665-67.
422. BENSON, supra note 3, at 224; LANE, supra note 255, at 105.
423. STEINBERG, supra note 3, at 25.
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system after 1854; as Steinberg discovered, “private prosecution remained popular
among a broad spectrum of ordinary Philadelphians.”424 The greatest difference
in Philadelphia, after 1854, was the number of victimless cases: to the alderman’s
office, the public police brought over a large number of people for the crimes of
public drunkenness, disorderly conduct, and vagrancy.425
England, around this time, likewise adopted its first professional police force,
though the many hundred private associations for prosecution and law enforcement still remained intact.426 A professional police force was first introduced in
London in 1829, then, in the 1840s and 1850s, across the rest of the country.427 It
was at this point in time that the British police gradually, though not exclusively,
took over the role of prosecutor, doing so, in theory, as “private” individuals.428
For more serious cases, the British police, following arrest, notified a private attorney to assume the prosecution.429
In the United States, outside of American cities, a professional police force
remained virtually non-existent. This placed the bulk of control in the victim’s
hands, the private community, and voluntaryist organizations. Vigilantism became a fact of life not only on the Western frontier, but also in rural communities
in all parts of the country, especially those without an easily accessible court system.430 Over 300 known criminal-justice organizations existed in nineteenth-century America, and as many as 500 may have proliferated, with subscription rolls
ranging from a mere dozen members to several thousand members—including
farmers, teachers, craftsmen, and ordinary, private attorneys—each association
adopting its own constitution and by-laws.431
Farmers in Worcester, Massachusetts, in 1843, established the Worcester Association for the Protection of Fruit, as the community had recently suffered a
problem of thievery among people’s gardens and orchards, apprehending and delivering suspected offenders to the public judiciary.432 Historian Professor AnnMarie Szymanski recently discovered that at least seventy-two protective societies
existed in nineteenth-century New England, serving over 100 towns, mostly in

424. Id. at 2, 150-67. See also Steinberg, Spirit of Litigation, supra note 174, at 231 (describing the
major economical, political, and social change to Philadelphia).
425. STEINBERG, supra note 3, at 29-30.
426. Landes & Posner, supra note 287, at 2.
427. Koyama, supra note 194, at 96, 121.
428. Landes & Posner, supra note 287, at 2.
429. JACOBY, supra note 3, at 9.
430. Little & Sheffield, supra note 195, at 796-97.
431. Id. at 803-04; Terry L. Anderson & P.J. Hill, An American Experiment in Anarcho-Capitalism:
The Not So Wild, Wild West, 3 J. LIBERTARIAN STUD. 9, 15-16 (1979). See also BENSON, supra note 3,
at 106-11 (distinguishing two occurrences of vigilantism by local groups, with an impaneled jury trying
an accused robber and preventing execution when jury voted nine guilty and three to acquit and an arsonist
who was caught in the act and hung immediately per the verdict); POUND, supra note 3, at 118 (stating
“Some of the characteristic features of our [The United States’] procedure grew out of the offhand application of common sense by la magistrates in colonial times to the scanty stock of English law and English
procedure which had come to notice. The ‘freedom and inclination to novelty’ which characterize our
formative era may be seen full blown in the colonies.”).
432. Szymanski, supra note 296, at 407.
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rural areas, providing extra-legal protection for its subscribers and the public benefit of general deterrence for non-subscribers.433
Moreover, as Americans streamed west—often before the establishment of
any formal government—extra-legal associations quite naturally proliferated, especially in the Midwest. Pioneers frequently squatted on the land before it was
even surveyed or put up for sale by the federal government, rendering their claims
to the land dubious at best, and making it extremely difficult to defend their property rights in the few dispersed courts in the western territory.434 Frontier settlers
in territories like Iowa established land clubs and other claims associations to enforce property rights.435 Squatters’ Associations and Cattlemen’s Associations
also proliferated, privately and peaceably resolving various conflicts without any
intervention from the federal or territorial government.436
Unlike in England, the lack of formal legal structures on the American frontier required that many of these associations privately execute justice. Elected
officers of the association judged the various cases, with neither government nor
trained lawyers, simply the purported victim and alleged offender.437 Though
such a system of vigilantism may strike many people today as unusually chaotic,
in actuality, it fulfilled a very important need on the frontier, and, given the circumstances, was remarkably successful in maintaining peace, calm, and order,
contrary to the popular and mythical notion of the “wild west.”438
Private associations and vigilantism also accompanied the California Gold
Rush of 1849. The gold discovery excited thousands of Americans from the eastern United States to hurriedly migrate to California, which as of yet had astoundingly few structures of legal authority and governance, the United States having
only acquired it from Mexico in 1848. On the many wagon trains that made the
cross-country trip, settlers voluntarily organized their own law-enforcement
mechanisms, privately prosecuting offenders en route to California and Oregon,
and promptly executing justice.439 Once in California, the miners established their
own private mining camps: associations of members who voluntarily agreed to
abide by the rules of the camp, enforced by the association. Private prosecution
was the norm, and the use of a trained attorney was either discouraged or expressly
barred.440 Other types of extra-legal associations cropped up across California,
Oregon, and most of the West: the San Francisco Vigilance Committee of 1856
boasted a membership roll of over 6,000, and the so-called People’s Courts in
Montana privately judged and executed sentences upon the basis of English common law.441

433.
434.
435.
436.
437.
438.
439.
440.
441.

Id.
Anderson & Hill, supra note 431, at 15.
Id.; BENSON, supra note 3, at 101.
Anderson & Hill, supra note 431, at 16-17; Young America, supra note 299, at 458.
Little & Sheffield, supra note 195, at 796-97, 804-05.
Id.
BENSON, supra note 3, at 101-06.
Id.; Anderson & Hill, supra note 431, at 18-25.
Little & Sheffield, supra note 195, at 803-04.
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F. LATE NINETEENTH CENTURY
Private prosecution still proliferated alongside public prosecution in many
areas of the country on the eve of the American Civil War. But several important
changes had taken place that would set the stage for the later public monopoly of
criminal prosecution. District attorneys, as previously mentioned, were now popularly elected, making the public attorney—in the eyes of many Americans—responsive to the people, not to the government, thus easing the classical opposition
in English legal culture to public prosecution.442 Second, a professional police
force was now established in American cities.443 The public police force had a
virtual monopoly on apprehending criminals in urban landscapes, excepting the
still-exercised right of citizen’s arrest. The establishment of police heralded future
changes in the prosecution of criminals, including not only the future public monopoly on prosecution, but also the near-total displacement of the victim in criminal justice procedures. It was in the second half of the nineteenth century, then,
that public prosecution definitively displaced the hybrid system of prosecution that
had proliferated in America since colonial times.
Following the end of the Civil War, it appeared, at first, that the move toward
public prosecutions would only occur slowly and that the system might even retain
its hybrid character. Private assistance in high-profile criminal prosecutions remained common. In Albany, for instance, in 1868, the brother of a murdered New
Yorker—believed, by the killer, to have slept with his wife—privately aided the
public prosecution and effectively took charge of the whole case, and there were
several other like incidents in the early 1870s.444 The new state constitutions for
former Confederate states—Louisiana, South Carolina, and Arkansas—included,
for the first time, explicit recognitions of the right of the crime victim to have
“justice administered . . . for all injuries or wrongs which he may receive in his
person, property or character.”445 Finally, private associations for criminal justice
and vigilantism continued to proliferate in the Midwest and beyond the Rocky
Mountains.446 And yet, within a few years, there were several very important
judicial decisions that hinted, more strongly than ever, that criminal prosecution
in the United States would soon decisively lean toward the public end of the spectrum.
In 1868, the United States Supreme Court affirmed the discretionary power
of the district attorney, strictly limiting the power of judges and private individuals
to override the writ of nol. pros.447 “Public prosecutions,” they ruled, “are within
442. See supra Part D.
443. See supra Part E.
444. Ireland, supra note 3, at 47 n.7.
445. LA. CONST. of 1864 art. 110, reprinted in 3 FSC, supra note 199, at 1429, 1442; S.C. CONST.
of 1868 art. I § 15, reprinted in 6 FSC, supra note 198, at 3281-82; ARK CONST. of 1868 art. I § 10,
reprinted in 1 FSC, supra note 199, at 306, 308.
446. Young America, supra note 299, at 458.
447. Confiscation Cases, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 454, 462 (1868).
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the exclusive direction of the district attorney, and even after they are entered in
court, they are so far under his control that he may enter a nolle prosequi at any
time before the jury is empanelled for the trial of the case . . . .”448 The same year,
in 1868, the new state constitution for North Carolina clarified that the public attorney should “prosecute on behalf of the State, in all criminal actions in the superior courts . . . .”449 “[T]here shall be in this State but one form of action for the
enforcement or protection of private rights, or the redress of private wrongs, which
shall be denominated a civil action,” the constitution explained, “and every action
prosecuted by the people of the State as a party, against a person charged with a
public offence, for the punishment of the same, shall be termed a criminal action.”450 The reputation of the district attorney also became much more favorable
in the late nineteenth century, not simply among the electorate, but also among the
legal profession. American legal theorists praised public “prosecuting officers”
for the “great power in his hands,” urging that they possess the “highest qualifications of learning.”451
Though private associations in the American West still proliferated, anti-theft
societies in the northeastern United States rapidly dwindled after the Civil War,
so that by the 1880s, most New England associations had either terminated or
converted into mere social clubs.452 In towns like Worcester, Massachusetts, the
professional police force (established in 1848) expanded its powers and rendered
irrelevant such organizations as the Worcester Association for the Protection of
Fruit. New England crime rates also flattened out, and even possibly declined, in
the latter half of the nineteenth century, further extinguishing the need for private
protective societies.453
In working-class Philadelphia, private prosecution survived the introduction
of a professional police force in 1854, after which the role of the police and district
attorney in criminal procedure remained remarkably limited.454 But in the 1860s,
legal reformers in Philadelphia, for the first time, targeted the city’s strong remnant of private prosecution, believing that a public monopoly would effectively
reform the shortcomings of Philadelphia’s criminal justice system.455
Consequently, the new Pennsylvania constitution in 1873 radically altered
the way criminal procedure was handled in Philadelphia.456 Despite reaffirming
the former guarantees of basic rights for victims, the new constitution utterly abolished the office of alderman, effectively castrating the right of civic participation

448. Id. at 457; GOLDSTEIN, supra note 29, at 12-13.
449. N.C. CONST. of 1868 art. IV § 29, reprinted in 5 FSC, supra note 198, at 2800, 2812.
450. Id. § 1.
451. 2 JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 15 (2d ed.,
Boston, Little Brown & Co., 1872).
452. Szymanski, supra note 296, at 429-32; Young America, supra note 299, at 457.
453. Id.
454. STEINBERG, supra note 3, at 3, 80, 171.
455. Id. at 196-223. See Steinberg, Spirit of Litigation, supra note 174, at 239 (describing some of
the shortcomings of private prosecution in Philadelphia).
456. PENN. CONST. of 1873 art. V § 12, reprinted in 5 FSC, supra note 198, at 3135.
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in criminal procedure among Philadelphia’s urban poor and allotting a virtual monopoly to the police.457 Legal reformers, however—well-intentioned as they may
have been—quickly discovered that this dual monopoly over-policing and prosecution did not accomplish all that they had hoped. Steinberg demonstrates that the
actual consequence of the 1873 constitution was the transferal of power and discretion from local leaders and ordinary citizens to bureaucrats and “notoriously
corrupt” city bosses: a newly “centralized structure of prosecution,” sadly “controlled by the machine and dominated by the police.”458 For the same reason, in
New York City, corrupt officials like William “Boss” Tweed could now effectively buy off the police and escape criminal justice without any fear of private
prosecution from ordinary citizens.
In 1875, the Michigan Supreme Court, in Meister v. Michigan,459 issued the
most strongly-worded ruling yet against private assistance in public prosecutions,
outlawing the practice altogether in Michigan, despite its guarantee of victims’
rights in its state constitution.460 According to the justices, a Michigan law of
1838—which instructed that public attorneys prosecute all criminal cases in their
county and not accept any private fees—indicated the legislature’s intent to “secure impartiality from all persons connected with criminal trials.”461 The public
prosecutor’s role, they argued, “is one involving a duty of impartiality not altogether unlike that of the judge itself.”462 Thereafter, in Michigan, the use of private attorneys to assist a public prosecutor was illegal, making it the first state to
outlaw the practice.463
In 1888, the Wisconsin Supreme Court likewise ruled in Biemel v. Wisconsin464 that the public prosecutor could not be assisted by private attorneys hired
out by the victim.465 The state legislature had recently enacted a law permitting
judges to appoint—at public expense—private attorneys to assist the public prosecutor in an exceptionally difficult case.466 The state supreme court, then, interpreted the statute as barring the private funding of attorneys by the victim.467 In
doing so, they deployed the same rationale that the Michigan court cited in Meister, comparing the position of the prosecutor to that of the impartial judge.468 A
public prosecutor, they alleged, seeks truth and not simply a conviction, something
that a private attorney could never adhere to because he was financially beholden
to the victim, who out of “passion, prejudice, or even an honest belief in the guilt
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Id. art. I § 11; id. art. V § 12.
STEINBERG, supra note 3, at 224, 229.
31 Mich. 99 (1875).
Id. at 102-04, 107.
Id.
Id. at 104.
Id. at 107; Ireland, supra note 3, at 50.
37 N.W. 244 (Wis. 1888).
Id. at 245.
Id. at 246.
Id.
Id. at 248; Ireland, supra note 3, at 50.
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of the accused, are desirous of procuring his conviction.”469 “Public policy,” they
concluded, “and the fair, just, and impartial administration of the criminal law of
this state, make it the duty of the courts to exclude the paid attorneys of private
persons from appearing as prosecutors.”470
Neither was private participation in federal court any longer permitted. In
1883, in United States v. Kilpatrick,471 the federal judge ruled that private citizens
could not directly approach the federal grand jury, who henceforth could only hear
from a federal district attorney, thus allowing the latter virtually unreviewable discretionary power.472 And yet private participation in a criminal prosecution was
not altogether rejected in the late nineteenth century. In Kentucky, for instance,
in 1883, friends and family of the murdered Walter Davis hired five attorneys to
assist the prosecution of Congressman Philip Thompson, Jr., accused of murdering
Davis for sleeping, allegedly, with Mrs. Thompson.473 In 1877, the Massachusetts
Supreme Court, in Massachusetts v. Scott,474 approved, with limitations, the legality of private assistance in public prosecution.475 In this particular case, a Massachusetts bank, allegedly burglarized by the defendants, requested that a private
attorney assist in the public prosecution.476 The defense adamantly objected, but
after the private attorney assured the court that he expected no financial contribution from the bank, the judge allowed him to assist the prosecution.477 Two years
earlier, in 1875, a court in New Hampshire limited the power of the district attorney to issue a writ of nol. pros., allowing the judge—following the victims’ complaint—to override the nol. pros. in the “extreme case” of the public attorney acting incompetently or corruptly.478
The constitutions for newly admitted states, including Nebraska (1866), West
Virginia (1872), Colorado (1876), Idaho (1889), Montana (1889), North Dakota
(1889), Wyoming (1889), and Utah (1895), also included the conventional guarantee of the rights of victims to secure “right and justice” and a “speedy remedy”
for “every injury of person, property or character.”479 Nevertheless, Biemel in

469. Biemel, 37 N.W. at 247-48; Ireland, supra note 3, 50.
470. Biemel, 37 N.W. at 245; Bessler, supra note 3, at 519-20.
471. 16 F. 765 (W.D.N.C. 1883).
472. Id. at 769; Krent, supra note 196, at 292 n.79. See also Dangel, supra note 3, at 1072 n.13
(noting the appointment of a New Hampshire attorney general in order to present criminal indictments
before the grand jury).
473. Startling Tragedy, LOUISVILLE COURIER-J., Apr. 28, 1883; A Malicious Woman, LOUISVILLE
COURIER-J., May 15, 1883; Ireland, supra note 3, at 46 n.7.
474. 123 Mass. 222 (1877).
475. Id. at 222; Ireland, supra note 3, at 48-49.
476. Scott, 123 Mass. at 223-24.
477. Id. at 224.
478. New Hampshire v. Tufts, 56 N.H. 137, 139 (1875); GOLDSTEIN, supra note 29, at 13.
479. NEB. CONST. of 1866 art. I §§ 8-11, reprinted in 4 FSC, supra note 199, at 2349-50; W.V.
CONST. of 1872 § 17, reprinted in 7 FSC, supra note 199, at 4033, 4037; COLO. CONST. of 1876 art. II §
6, reprinted in 1 FSC, supra note 199, at 474-75; IDAHO CONST. of 1889 art. I § 18, reprinted in 2 FSC,
supra note 275, at 918, 920; MONT. CONST. of 1889 art. III § 6, reprinted in 4 FSC, supra note 199, at
2300, 2302; N.D. CONST. of 1889 art. I § 22, reprinted in 5 FSC, at 2854, 2856; WYO. CONST. of 1889
art. I § 8, reprinted in 7 FSC, supra note 199, at 4117-18; UTAH CONST. of 1895 art. I § 11, reprinted in
6 FSC, supra note 198, at 3700, 3703.
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Wisconsin proved that recognition of certain basic rights for victims was not sufficient to defend private prosecution as constitutional in court, for its 1848 constitution had also recognized the rights of victims, doing so in its so-called “Declaration of Rights” in Article I.480 And yet it was also in one of these new states,
North Dakota, where the state supreme court delivered the most passionate defense of privately-funded prosecution in the late nineteenth century. 481 In North
Dakota v. Kent,482 the North Dakota Supreme Court upheld the right of victims to
hire private attorneys to assist the public prosecution.483 The court argued that
public prosecutors, in actuality, are neither impartial nor do they possess even the
ability to be impartial; rather, the court said, they are “necessarily a partisan in the
case.”484 Indeed, the zeal of the prosecutor—whether public or private—was rather to be “commended . . . not condemned.”485 “The best mode of reaching the
truth,” they argued, “is by the strenuous contentions of opposing counsel, each
animated by the conviction that the cause he has espoused is just.”486
Indeed, by the end of the nineteenth century, the highest tribunals for Alabama (1831), Florida (1896), Iowa (1878), Kansas (1880), Kentucky (1864),
Maine (1867), Minnesota (1898), Mississippi (1835), Nebraska (1883), New Jersey (1892), North Dakota (1895), Texas (1885), Utah (1886), Vermont (1889),
and Virginia (1849) all expressly upheld the legality of private assistance in public
prosecutions.487 In so doing, a few of them noted the gross unfairness of a young,
inexperienced public prosecutor facing off against a well-paid, private attorney for
the defendant.488
The era of a fully-private prosecution was clearly over, though, in reality, the
assistance of private attorneys in a public prosecution amounted to a de facto private prosecution, as the victim’s attorney almost invariably conducted a great bulk
of the prosecution, if not the entire case. It is certainly a stretch to claim, as
McDonald has done, that “by the end of the [nineteenth] century, the victim ceased
to be a concern for the correctional authorities and the criminal justice system.”489

480. WIS. CONST. of 1848 art. I § 9, supra note 374, at 4078. See generally Biemel v. Wisconsin, 37
N.W. 244 (Wis. 1888) (“[A]n attorney employed and paid by private parties should not be permitted either
by the courts or by the prosecuting attorney to assist in the trial of such criminal cases.”).
481. See generally North Dakota v. Kent, 62 N.W. 631 (N.D. 1895) (“It is not error for a trial judge
to permit an attorney . . . who is employed solely by the relatives of the person for whose murder the
accused is being tried, to assist the prosecuting attorney on the trial[.]”).
482. Id.
483. Id. at 633-34.
484. Id. at 634.
485. Id.
486. Id.; Ireland, supra note 3, at 50-51.
487. Ireland, supra note 3, at 49 (citing Shelton v. Alabama, 1 Stew. & P. 208 (Ala. 1831); Thalheim
v. Florida, 20 So. 938 (Fla. 1896); Iowa v. Fitzgerald, 49 Iowa 260 (1878); Kansas v. Wilson, 24 Kan. 189
(1880); Price v. Caperton, 62 Ky. (1 Duv.) 207 (Ct. App. 1864); Maine v. Bartlett, 55 Me. 200 (1867);
Minnesota v. Rue, 75 N.W. 235 (Minn. 1898); Byrd v. Mississippi, 2 Miss. 247 (1835); Polin v. Nebraska,
16 N.W. 898 (Neb. 1883); Gardiner v. New Jersey, 26 A. 30 (N.J. 1892); Kent, 62 N.W. 631; Burkhard v.
Texas, 18 Tex. Ct. App. 599 (1885); Utah v. Tidwell, 12 P. 61 (Utah 1886); Vermont v. Ward, 17 A. 483
(Vt. 1889); Hopper v. Virginia, 47 Va. (6 Gratt.) 684 (1849)).
488. Id.
489. McDonald, supra note 1, at 659.
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True, that a major shift had taken place in the latter half of the nineteenth century.
Again, fully-private prosecution—as the poor and middle classes once enjoyed in
Philadelphia—was now out of the question; private assistance in a public prosecution was a luxury of the upper-middle classes and wealthy; professional police
forces now roamed the streets of American cities (though private protective societies were still existent in the West and Midwest), and the office of the public
prosecutor had now expanded to levels unimaginable in the early part of the century.
Even in Britain, the mode of prosecuting crime dramatically altered in the
late nineteenth century, though the English retained a nominally private mode of
prosecution.490 In the first half of the century, reformers like Jeremy Bentham
and Sir Robert Peel argued strenuously against private prosecution, but the opposition to public prosecution in England was too historic and longstanding. 491 A
public prosecutor’s office, opponents argued, could at worst devolve into an oppressive instrument in the hands of the State and, at best, would be a tool for political patronage; moreover, it was the natural right of every Englishmen, including
the victim, to freely present his case before the judge under an adversarial system
of justice.492 Nevertheless, the rapid expansion of the professional police force in
England had already begun to make major dents in the system, especially in urban
areas, crowding out many of the private associations that once proliferated, rendering them largely irrelevant by the 1870s as the police themselves began prosecuting cases as “private” individuals interested in the maintenance of law and order.493
In 1879, the U.K. Parliament authorized the Prosecution of Offenses Act, establishing the Office of Director of Public Prosecutions, responsible to the attorney
general.494 The new Director of Public Prosecutions had the authority and duty,
when requested, to formally advise the police on criminal proceedings and to personally institute and prosecute cases of special importance to the public, such as
counterfeiting, treason, seditious libel, and capital offenses (though confusion remained as to the precise extent of even these powers).495 The creation of the office
was the culmination of a gradual, half-century expansion in the government’s role
in criminal prosecution in Britain, and though the Director of Public Prosecutions
was the first figure in Britain to even vaguely resemble the American public prosecutor, his duties, nevertheless, were comparatively ambiguous and heavily circumscribed.
The British Director of Public Prosecutions, indeed, had only slightly more
power than an ordinary private citizen to prosecute criminal cases, and the English,

490. Cardenas, supra note 3, at 362-63; JACOBY, supra note 3, at 8-9.
491. Cardenas, supra note 3, at 362-63; JACOBY, supra note 3, at 8-9.
492. Cardenas, supra note 3, at 362.
493. Koyama, supra note 194, at 120-21.
494. Van Alstyne, supra note 71, at 125; Cardenas, supra note 3, at 361; Sidman, supra note 3, at
761.
495. Van Alstyne, supra note 71, at 125-27; Cardenas, supra note 3, at 361-62; Sidman, supra note
3, at 760-61.
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by and large, preferred to keep it that way. In 1883, Sir James Fitzjames Stephen,
legal theorist and historian, happily remarked that “[e]very private person has exactly the same right to institute any criminal prosecution as the Attorney-General
or any one [sic] else.”496 Of private prosecution, Stephen proudly argued that “no
stronger or more effectual guarantee can be provided for the due observance of
the law of the land . . . .”497
Notwithstanding, the British system had undergone almost as radical of a
change over the course of the nineteenth century as the American system had. In
1908, Parliament went further and passed a new statute enumerating a large number of criminal offenses that could not be privately prosecuted without prior approval from the Director of Public Prosecutions, with the Director now enjoying
the power to dismiss any criminal proceeding or to take over a private prosecution
at any time.498 Though the Director of Public Prosecutions conducted only a very
small percentage of overall prosecutions in England, the police, by 1900, were
prosecuting an estimated ninety-seven percent of all crimes.499 Nevertheless,
English victims—if they had the means—could still elect to fully prosecute the
case themselves, with the aid of a private attorney, a right that was almost totally
lost in the American system by the turn of the twentieth century.500
G. TWENTIETH CENTURY TO TODAY
By the end of the nineteenth century, the highest tribunals in fifteen different
states recognized the right for victims to privately hire attorneys to assist a public
prosecution, amounting to a de facto private prosecution.501 Fully-private prosecutions, however, had almost entirely disappeared, save for a few rural areas out
west where private protective societies still operated. After New Mexico and Arizona joined the Union as states in 1912, each of the forty-eight states had public
prosecuting attorneys—thirty-eight had the office of public prosecutor built into
their constitution—and district attorneys were democratically elected in all but
five states (Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, New Jersey, and Rhode Island).502
The most noticeable change in the twentieth-century courtroom, however, was yet
to come: the near-total displacement of the victim in criminal proceedings. The
victim, remarkably, devolved into a scorned, disdained figure in the eyes of many
a public prosecutor, a stark turn of events from the historic role of the American
victim in the prosecution of crime.

496. 1 SIR JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 495 (London, Macmillan & Co., 1883).
497. Id. at 496.
498. Cardenas, supra note 3, at 365.
499. BENSON, supra note 3, at 223.
500. JACOBY, supra note 3, at 8.
501. See supra notes 487-488 (providing the cases for the fifteen states that recognized a victim’s
right to hire a private attorney).
502. JACOBY, supra note 3, at 26.
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The trend toward fully-public prosecutions accelerated so quickly in the early
twentieth century that even de facto private prosecutions became obsolete. In
1911, the Nebraska Supreme Court, in McKay v. Nebraska,503 prohibited the use
of private attorneys in public prosecutions, reversing its earlier ruling from 1883
that once affirmed its constitutionality.504 Private attorneys, they argued, “represent the wishes, prejudice, and animosities of a client to secure a conviction at all
hazards.”505 Two years later, in Flege v. Nebraska,506 the Nebraska Supreme
Court barred any full-fledged private prosecution.507 In 1921, the Connecticut
Supreme Court, in Malley v. Lane,508 likewise emphasized that “‘[t]he peace’ is
that state and sense of safety which is necessary to the comfort and happiness of
every citizen, and which government is instituted to secure”509 showing the belief
in Connecticut that
[i]n all criminal cases in Connecticut, the state is the prosecutor.
The offenses are against the state. The victim of the offense is not
a party to the prosecution, nor does he occupy any relation to it
other than that of a witness . . . . He cannot in any way control the
prosecution.510
Seven years later, in 1928, the Wisconsin Supreme Court also formally rejected
the constitutionality of fully-private prosecutions, calling it contrary to “state policy.”511 A ruling by the Massachusetts Supreme Court in 1925 allowed a private
attorney to counsel and consult with the public prosecutor, but such a ruling contravened the undeniable trend in criminal justice to secure a total and exclusive
monopoly for the public attorney.512
By the early twentieth century, the victim was almost entirely cut off from
criminal proceedings. American legal culture had now fully accepted the notion—
originating first in the Enlightenment—that crime was an offense against society,
not the victim, and that only the State could properly represent society in a prosecutorial role; the victim could only seek redress or vindication in civil court.513
Indeed, now, the only role for the victim was in making the initial complaint.514
No longer could a private citizen initiate criminal proceedings without the ap-

503. 132 N.W. 741 (Neb. 1911).
504. Id. at 745-46.
505. Id. at 745.
506. 142 N.W. 276 (Neb. 1913).
507. Id. at 282.
508. 115 A. 674 (Conn. 921).
509. Id. at 676.
510. JACOBY, supra note 3, at 11 (quoting Walter M. Pickett, The Office of Prosecutor in Connecticut, 17 J. AM. INST. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 347, 356-57 (1926)).
511. Wisconsin v. Peterson, 218 N.W. 367, 369 (Wis. 1928); JACOBY, supra note 3, at 10-11.
512. Massachusetts v. Herman, 149 N.E. 198, 198 (Mass. 1925).
513. McDonald, Role of Victim, supra note 3, at 295-96; Donald J. Hall, The Role of the Victim in the
Prosecution and Disposition of a Criminal Case, 28 VAND. L. REV. 931, 932 (1975).
514. Hall, supra note 513, at 946. See Sebba, supra note 24, at 218-19 (noting the initiation of the
penal process is dependent upon a victim’s complaint).
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proval and concurrence of the public attorney, not even for a simple misdemeanor.515 In states that allowed private attorneys to assist in public prosecution—a rare case by this date—the victim still required approval from the district
attorney.516 The victim might happen to assist the public prosecutor in investigating the crime, but beyond this possibility, the case was completely out of the victim’s hands beyond the initial complaint.517
District attorneys now enjoyed an awesome degree of discretion and power,
at levels altogether unimaginable just a few decades earlier, and without any parallel in either England or Europe.518 Without any say from the victim, or anyone
else for that matter, the district attorney singlehandedly determined whether or not
to enforce the law in a particular case.519 He was now the most central figure in
the entire American system of criminal justice.520 He could charge the offender
to the fullest extent of the law, or, through plea bargaining, he could reduce the
charge below what the evidence would otherwise clearly establish.521 He could
outright pardon the offender through simple inaction or through the entry of a nol.
pros. (no longer a check upon private prosecutions, but rather a formal declaration
by the public attorney of an unwillingness to pursue a particular case).522 If the
district attorney refused to prosecute, the victim no longer had any standing to
appeal the refusal.523 The reversal from the earlier system of American justice
was astounding.
The near-total sovereignty of the district attorney was not without its contemporary legal critics. Judge William Gemmill, in 1914, railed against the discretionary power of the public attorney, emphasizing the potential for corruption.524
Regarding the nol. pros., he wrote, “the public can never know whether the influences, and the motives which led to these dismissals before trial, were good or
evil, and the public is justified in its suspicion that justice, being proverbially
blind, has often been sorely cheated.”525 In Gemmill’s opinion, the court ought
to be required to consent to such dismissals, following a detailed explanation from
the district attorney as to why he desired a dismissal.526 It was a gross abuse of
discretionary power, he pointed out, when twenty-one percent of those arrested on
criminal charges in Chicago in 1911 escaped trial by nol. pros.527 Dean Roscoe

515. Cardenas, supra note 3, at 375.
516. Id.
517. Hall, supra note 513, at 937.
518. Kress, supra note 3, at 99.
519. Id.; GOLDSTEIN, supra note 29, at 3.
520. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 29, at 3.
521. Id. at 3-4.
522. Comment, Private Prosecution: A Remedy for District Attorneys’ Unwarranted Inaction, 65
YALE L.J. 208, 209-10 (1955) [hereinafter Private Prosecution].
523. Cardenas, supra note 3, at 375.
524. William N. Gemmill, What Is Wrong with the Administration of Our Criminal Laws?, 4 J. AM.
INST. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 698, 701-04, 711 (1914).
525. Id. at 703.
526. Id. at 703-04.
527. Id. at 703.
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Pound, the most distinguished American legal scholar of the early twentieth century, also criticized the “unlimited power of nol. pros.”528 “Originally, this was a
public check upon private prosecutions,” he wrote, “[n]ow, it is not a check upon
a power, but a power needing check.”529
In reaction to this astonishing development, some courts and state legislatures
in the early twentieth century set out to curb the immensity of the district attorney’s power. In 1918, the Illinois Supreme Court warned of “[t]he disastrous consequences of endowing a state’s attorney with absolute and unlimited power to
enter a nolle prosequi . . . .”530 In such cases of refusing to prosecute, the justices
argued, the people ought to have a check against the public attorney by suing him
for “malfeasance in office.”531 By 1930, thirty-one states had adopted various
checks against the public attorney’s right to summarily dismiss the prosecution of
a case, often involving some sort of explanation to the judge for the nol. pros.532
But in practice, the district attorney’s use of discretionary power was rarely questioned or challenged by the court, and his motions to dismiss a case were often
rapidly and dutifully approved by the judge with little to no meaningful explanation.533
By the mid-twentieth century, then, despite circumscribed efforts at challenging this discretionary power, public attorneys retained a firm and unparalleled hold
over criminal justice in America. The victim was all but forgotten, with no standing in court. As the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in 1973, “a citizen lacks standing
to contest the policies of the prosecuting authority when he himself is neither prosecuted nor threatened with prosecution.”534 Though the supreme courts of Mississippi and North Carolina, in 1960 and 1972, reiterated the constitutionality of
private attorneys assisting a public prosecution—claiming “it represents a common law practice” —the Missouri Supreme Court, in 1976, prohibited such assistance as a violation of due process.535 Victim involvement in criminal justice

528. POUND, supra note 3, at 187.
529. Id.
530. Illinois ex rel. Hoyne v. Newcomer, 120 N.E. 244, 247 (Ill. 1918).
531. Id.; GOLDSTEIN, supra note 29, at 13.
532. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 29, at 14.
533. Id.
534. Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973). See also Cardenas, supra note 3, at 377
(“While the United States Supreme Court has not yet directly dealt with the issue of a private citizen’s
ability to initiate a prosecution, the Court’s very broad language in Linda R. S. v. Richard D. suggests that
a crime victim has no authority to do so.”).
535. Goldsby v. Mississippi, 123 So. 2d 429, 437 (Miss. 1960); North Carolina v. Best, 186 S.E.2d
1, 4 (N.C. 1972); Missouri v. Harrington, 534 S.W.2d 44, 52 (Mo. 1976). See also John A.J. Ward, Private
Prosecution: The Entrenched Anomaly, 50 N.C. L. REV. 1171, 1171-72 (1972) (“While adhering to the
philosophy of the common law rule, the North Carolina courts have modified its application. Whereas the
classic interpretation precluded any challenge to the private prosecutor, North Carolina courts have reserved the final determination for the discretion of the trial judge but have intimated that the practice is
not to be inferred with the absence of a showing of abuse.”); Ireland, supra note 3, at 56 (expressing that
“[b]randing the practice of privately funded prosecution as a violation of due process, the Missouri Supreme Court in 1976 invalidated the practice.”).

BarthFINAL(third sub. edits_J.) (Do Not Delete)

178

SOUTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

8/21/2022 3:37 PM

[Vol. 67

reached its lowest ebb in the 1950s and early 1960s. Ironically, the rights of defendants had never been more fervently championed, recognized, and protected,
led by a number of key rulings from the Warren Court.
As should have been expected, by the 1970s, the utter exclusion of the victim
in criminal justice proceedings had provoked the beginnings of a backlash. California, in 1965, became the first state to launch a victim-assistance program, followed by many other states in the latter part of the 1970s, with varying measures
for compensation and restitution for crime victims.536 Politically speaking, the
victims’ rights movement had a strong conservative bent, though some prominent
liberals participated.537 The idea for a victims’ rights amendment to the U.S. Constitution appeared first in 1982.538 The leaders of the victims’ rights movement,
however, determined, for now, to strategically focus on the less monumental task
of passing state constitutional amendments.539 Their efforts were greatly successful. California, in 1982, became the first state to pass such a constitutional amendment, and thirty-two states followed by the end of the twentieth century.540 Moreover, in 1984, Congress passed the Victims of Crime Act, establishing a Crime
Victims Fund to grant money to states to expand various services to crime victims.541 Two state judicial rulings in the late 1970s appeared to validate the constitutionality of a fully-private prosecution. In 1978, a court in New York established that the district attorney, in actuality, did not enjoy the exclusive right to
initiate or approve all criminal proceedings.542 So long as private prosecutors
“show fairness and objectivity of the same caliber as the District Attorney”—and
so long as the judge approves—they too ought to have the ability to criminally
prosecute offenders.543 The following year, in 1979, the West Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals argued that “the major criticism of private prosecutors . . . entirely dissipate[s]” upon considering the fact that “[a] private prosecutor is subject
to the same high standards of conduct in the trial of the case as is a public prosecutor.”544 A private prosecutor, in other words, must still produce sufficient evidence to convince the jury.
In 1987 the U.S. Supreme Court countered this point by arguing that private
prosecution creates much potential for conflicts of interest:

536. Cardenas, supra note 3, at 357. See also McDonald, supra note 1, at 669 n.105 (referencing
New York and California as some of the most well-known examples of state victim compensation programs).
537. Levine, supra note 216, at 340-41; Henderson, supra note 8, at 943-51.
538. Steven J. Twist, The Crime Victims’ Rights Amendment and Two Good and Perfect Things, 1999
UTAH L. REV. 369, 372.
539. King, supra note 6, at 358.
540. Id.
541. Id.; Levine, supra note 216, at 343; Michael O’Hear, Punishment, Democracy, and Victims, 19
FED. SENT’G REP. 1, 1-4 (2006).
542. New York ex rel. Luceno v. Cuozzo, 412 N.Y.S.2d 748, 751 (City Ct. 1978); Cardenas, supra
note 3, at 376.
543. Cuozzo, 412 N.Y.S.2d at 751.
544. West Virginia v. Atkins, 261 S.E.2d 55, 56, 58 (W. Va. 1979); Cardenas, supra note 3, at 381.
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[A private prosecutor] may be tempted to bring a tenuously supported prosecution if such a course promises financial or legal rewards for the private client. Conversely, a [private] prosecutor
may be tempted to abandon a meritorious prosecution if a settlement providing benefits to the private client is conditioned on a
recommendation against criminal charges.545
Other state courts agreed with this sentiment: three years earlier, in 1984, the chief
judges of Georgia’s superior courts, by uniform court rule, prohibited all private
attorneys from assisting public prosecutors, and in 1991, the Criminal Court of the
City of New York repudiated the use of private assistance, citing its alleged violation of due process for the defendant.546 Despite the Supreme Court’s decision
in 1987—and notwithstanding the newly passed prohibitions in Missouri, Georgia, and New York—many jurisdictions across the United States still permitted,
and continue to permit, victims or their families to hire private attorneys to assist
the district attorney, directing and controlling the bulk of the prosecution, though
the private attorney was and is theoretically subordinate to the public prosecutor.547 In 1989 and 1990, the Kentucky Supreme Court and the Tennessee Criminal Appeals Court, respectively, approved the constitutionality of private assistance in public prosecutions.548 In 1985, the Virginia Supreme Court approved
the practice—contingent on certain oversights to ensure against unethical conduct—so long as the trial judge consented.549
Indeed, a majority of states, in the early 1990s, still recognized the right of
private assistance in prosecutions, with varying restrictions.550 Technically
speaking, in such states, the private attorney is not permitted to advocate on behalf
of the victim; by law, he must only be an advocate for the state’s interests, not
unlike a temporary public prosecutor. Critics, of course, have forcefully argued
that the private attorney will inevitably consider the interest of his client, who
strongly desires a conviction, potentially interfering with the district attorney’s
discretion and violating the defendant’s right to a fair trial.551 But as legal scholar
545. Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 805 (1987). See also Blondel,
supra note 7, at 263 (“Young addressed the appointment of a private attorney whose client had a financial
stake in the outcome of the proceedings to prosecute a criminal contempt case.”); Bessler, supra note 3, at
511-12 (“In 1987, the United States Supreme Court held, in the exercise of its ‘supervisory authority,’ that
a district court erred in appointing counsel for an interested party to prosecute a criminal contempt action.
In Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., the Supreme Court ruled that the appointment of
counsel for an interested part created opportunities for conflicts of interest to arise and created at least an
appearance of impropriety.”).
546. GA. UNIF. SUPER. CT. RULE 42.1; New York v. Calderone, 573 N.Y.S.2d 1005, 1005-10 (Crim.
Ct. 1991). See also Ireland, supra note 3, at 56 (“In 1984, the chief judges of Georgia’s principal trial
courts, the superior courts, by uniform court rule invalidated privately funded prosecution.”).
547. Sidman, supra note 3, at 755, 765-67; Bessler, supra note 3, at 512.
548. Kentucky v. Hubbard, 777 S.W.2d 882, 883 (Ky. 1989); Tennessee v. Bennett, 798 S.W.2d 783,
786 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1990). See also Ireland, supra note 3, at 56-57 (referencing that “the Kentucky
Supreme Court and the Tennessee Criminal Appeals Court recently held that the practice of privately
funded prosecution was constitutional.”).
549. Cantrell v. Virginia, 329 S.E.2d 22, 25-27 (Va. 1985); Ireland, supra note 3, at 56-57.
550. Sidman, supra note 3, at 772; Cardenas, supra note 3, at 377-78, 381-82; Ireland, supra note 3,
at 55-56.
551. Cardenas, supra note 3, at 381-82.
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Juan Cardenas has pointed out, “the practice of allowing crime victims to hire
private attorneys to participate in state prosecutions is a vestige of the English
origins of American justice.”552 Its roots are as deep as those for the rights of the
defendant; under English common law, victims also enjoy due process and the
right to a fair trial.
In the 1990s, the victims’ rights movement—having secured many victories
on the state level—shifted its attention toward the national level. The decade began strongly: in 1990, Congress enacted the Victims’ Rights and Restitution Act—
the so-called “Victims’ Bill of Rights”—granting victims the right to be notified
of criminal proceedings, the right to confer with the prosecutor, and the right to be
informed of the conviction, sentencing, imprisonment, and release of the convicted defendant.553 After the Republican sweep in the 1994 Congressional elections, victims’ advocates pushed for a federal constitutional amendment. In April
1996, the amendment was introduced to Congress by Senators Jon Kyl, Orrin
Hatch, and Dianne Feinstein—two Republicans and one Democrat—with support,
as well, from President William J. Clinton. The proposed amendment failed to
attract the required two-thirds support.554
Seven years later, in 2003, Kyl and Feinstein adopted a different approach
and introduced a statutory bill in Congress. Despite some vigorous opposition
from the legal community, Congress and President George W. Bush authorized
the ’“CVRA” in 2004.555 The CVRA expanded the rights conferred in the 1990
Victims’ Rights and Restitution Act, including the “right to be reasonably heard
at any public proceedings,” and to be “treated with fairness and with respect for
the victim’s dignity and privacy.”556 The CVRA received some criticism, including from victims’ rights advocates, for its purported ambiguity and broadness, as
there seemed to have been little consideration for how the sweeping declaration
of rights ought to be implemented (a result, perhaps, of having developed out of a
proposed constitutional amendment). There has been no shortage of instances
since 2004 in which the CVRA reforms were flagrantly violated. Moreover, the
CVRA reaffirmed and validated the model of public prosecution that had come to
monopolize criminal justice since the late nineteenth century. The victim was not
made a party in the adversarial system—the contest remained the State versus the
defendant—causing some critics to point out that the act is essentially asking the
courts and prosecution to vindicate the interests of a non-party.557 Nevertheless,
in providing victims with standing, the crime victim in post-CVRA America has
552. Id. at 383.
553. Levine, supra note 216, at 343.
554. Cassell & Joffee, supra note 247, at 166. For supporters of the amendment, see William T.
Pizzi, Victims’ Rights: Rethinking Our “Adversary System”, 1999 UTAH L. REV. 349, 349-67; Cassell,
supra note 7, at 479-544; Twist, supra note 538, at 369-82. See generally Henderson, supra note 8, at
938-1021 (discussing the problems of “victimization”); Robert P. Mosteller, The Unnecessary Victims’
Rights Amendment, 1999 UTAH L. REV. 443 (opposing the proposed constitutional amendment); King,
supra note 6, at 357-402 (opposing the granting of “constitutional rights” expressly to victims).
555. Levine, supra note 216, at 344.
556. Blondel, supra note 7, at 237, 257-58; Levine, supra note 216, at 344-49; Steven J. Twist, Kenna
v. District Court, 19 FED. SENT’G REP.30-35 (Oct. 2006).
557. Blondel, supra note 7, at 237, 240, 259; Levine, supra note 216, at 335-36.
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a greater role in the justice system than at any time since around the late nineteenth
century. In that respect, the CVRA, despite its flaws, still falls very much in line
with the country’s historic tradition.
III. ANALYSIS
So what can we conclude from this history of American prosecution? First,
that many legal historians have greatly overemphasized the presence of public
prosecutors in colonial courts. Second, criminal justice in the early national period, to the eve of the Civil War, was a hybrid system of public and private prosecution, including nominally public, de facto private prosecutions. The same may
also be said, albeit to a lesser degree, of even the late nineteenth century. Legal
historians have vastly overstated the extent to which public prosecution replaced
private participation in the American criminal justice system prior to the twentieth
century.
Should America return to a hybrid system of criminal prosecution? The criticisms of purely public prosecutions are many. A common source of complaint is
that the public attorney abuses discretionary power when the situation does not
seem to warrant it, so that many suspected offenders are never brought to trial for
crimes in which there was plenty of evidence to convict.558 The legislature, not
the public attorney, is the body that defines what constitutes a crime, and often it
is also the legislature that determines the precise sanction. Moreover, though district attorneys, in theory, may be removed from office for abusing their discretionary power, removal rarely happens, and improper conduct, besides, is notoriously
difficult to prove, often leaving public attorneys quite unaccountable.559
Another frequent source of complaint against public prosecution is the disappearance of the victims. Indeed, surveys unveil that many crime victims experience a deep sense of alienation from the criminal justice system.560 At best,
victims are peripheral actors in a criminal prosecution; at worst, victims are severely mistreated, scorned, and of no consequence to the criminal proceeding
whatsoever, a massive departure from the historic role of victims under the adversarial system.561 Many victims never even take the witness stand, the cases disposed of without trials with no input from the very people who suffered directly
at the hands of the criminals.562 Victims receive no explanation if the case is
dropped or plea bargained; neither do the victims have any right, upon conviction
of the offender, to represent to the judge what they believe might be an appropriate

558. Private Prosecution, supra note 522, at 211-12, 215; GOLDSTEIN, supra note 29, at 4-5, 12;
POUND, supra note 3, at 151, 184, 187.
559. Private Prosecution, supra note 522, at 211-12, 215; GOLDSTEIN, supra note 29, at 4-5, 12;
Landes & Posner, supra note 287, at 38; POUND, supra note 3, at 151, 184, 187.
560. Cardenas, supra note 3, at 357.
561. See McDonald, Role of Victim, supra note 3, at 300-01 (stating that victims are seen as just a
piece of evidence and are not seen as having a stake in the matter).
562. See id. at 300 (stating that victims are often not given the opportunity to be heard).
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sentence.563 Meanwhile, the defense counsel, as McDonald points out, is very
liberally allowed “to appeal to the judge, to beg for mercy, to try to sway the
judge’s emotions . . . but the victim is not allowed to have his counsel make an
appeal.”564 Tort action, moreover—though available to some victims upon nonaction from the district attorney—is often ineffectual and by no means constitutes
an acceptable alternative to the public monopoly on prosecuting crime.565 Excepting robbers or thieves, most criminal offenders are judgment-proof.566 Vindication for the victim of most criminal acts is not usually quantifiable in any
monetary sense, and civil personal injury suits center on the recovery of monetary
damages, which in many cases provides little relief to the victim.567 “Even when
perpetrators are able to pay judgments,” Professor Erin A. O’Hara writes, “the
civil trial can be a hollow and antiseptic and therefore inappropriate forum for
serving the emotional needs of the victim.”568
Greater inclusion of the victim, then, is desperately needed. Indeed, the notion that the victim is a non-party in criminal cases is only a very recent assumption—an illogical deviation from common law and historic conceptions of justice.
When the victim, for instance, attempts to compel a prosecution after the public
attorney demurs, the courts allege that the victim lacks “standing” and refuse to
consider the appeal.569 Not only does this fly in the face of English common
law—the very basis of American jurisprudence—it also affords the victim fewer
rights than he or she receives in some of the European countries that deploy an
inquisitorial model.570 In Germany, for example, though public attorneys enjoy a
monopoly on criminal prosecution, the victim can appeal to the state appellate
court if the public attorney refuses to prosecute, and the court, if convinced, may
compel a prosecution and allow the victim to join the action as a ‘supplementary
prosecutor’ to ensure that the public attorney does an adequate job.571 For this
reason, legal analysts like Professor Abraham Goldstein have been extremely critical of the so-called “passive judiciary” in America, as the courts seem generally
uninterested in checking the power of public attorneys.572 Goldstein urges “a
more active role for the judge”—a system of “judicial review of the prosecutor”—
so that the burden be placed on the prosecutor to justify dismissals and guilty
pleas.573

563. Id. at 300-01.
564. Id.
565. O’Hara, supra note 10, at 234.
566. Landes & Posner, supra note 287, at 31; O’Hara, supra note 10, at 234.
567. See O’Hara, supra note 10, at 234 (stating that even if perpetrators are able to pay damages,
monetary damage are an inappropriate means to reach the victim’s emotional needs); see also Cardenas,
supra note 3, at 372 (stating that damages are a matter for civil courts rather than criminal courts).
568. O’Hara, supra note 10, at 234.
569. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 29, at 4.
570. Id.; O’Hara, supra note 10, at 234.
571. BENSON, supra note 3, at 287.
572. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 29, at 54-55, 75.
573. Id. at 67-68.
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Beyond the problem of victim neglect and abuse of discretionary power, public attorneys may also be inordinately concerned with their own political ambitions.574 Political ambition may determine whether they aggressively and overzealously prosecute politically popular cases, or it may encourage them to refuse
to prosecute a case that might endanger their own political popularity.575 We cannot naively pretend as though this might not be a very real factor for some prosecutors. Pound argued this point all the way back in 1930:
Undoubtedly the bane of prosecution in the United States of today
is the intimate connection of the prosecutor’s office with politics. . . . The position of public prosecutor is politically strategic
in the highest degree. . . . If the prosecutor is ambitious, he looks
upon his office as a stepping stone to Congress or to the Governorship. . . . The political value of sensation and the danger of
offending those on whose political favor he must depend for political advancement, are not unlikely to drive him to a perfunctory
routine for his ordinary work and spectacular handling of a few
sensational cases.576
Furthermore, a deficiency of funds and personnel may cause the public attorney to exercise discretionary power to excess, refusing to prosecute crimes that
might otherwise have warranted attention, if only the office of district attorney
possessed sufficient time and money.577 A general lack of talent and continuity
of personnel, moreover, not infrequently awards a considerable advantage to professional defense attorneys.578 Corruption may also be a concern, as it is for any
local officer.579 The public prosecutor may potentially be beholden to the wishes
of major campaign donors. There may be political pressure to fill quotas for a
private prison in contract with the city. Perhaps most significant is the inherent
conflict of interest that arises when a suspected criminal is a state employee, including government officials and police officers, whereby the State becomes a
judge in its own cause.580
Opponents of private prosecution, or a hybrid system, are quite vehement in
their opposition. Andrew Sidman, for instance, assails private prosecution as “outmoded, unnecessary, unethical, and perhaps unconstitutional”;581 John A.J. Ward
states that it inherently “results in intolerable prejudices.”582 Professor Donald J.
Hall tells us that it “contradicts the American notion of evenhanded justice”;583
574. Private Prosecution, supra note 522, at 210.
575. See id. (stating that political ambition often motivates district attorneys to abuse their discretionary power).
576. POUND, supra note 3, at 183-84.
577. Private Prosecution, supra note 522, at 210.
578. POUND, supra note 3, at 184.
579. Private Prosecution, supra note 522, at 210.
580. A.G. Noorani, Institutional Checks Against Police Excesses, 24 ECON. & POL. WKLY. 2406,
2406 (1989) (discussing a department’s handling of police misconduct).
581. Sidman, supra note 3, at 755.
582. Ward, supra note 535, at 1174.
583. Hall, supra note 513, at 984.
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Bessler calls it “unethical and violative of a defendant’s constitutional rights.”584
One critic in Britain, Richard Blakeley, calls private prosecution “an historical
hangover.”585 While acknowledging that some in England “view the right as a
constitutional fundamental . . . the prosecutorial function,” he writes, “is properly
the preserve of the state alone.”586
Prosecution, for one, is a very costly procedure. It involves such actions as
presenting evidence before the magistrate, assembling witnesses, collecting depositions, and organizing the case, necessitating, in turn, the hiring of a private attorney who will inevitably demand a large sum of money to carry out the procedure.
Though a successful conviction provides the public with the social good of arresting the criminal and deterring others, the victim and prosecutor—under a purely
private system—are never compensated by the public. Many crimes would likely
be settled out of court—something, ironically, that already characterizes the public
system—weakening the overall effect of deterrence. For this reason, some opponents argue that private prosecution would inevitably lead to not enough prosecutions, though other opponents of private participation believe that it would invariably lead to too many prosecutions.587
The most common argument, indeed, against private or hybrid prosecution is
the potential for overzealousness from the private attorney to secure a conviction.
The attorney, after all, was hired precisely for that purpose; he has a personal stake
in carrying out the wishes of his client. A private prosecution, therefore, violates
the due process clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, for it denies defendants the right to a fair trial.588 “The high standard of impartiality demanded
of a prosecutor,” says Ward, “realistically cannot be expected of the private advocate.”589
The public attorney—as supporters portray it—is the paragon of impartiality
and public service. Indeed, “[m]any, if not all, prosecutors take the positions out
of a sense of duty to their community,” remarks Fairfax, “public prosecution has
become synonymous with the public service ideal.”590 “He is not an advocate in
the ordinary sense of the word,” Ward insists, “but is the people’s representative,
and his primary duty is not to convict but to see that justice is done.”591 He has
“no private interest in the prosecution,” but is solely concerned “with seeing that
the criminal laws of the state are honestly and impartially administered . . . .”592
Cardenas remarks that the public prosecutor is uniquely “qualified to make impartial evaluations of evidentiary sufficiency and public necessity”; he calls it “the

584. Bessler, supra note 3, at 514.
585. Richard Blakeley, To the Fullest Extent of the Law? Jones v. Whalley and the Right to Private
Prosecution, 66 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 11, 12 (2007).
586. Id. at 11-13.
587. Koyama, supra note 194, at 99-100; O’Hara, supra note 10, at 236-38.
588. Private Prosecution, supra note 522, at 220-21; Ward, supra note 535, at 1174-78.
589. Ward, supra note 535, at 1173.
590. Fairfax, supra note 3, at 433-34.
591. Ward, supra note 535, at 1173.
592. Id.
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best means to ensure liberty of the innocent and punishment of the guilty.”593 Personal gratification, vengeance, private gain, and even malice would unduly influence a privately directed prosecution; public prosecutors, on the other hand, “are
very often more neutral and emotionally detached . . . .”594
Even a private attorney who assists a public prosecution—as many states
continue to allow—raises serious ethical issues, according to this view, for though
the private attorney, in theory, represents the interests of the State and not of the
victim, his benefactor is a private client with a personal interest in the case.595
This creates an “untenable ethical dilemma” because the private attorney is burdened by “competing loyalties,” and may be forced to “abdicate his responsibilities to the state.”596 The private attorney may also unduly intervene with the discretionary power of the public prosecutor, discouraging him from a plea bargain
or dismissal. It is precisely for these reasons that several states have altogether
prohibited any private assistance in public prosecution.
In defending the public monopoly, Fairfax deploys a Hobbesian argument.
Private prosecution, he says, “represents an inappropriate delegation of sovereign
prerogative.”597 Prosecution “is at the core of governmental power,” he argues,
and private prosecution flagrantly violates the “sovereign authority” of the king or
state.598 This argument alone is sufficient, Fairfax believes, to entirely prohibit
private participation in criminal prosecution. “Perhaps there is nothing inherently
wrong with private participation in even crucial, discretionary criminal justice
functions,” he concedes, “[h]owever, if we can delegate the core prosecution function . . . to private hands, what can we not delegate? The delegation of prosecutorial discretion to private actors presents fundamental questions about how we view
the sovereign authority . . . .”599 Strangely, however, the kingdom of England for
many centuries permitted fully private prosecutions during periods in which the
English possessed an extraordinarily high view of the regal prerogative. The
king’s attorney had the right to nullify any private prosecutorial action, it is true,
but this sovereign prerogative could very easily be adapted to fit a private prosecutorial system today.
More broadly, the victims’ rights movement has drawn considerable flak
from many prominent legal theorists. Blondel argues that the CVRA “undermines
historic protections for criminal defendants”; she urges judges and prosecutors to

593. Cardenas, supra note 3, at 371, 384.
594. O’Hara, supra note 10, at 237.
595. See Sidman, supra note 3, at 773 (“The concept of private prosecution raises significant ethical
issues because such a prosecutor is asked to fulfill two functions that may require competing loyalties. On
one hand, he is a temporary public prosecutor, serving the interests of the state. Yet, at the same time, he
is an attorney retained by private clients with personal interests.”).
596. Id. See also Fairfax, supra note 3, at 413 (claiming that “private or semiprivate actors are given
the tremendous discretion and power associated with the public prosecution of criminal offenses.”).
597. Fairfax, supra note 3, at 413.
598. Id. at 414.
599. Id. at 455-56.
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only “narrowly” interpret the CVRA, extending nothing more than simple “institutional courtesy toward crime victims.”600 There is also the question of how
courts and prosecutors can even recognize an official “victim” before the prosecutor has charged anyone with a crime. The entire notion of victims’ rights, they
argue, severely interferes with prosecutorial discretion, especially when “victims’
interests diverge from those of the public,” whom the prosecutor still fully represents, for there may indeed be cases where only partial enforcement would better
serve the public interest.601 “Victims deserve to be treated respectfully and integrated into the criminal process . . . ,” writes Danielle Levine, “however, forcing
prosecutors and judges to elevate victims over the defendant and the public may
threaten the fair and just adjudication of a criminal case.”602 Levine takes a more
moderate stance, cautiously warning about the implications of the CVRA while
simultaneously affirming that “a public prosecution system must consider all interested parties: the victim, the defendant, and society.”603 Some of the more vehement critics, however, entirely reject this view; Professor Lynne N. Henderson,
for instance, blasts the movement as having a “decidedly conservative bent,” fostering “a new mythology of victimization . . . .”604
Blondel raises perhaps the most formidable argument against the CVRA.
The CVRA, she points out, did not confer party status to the victim, but rather
reaffirmed the public prosecutorial model.605 By compelling the courts and prosecutor to satisfy or vindicate the interests of a non-party, it places them in a highly
“unusual posture,” elevating the interests of a non-party “over the interests of the
public, the community, and the defendant.”606 For this reason, she continues, the
CVRA undermines the adversarial system, which posits one party against the
other; the interests of a non-party ought not to even be considered in a truly adversarial system. “The CVRA could have made victims coparties with the government . . . ,” she points out; it also “could have abandoned the public prosecution
system and asked victims to prosecute criminal cases, or it could have made prosecutors representatives of the victim rather than the public . . . .“607 But it did
none of those things, and by consequence, it disrupts the core principles behind
the “adversary tradition, promoting essentially inquisitorial values . . . .”608
Proponents of the CVRA, and victims’ rights in general, call out the supposed
absurdity and injustice in not considering the interests of the victim. The victim,
after all, was the one “most severely harmed by the criminal act . . . ,” and it is the
600. Blondel, supra note 7, at 237, 240, 258.
601. Id. at 263. See also Levine, supra note 216, at 336, 361 (addressing issues surrounding standard
of review for CVRA cases); Robert C. Davis, Frances Kunreuther & Elizabeth Connick, Expanding the
Victim’s Role in the Criminal Court Dispositional Process: The Results of an Experiment, 75 J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 491, 492 (1984) (identifying reasons that prosecutors may not consult victims during
ongoing prosecutions).
602. Levine, supra note 216, at 361.
603. Id. at 337.
604. Henderson, supra note 8, at 951-52, 1020.
605. Blondel, supra note 7, at 240.
606. Id. at 237, 247, 253.
607. Id. at 260-61, 264-65.
608. Id. at 273.
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victim who will be “uniquely affected by the failure of society to prosecute.”609
There is nothing unreasonable, proponents of the CVRA say, with simply demanding that prosecutors and judges formally involve the victim: the so-called “forgotten man” who receives not even a fraction of the rights and protections afforded
to the accused.610 Cassell, for instance, blasts the present “legal culture” that is
currently “unsympathetic, if not overtly hostile, to the interests of crime victims.”611 Others, like Cardenas, a firm supporter of public prosecution, argue that
“there is ample precedent and policy justification to allow the crime victim some
measure of participation in the prosecutorial process as a private party so long as
proper safeguards for controlling abuses exist.”612 Victims, supporters of the
CVRA argue, have “a stake in the trial that is different from that of the general
public or even the prosecutor,” and thereby deserve the enumeration in law of
certain basic, fundamental rights.613
Some proponents of victims’ rights, like Goldstein, argue that the “risk of
added vindictiveness is overstated.”614 In cases of theft or property damage, for
instance, victims generally prefer reasonable restitution over imprisonment. Goldstein also suggests that if public prosecutors dismiss or mitigate a charge, they
ought to be compelled “to identify for the court why the public interest is different
from the victim’s.”615 Other advocates support placing restitution, once again, at
the center of criminal justice. “A restitutional system of justice . . . ,” Professor
Randy E. Barnett argues, “would benefit the victim, the criminal, and the taxpayer.”616
Competing views of punishment, indeed, lay at the heart of much of this debate: the utilitarian theory, on the one hand, and the retributive theory on the other.
The utilitarian theory views crime as a wrong against the collective public and not
necessarily against the individual. Concerning punishment, the utilitarian theory
is primarily focused on producing optimum consequences for society as a whole,
achieving the total amount of good with maximum social utility.617 The public
prosecutor, in this view, is uniquely qualified to handle the case. Because he is
not beholden to the interests of the individual victim, the public prosecutor has a
free hand to exercise discretion by pardoning the occasional offense through a
non-suit or by mitigating the charge through a plea bargain agreement. Utilitarian
theory is less concerned with justice for the past criminal offense and more concerned with future rehabilitation and deterrence. The retributive theory, on the
609. Private Prosecution, supra note 522, at 228.
610. McDonald, supra note 1, at 649-50, 662; Twist, supra note 538, at 370.
611. Cassell, supra note 7, at 535.
612. Cardenas, supra note 3, at 358.
613. Pizzi, supra note 554, at 349.
614. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 29, at 71.
615. Id. at 73.
616. Randy E. Barnett, Restitution: A New Paradigm of Criminal Justice, 87 ETHICS 279, 294 (1977).
See also Burt Galaway, Restitution as an Integrative Punishment, in ASSESSING THE CRIMINAL: RESTITUTION, RETRIBUTION, AND THE LEGAL PROCESS, supra note 3, at 331-47 (addressing issues regarding sanctioning).
617. John Hospers, Retribution: The Ethics of Punishment, in ASSESSING THE CRIMINAL: RESTITUTION, RETRIBUTION, AND THE LEGAL PROCESS, supra note 3, at 181, 95-99.
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other hand—also called the deserts theory—emphasizes justice for the past criminal offense.618 The victim, in this view, takes center stage in deciding how he or
she would like to pursue securing justice for a crime committed against their individual selves.
For those concerned about the integrity of the adversarial system, some advocates of victims’ rights, like Professor William T. Pizzi, have questioned the
wisdom of the adversarial system altogether. Instead, Pizzi calls for “multi-sided
criminal trials.”619 The adversarial view, he argues, is “artificial[] and confining,”
leaving crime victims virtually “invisible in the system.”620 Pizzi insists that all
the talk about endangering the rights of defendants is “complete hyperbole
[and] . . . a chimera, because a trial system that fails to treat victims well will often
end up treating most defendants poorly too.”621 Indeed the present system, Pizzi
argues, overwhelmingly favors wealthy defendants who can afford to hire extremely talented, sophisticated attorneys, artificially tipping the balance in favor
of the wealthy defendant, relieving him of punishment simply because of his ability to pay.622 How is that justice? How is that impartial?
Denying victim participation in criminal proceedings runs entirely counter to
the English and American historical experience through at least the middle of the
nineteenth century. As this article has demonstrated, the total disregard of the
victim is a relatively recent phenomenon, developing in full only a century or more
after the signing of the Constitution. “Unlike the criminal,” McDonald writes,
“the victim was better off before the Revolution than he is today.”623 “Those who
argue for keeping victims outside the process,” note Cassell and Joffee, “are defending a view of criminal processes that is neither historically justified nor good
public policy.”624 “Victims have been involved in the disposition of criminal
cases for much longer than they have been marginalized,” remarks O’Hara; it is
only within the “past century” that they have “gradually been sidelined.”625 “Ignored in the legal academy,” she continues, victims do not even appear at all in
the vast majority of criminal procedure textbooks, which so “dogmatically insist
that crimes are wrongs committed against the public rather than an individual.”626
“Given that virtually all law professors were trained in criminal law classes that
ignored victim involvement,” O’Hara writes, “it is perhaps not surprising that it is
considered heretical to suggest that direct participation by victims might be warranted.”627 Even “indirect participation” is “likewise viewed by many as problematic.”628
618.
619.
620.
621.
622.
623.
624.
625.
626.
627.
628.

Id. at 183-88.
Pizzi, supra note 554, at 350.
Id. at 350, 352.
Id. at 364-65.
Id.
McDonald, Role of Victim, supra note 3, at 296.
Cassell & Joffee, supra note 247, at 183.
O’Hara, supra note 10, at 229, 234.
Id. at 229, 233-34.
Id. at 229-30.
Id. at 230.
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So what exactly is the answer? After over a century of almost total disregard,
is the CVRA sufficient to restore rights and a voice to victims? Or is the CVRA
poor policy, however well-intended? Should we return to a hybrid system of public and private prosecution?
First, American legal culture ought to finally dispel the myth of impartiality
in the public prosecutor. The way that many legal theorists speak of the public
prosecutor is almost comically romanticized, with little or no bearing on reality.
Psychologists and social scientists have long recognized that it is utterly impossible for anybody to be “impartial” or “unbiased”; we are all inflicted with biases of
one sort or another.629 Impartiality is not limited to the much talked about implicit
bias toward other social groups; it also includes ideology, worldview, and a litany
of self-interested personal motivations (relating to career, connections, money, or
family) that are often not even consciously understood. To assert that the public
prosecutor is somehow immune to this is extremely naive. Even in the best-case
scenario, the public prosecutor is admittedly partial toward the supposed interests
of the public: an interest defined, of course, exclusively, by him or her—in possession of all of his or her in-built biases over what constitutes the public interest—
with little to no checks over his or her particular mode of analysis or decisionmaking. Is impartiality possible in any human being? Are all human beings inflicted with bias, except for those predestined to serve as public prosecutors?
The de facto partiality of the public prosecutor does not simply affect many
victims in a negative fashion. Defendants, as well, may experience negative outcomes. Surely, the public attorney does not wish to be embarrassed in court, outwitted by the defense attorney. District attorneys very often have political ambitions beyond their current office; they have a private stake in winning high-profile,
sensational cases. As Professor Bruce L. Benson remarks, many “prosecutors
have become, in large part, political animals who pursue their own interests.”630
The public attorney may also hold various prejudices against either victims
or defendants of a particular skin color, sexuality, religion, ideology, or gender.
In analyzing criminal justice in nineteenth-century Philadelphia, Steinberg concluded that through private prosecution, “disenfranchised” groups were finally
able “to mobilize the criminal law on their own behalf,” no longer beholden to the
state monopoly.631 Moreover, outrageous as it sounds, public attorneys are not
infrequently under pressure to meet certain quotas from private prison systems: in
many parts of the country, if a certain number of prison beds are left unfilled, states
must pay the prison company for the unused beds. Some prisons have state contracts that guarantee occupancy of more than ninety percent—quite a job for the
“impartial” public prosecutor.632
629. Irene Scopelliti, Carey K. Morewedge, Erin McCormick, H. Lauren Min, Sophie Lebrecht &
Karim S. Kassam, Bias Blind Spot: Structure, Measurement, and Consequences, 61 MGMT. SCI. 2468,
2483-84 (2015).
630. BENSON, supra note 3, at 287.
631. STEINBERG, supra note 3, at 25.
632. Chris Kirkham, Prison Quotas Push Lawmakers to Fill Beds, Derail Reform, HUFFINGTON POST
(Sept. 19, 2013, 11:54 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/09/19/private-prison-quotas_n_3953483.html.
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Theoretically, of course, partiality on the part of the prosecutor (whether public or private) ought not to be a detriment. Under the adversarial system, partiality
is an absolute necessity. The very nomenclature—adversarial system—implies
partiality on both sides of the contest. Nobody would ever claim that the defendant’s attorney is “impartial,” and so why must the prosecutor? Far from violating
due process by tipping the scales against a defendant, the prosecutor who desires
to secure a conviction actually balances the scale. The only impartial figure, theoretically, ought to be the third-party arbiter (though he too, being human, is not
truly impartial). Neither does the partiality of the prosecutor violate the presumption of innocence: the defendant, indeed, is presumed innocent by the neutral,
third-party fact finder unless the adversarial prosecutor can convince the judge or
jury otherwise.
The CVRA of 2004 was only a very moderate response to the question of
victim participation in criminal proceedings. It neither overturned the public monopoly over prosecution nor challenged the notion that prosecutors represent the
State alone and not the actual victim. Nevertheless, in giving the victim standing
in court, the CVRA constituted the most comprehensive federal legislation on behalf of victims since the start of the victims’ rights movement in the 1960s. And
yet so much more could be done.
The United States should consider reestablishing a hybrid system of criminal
prosecution. Victims should have the liberty to pursue, guide, or direct criminal
prosecutions in court, but with public safeguards in place to check unwarranted
victim discretion and unreasonable private prosecution. Moreover, because it is a
hybrid system, a public option would exist for victims who either cannot afford
private counsel or who simply prefer a public attorney over a private one.
Under this plan, the victim of a crime could prosecute the offender directly.
Such would constitute a fully-private prosecution, not simply private assistance
for public prosecution. The prosecution would represent neither the state nor an
ill-defined public, but rather the victim. The victim, or his or her friends and family, would initiate the prosecution and hire a private attorney to represent their
interests in court. The State would occupy the position of neutral arbiter. If acquitted, the defendant would be entitled to full reimbursement from the victim; if
convicted, the defendant would reimburse the costs of prosecution.
Furthermore, under this plan, a public check against private prosecutorial
abuses would also be in place. First, the district attorney’s office would have full
authority to submit a writ of nol. pros., immediately ending the private prosecution. However, to prevent misconduct in this area, an additional check against
unwarranted abuse of the nol. pros. would also exist: the district attorney, or his
staff, would have to explain to the judge why they object to the private prosecution, and if the judge disagrees, he may override the district attorney and allow the
private prosecution to proceed.
If the victim cannot afford a private attorney, then he or she may have the
right to a public attorney, just like the accused. But unlike the public prosecutor
today, this particular attorney would represent the interests of the victim, not the
state. Public counsel for the defendant does not represent the State or the public,
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and so neither will public counsel for the victim. In applying for a public attorney
to represent their interests in court, the victim, of course, must also sufficiently
demonstrate that there is probable cause that the accused committed a crime.
Still, nobody can deny, however, that the public has a stake in punishing
criminals. And so—under this plan—how would we deal with cases in which the
victims refuse to prosecute or who unseemly negotiate, out of court, unreasonable
settlements with hardened criminals, returning them to the street, where they endanger the public? In the case of unwarranted victim discretion, the district attorney may immediately step in and publicly prosecute the alleged offender. In this
particular case, the public attorney will not represent the victim—the victim was
unwilling to prosecute—but will represent the interests of the State and the public,
as he does today.
Many legal analysts, undoubtedly, would deeply recoil at this proposed solution. But a private option for prosecuting offenders is not nearly as radical as it
may seem. For one, it would finally align American criminal justice more closely
and consistently to the system of English common law that formed the original
basis for American jurisprudence. Moreover, not only do we currently allow for
private defense attorneys, but our system already relies upon the discretion of private actors: both the grand and petit juries are entirely composed of private citizens. A hybrid system of criminal prosecution existed in this country for arguably
as long, if not longer, than the public monopoly, and history demonstrates that
corruption and rank abuse is just as likely, if not more likely, under a centralized,
public monopoly than under a decentralized system of citizen prosecutors. Even
the most talented private prosecutor must convince the private jury that the accused is guilty beyond any reasonable doubt. Indeed, the private attorney would
likely face greater scrutiny than a public prosecutor as the jury, perhaps suspicious
of motive, holds him to a higher standard. If there is any suspicion that the private
attorney is acting in a malicious manner, the district attorney may issue a writ of
nol. pros., and if he does not, the defense counsel may passionately appeal to the
jury that the private attorney cannot be trusted.
Besides the nol. pros., there are other checks against unwarranted private
prosecutions. The immense damages that a private prosecutor must pay the defendant upon an acquittal would be sufficient to discourage many malicious or
frivolous prosecutions. Aside from potential damages following an acquittal, the
sheer management of a private prosecution is also very time-consuming and expensive, and the victim, again, may only be allowed a public prosecutor if they
demonstrate a strong enough reason.
The greatest check, again, is the jury. To quote the West Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals, in upholding private assistance in a public prosecution in 1979:
“a private prosecutor is subject to the same high standards of conduct in the trial
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of the case as is a public prosecutor. This rule blunts, if it does not entirely dissipate, the major criticism of private prosecutors, that they will be overzealous to
convict.”633
Private prosecution, moreover, would finally correct the imbalance of talent
that typically favors the defense attorney. When the Missouri Supreme Court, for
instance, banned private assistance in public prosecutions in 1976, the dissenting
justice, Lawrence Holman, cited the problem of young, inexperienced prosecuting
attorneys being regularly outmatched by a highly skilled defense.634
At the very least, if this solution is deemed too extreme or undesirable—and
the monopoly of the district attorney over prosecution continues forward—private
citizens ought to be allowed, as they are in Germany, to appeal the inaction or
improper action of a district attorney, compelling a full hearing in which the district attorney must explain his decision to dismiss, with the court making the final
determination. Such a system would leave criminal prosecutions primarily in the
hands of the district attorney, but would leave victims an option to challenge
abuses. And if the public monopoly persists, the CVRA is also very desirable,
despite the theoretical problems it poses for the adversarial system. The hybrid
system proposed above, in our view, is far superior, but the CVRA under a public
monopoly is far superior to a public monopoly where victims have zero standing
at all in a criminal proceeding.
IV. CONCLUSION
A hybrid system of criminal prosecution existed in America through at least
the middle of the nineteenth century. The gradual evolution toward a public monopoly occurred at different rates and stages, depending on the state. Undoubtedly, the Framers of the U.S. Constitution could not have possibly conceived of a
system in which the victim was left out of the process altogether. For one, private
prosecution remained widespread at the writing of the Constitution; secondly,
when a public official prosecuted a case, he worked closely with the victim, who
he often knew personally, with a vested interest in ensuring that the victim retained
a voice and was generally satisfied with judicial proceedings. Certainly, even in
cases of public prosecution, the victim—until around the late nineteenth century—
was not anywhere as absent as he was in the twentieth century or even in the postCVRA era.
A return to a hybrid system of criminal prosecution would properly restore
to the victim the rights and voice they once enjoyed in earlier parts of American
history, without sacrificing the adversarial system, and without sacrificing any of
the rights and protections afforded to the accused. The hybrid system is uniquely
American: it allots a voice to private citizens, allowing them to assume a venerable

633.
1979)).
634.

Cardenas, supra note 3, at 381 (quoting West Virginia v. Atkins, 261 S.E.2d 55, 58 (W. Va.
Ireland, supra note 3, at 56 (citing Missouri v. Harring, 534 S.W.2d 44, 52 (Mo. 1976)).
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degree of civic action while also enacting public safeguards and guarantees to ensure an orderly and fair system of justice. As Steinberg remarks, “perhaps the
recovery of the American tradition of private prosecution can help in fashioning a
way to revive an American commitment to law and democracy.”635 The aim of
this article was to show that a functioning hybrid system existed earlier in American history and also far later than many legal theorists have previously recognized.
This rich historical precedent provides us a working example of how to reform
and creatively innovate for the twenty-first century.

635.

STEINBERG, supra note 3, at 232.

